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Introduction
2009 was a year of  upheaval and change. It was the year we felt the variable 
impact of  the Global Financial Crisis. It was a year of  vital elections across 
the region: in India, in Indonesia, in Japan, in Malaysia and in Afghanistan. 
2009 was also a milestone year for China, being the sixtieth anniversary of  
the founding of  the People’s Republic of  China. And it was the year the 
bombing of  the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai gripped media attention as did 
a major missile test in North Korea.
Members of  the ANU College of  Asia and the Pacific interpreted these 
events in newspapers and periodicals ranging from our city’s Canberra Times 
to the Jakarta Post, The New Yorker and The Economist.
This is the fourth year that the college has published a selection of  popular 
writing produced by its members. From more than 160 articles published by 
college members in the past year,* we have selected 65, written by 57 of  the 
college’s members.
The college has more than 150 scholars who are vigorously engaged in 
high level research and teaching and who seek to communicate the results 
of  their work to people who might benefit from it—across Australia, across 
Asia and the Pacific and to the world at large. Collectively, we do this by 
maintaining blogs, doing radio and television interviews and writing for 
newspapers and magazines. This popular writing, which represents the 
*  For purposes of  Capturing, we take an elastic view of  ‘the year’: it extends from about 
November of  one calendar year to October of  the next.
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distillation of  years of  research, is represented in Capturing the Year.
We see this volume as both an engaging and useful snapshot of  major 
developments in Asia and the Pacific during 2009 and a convenient window 
offering people a fuller appreciation of  the range of  expertise within the 
college. To be sure, we are heavily engaged with ‘new media’—as the 
spectacular rise of  some of  our blog sites such as the East Asia Forum, New 
Mandala and South Asia Masala suggests. The more traditional book format 
of  Capturing the Year allows us to bring a selection of  all of  our popular 
publications together in a convenient fashion.
The 2009 menu for Capturing the Year is rich and diverse. We have pieces 
on cross-cutting themes such as climate change, democracy, human rights 
and ethics, language and resources and energy. We supplement this with 
a range of  pieces focused on developments in particular countries. This 
year’s selection covers sixteen countries, stretching from Afghanistan and 
Australia through the Pacific to the United States.
It’s a potent mix. We hope you enjoy it. We also hope that if  you don’t yet 
know the work of  our college well, you will be moved to make contact with 
us. We care as much about getting our ideas out to people who can benefit 
from them as we do about producing them in the first place.





New government, new attitude, new optimism
Will leaders have the stomach to get serious about climate change, as 
the global financial crisis turns into recession? The international climate 
negotiations have been in a holding pattern for years waiting for the end of  
the Bush presidency. Now—with the new US administration needing to fix 
the banks, keep Detroit alive and deal with soaring unemployment—might 
seem like a truly bad time to be expecting breakthroughs on climate policy. 
But it ain’t necessarily so.
President-elect Obama put climate change high up his agenda and did so 
even in his acceptance speech: ‘Two wars, a planet in peril, the worst financial 
crisis in a century.’ To tackle climate change, Obama needs to put in place 
effective domestic policies to establish America’s credibility on the issue and 
get the major developing countries into a post-Kyoto agreement. The first 
may be surprisingly easy to do; the second difficult but not impossible.
First published in Canberra Times, 20 November 2008.
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Obama’s policy platform features carbon pricing via emissions targets 
and trading, and boosting investment in clean energy. The mood in the US 
Congress has been shifting on emissions trading, and northeastern and 
western states are poised to introduce their own schemes. Recession could 
dampen the appetite for putting a price on carbon for a while, but it may 
very well result in a very large shot in the arm for revamping the energy 
sector. Public money for clean energy and improving energy efficiency kills 
two birds with one stone: it takes the economy onto a lower-emissions path 
to help with climate change and lessens the reliance on imported oil.
Now it kills three: green energy is an attractive target for government 
spending to pump the economy. With consumer and business confidence 
evaporating, government spending is fast becoming the only way to shore 
up the economy. Infrastructure is an obvious target for such Keynesian 
spending, and most economists agree that it beats sending cheques in 
the mail or paying people to paint rocks. The danger is misallocation of  
resources, with governments sometimes prone to favour wasteful causes: 
roofs covered with solar panels in cloudy Germany and grain converted 
to fuel in America tell the stories. Faced with the right price signals like 
under emissions trading, business will generally make the better investment 
decisions. In any case, the next New Deal may well have a big green streak 
to it. China’s government has announced that it is going to pour money into 
railways, and America could jump-start its energy revolution.
In parallel, Obama must take the lead in getting developing countries on 
board of  meaningful global climate policy, fast and with a dollop of  creativity. 
The timing is delicate: halting the slide into recession is paramount, but the 
crisis right now is also the opportunity for change. And the United Nations 
climate talks are geared toward the December 2009 Copenhagen conference. 
To avoid negotiations getting bogged down in the usual fashion, a political 
deal is needed beforehand between the leaders of  the major countries: at 
least the US, China, India and the European Union, and better, these four 
plus other major economies, say the G20 group.
Time is short, but the ideas are out there. The Garnaut review showed what 
a global climate deal could look like: binding greenhouse gas commitments 
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with absolute reductions for all high-income countries, commitments 
below ‘business as usual’ with a temporary opt-out clause for all but the 
poorest developing countries, convergence to equal per capita emissions 
entitlements, international emissions trading to encourage developing 
countries into the system, an immediate start everywhere with some key 
emissions-intensive sectors, and large-scale funding from rich countries for 
technology development and transfer to developing countries. Views differ 
on the detail, but an international consensus seems to be emerging around 
the core elements of  a package for Copenhagen.
Easy to do? Certainly not. But the economic crisis shows that staring into 
the abyss can concentrate governments’ minds wonderfully and may even 
bring about some much needed international cooperation. The same could 
hold for climate change. Difficult, but with leadership from a president who 
enjoys a huge measure of  goodwill around most of  the globe, the answer 




Everyone must do their bit
I have described the mitigation of  human-induced climate change as a 
diabolical policy problem. The most difficult of  its challenging dimensions is 
that there can be no effective mitigation without all countries of  substantial 
size making major contributions to the solution. And yet each country has 
an interest from a narrow national perspective in doing as little as possible so 
First published in The Age, 25 June 2009.
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long as its own free-riding does not undermine the efforts of  others.
The apparent national benefits from free-riding make climate change 
mitigation a more difficult subject of  international negotiations than trade 
or arms control. With trade, unilateral reduction of  protection will make a 
country richer whatever other countries do. And yet it is hard enough to 
achieve agreement on mutual reduction of  protection. With arms control, 
at least unilateral reduction of  defence expenditure has a national benefit for 
the budget and economic growth.
The climate change problem requires the cooperation of  the whole 
world. It is not amenable to a local solution. Therefore a solution will not 
emerge country by country as each country becomes rich. The problem is 
made even more difficult because the international community agreed at 
the beginning of  the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
the early 1990s that the developed countries would make commitments to 
and implement major actions to reduce their emissions before developing 
countries would be expected to take these steps. Further, developed 
countries would be expected to meet the incremental costs of  mitigation in 
developing countries.
There was some justice in this approach since the countries that are 
now developed had been responsible for the increase in concentrations 
of  greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that had taken the world to the 
threshold of  dangerous climate change.
In 2009 the constraints are much tighter. In the early twenty-first century, 
emissions have been growing much more rapidly than before and than 
previously anticipated. We have squandered the time and headroom we 
had in the early 1990s. Developing countries now account for about 40 per 
cent of  emissions. In the absence of  mitigation, they would be likely to 
account for about 90 per cent of  the growth in emissions over the crucial 
two decades ahead.
There will be no solution if  those who want effective action rely on 
slogans rather than analysis of  the international situation. There will be no 
effective mitigation from unilateral action in single countries, however good 
that may feel to some people in those countries. Indeed, taking a step too far 
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on a unilateral basis may set back the global mitigation effort.
It is much more costly for one country to achieve a specified degree of  
mitigation alone, than it would be to achieve the same level of  mitigation 
within a global agreement. The high costs of  achieving high mitigation 
targets unilaterally may demonstrate to others the difficulty rather than the 
feasibility of  action.
It seems unfair that developing countries must accept major commitments 
to mitigation when the countries that grew rich before them were not so 
constrained. Unfair or not, there will be no effective global mitigation without 
all substantial countries reducing emissions significantly. The differentiated 
treatment in favour of  developing countries, of  which the UN framework 
agreements speak, must take the form of  obligations that are consistent 
with continued strong economic growth.
The world’s challenge is not to reduce emissions by reducing material 
living standards. There is no chance at all of  Australia or any other country 
committing itself  to mitigation on those terms. The challenge is to break 
the nexus that has always been present in the past between growth in 
living standards and the growth in greenhouse gas emissions. Fortunately, 
the economics says that it is possible to reconcile reduction in emissions 
with continued economic growth in the world as a whole and in each of  its 
parts.
There is a deal to be done, within what is politically feasible in the major 
countries. China, for example, has committed itself  domestically to do as 
much and more than the Garnaut review suggested would be required of  
it by 2020, within an agreement directed at concentrations of  450 parts per 
million. But China is a long way from committing internationally to deliver 
that outcome. Australia’s proportionate contribution to an effective global 
agreement to achieve an ambitious (450ppm) international agreement would 
require us to commit to reduce emissions by 25 per cent from 2000 levels by 
2020, and by 90 per cent by 2050.
This would be difficult. But it could be done consistently with continued 
growth in living standards. Australia would need to increase considerably 
its public expenditure on research, development and commercialisation 
6 Capturing the Year — 2009
of  low-emissions technologies. It would also need to raise significantly its 
development assistance for climate change adaptation, particularly to our 
neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.
The numbers are not plucked out of  the air. They are derived from the idea 
that entitlements should converge on equal per capita allocations by 2050. 
There has been much international discussion of  this basis for allocating 
entitlements. World leaders must discuss alternative ways of  dividing up a 
global emissions budget that add up to avoidance of  the risks of  dangerous 
climate change.
A global agreement that avoids high risks of  dangerous climate change in 
December in Copenhagen this year won’t be reached in one step. There is, 
however, a chance that a set of  principles is agreed in Copenhagen that is the 
basis of  an effective global agreement that significantly reduces the risk of  
dangerous climate change. That would need to be followed by detailed and 
highly technical discussions of  numbers that add up to a solution. 
Resolving these issues remains the most difficult international as well as 
national political problem that we have ever faced. But in June 2009, with 
Australia and the US having decided to play for the international team rather 





Climate change: the risks of doing nothing
The carbon pollution reduction scheme to control Australia’s emissions of  
carbon dioxide continues its long and tortuous road towards approval and 
implementation. Even more challenges await in December in Copenhagen, 
when the global community gathers to come to grips with climate change 
in earnest.
Meanwhile, science is painting a clearer picture of  the risks that lie ahead 
if  the Copenhagen negotiations fail and human-driven climate change is 
allowed to continue unabated over the coming decades. In a word, the 
message from science to the negotiators is ‘urgency’.
In many ways the climate system is now moving faster than we had 
thought likely a decade ago, and faster than the middle-of-the-range climate 
model projections suggest. For example, the rate of  accumulation of  carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere has increased since 2000 due to growth in the 
global economy and the relative weakening of  the natural processes that 
absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
Warming of  the ocean, which absorbs the vast majority of  the extra heat 
at the earth’s surface due to increasing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, 
has also increased over the past few decades. Ocean heat content has risen 
particularly sharply since the late 1990s. Sea-level rise, in part due to the 
thermal expansion of  warming ocean water, has also increased in rate, from 
1.6 millimetres per year in the 1961–2003 period to 3.1 millimetres per year 
in the 1993–2003 period. The higher rate has continued unabated through 
the most recent measurements to 2008.
The world’s ice realms are also changing rapidly. Arctic sea-ice is being 
Published as ‘No time to lose as climate change turns for worse’, Canberra Times, 27 July 
2009.
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lost at a rate faster than any model has predicted. In the last 15 years the 
Greenland ice sheet has gone from being in balance—the rate of  melting 
and disintegration being balanced by the accumulation of  snow in the 
interior—to a net loss of  about 200 cubic kilometres per year. More recently, 
the Antarctic ice sheets have also shown net losses in mass.
Global air temperature, too, is rising as expected. Despite considerable 
year-to-year and even decadal variability, the long-term trend is unmistakeably 
upwards. Thirteen of  the fourteen warmest years ever recorded since the 
instrumental record began around 1850 have occurred since 1995.
The rate at which the world’s climate is now shifting towards a warmer 
future carries significant risks for contemporary society and especially for 
Australia. Of  all of  the world’s industrialised countries, Australia is probably 
the most vulnerable to the consequences of  climate change, or ‘climate 
disruption’ as it is increasingly called.
Sea-level is expected to rise by an additional 50 centimetres to one metre 
by 2100 relative to 1990; levels somewhat more than one metre cannot be 
ruled out. A sea-level rise of  ‘only’ 50 centimetres would already increase the 
frequency of  flooding events associated with high tides and storm surges by 
a hundredfold at many places along Australia’s coastline.
Increasing absorption of  carbon dioxide by the ocean is increasing its 
acidity, which, coupled with rising sea-surface temperature, is stressing corals. 
The Great Barrier Reef, the world’s largest coral-dominated ecosystem, may 
well be largely converted to algae beds by the second half  of  the century.
The health and wellbeing of  Australians is directly threatened by global 
warming. Temperature-related extreme events, such as the Melbourne heat 
wave earlier this year, have become more likely with global warming. So have 
mega fires of  the type that swept across Victoria in February and damaged 
Canberra in 2003.
With the Murray-Darling Basin in the grip of  a severe, multiyear drought, 
the threat to water resources in southeast Australia looms large. As the 
evidence strengthens for a climate change-drought link, so do the risks for 
the most agriculturally productive and populous parts of  the country.
The severity of  these doom-and-gloom projections, of  course, assumes 
Climate Change 9
that human-driven emissions of  greenhouse gases will continue unabated 
for several decades at least. Much has been written about the perceived high 
costs of  reducing greenhouse gas emissions, thus contributing to inaction 
and to a possible realisation of  these doom-and-gloom projections.
However, the prevailing economic thought globally has shifted strongly. 
The costs of  inaction far outweigh costs of  abatement. Delaying action 
means more severe climate change with escalating adaptation and impacts 
costs. Delay also locks in carbon-emitting infrastructure such as coal-fired 
power plants and makes emission reductions in future much more costly.
The news from the engineering community is even better. Society already 
has many technologies, such as a suite of  renewable energy systems, that 
can quickly and effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Their costs are 
dropping rapidly and novel approaches such as ‘smart grids’ are facilitating 
their deployment.
The challenge of  climate change is indeed complex—spanning science, 
technology, economics, public policy, history, psychology, systems analysis 
and much more. The broad knowledge base required to meet the challenge 
is expanding rapidly, giving hope that society is approaching a turning point 
in the transformation to a low-carbon future. But there is no time to lose in 
getting to that turning point.




India and the Copenhagen summit
As the world moves inexorably towards the climate summit in Copenhagen 
in December 2009, immense pressure has been brought to bear on India 
to accept legally binding carbon emissions targets. The latest attempt to 
pressure India came from US Secretary of  State Hillary Clinton during her 
recently concluded visit to India.
Such pressures on India and some other countries (particularly China) are 
occurring against the backdrop of  a new wave of  environmental activism 
among Western commentators over the climate change debate. For example, 
Al Gore has called on all countries to place an immediate moratorium on 
coal-fired power plants. This would simply be a no-go for India. More than 
half  of  the 800,000 megawatts of  power India plans to produce by 2030 are 
to come from coal-fired plants because coal is abundant in India and other 
energy sources are relatively scarce.
Against this backdrop, it is instructive to recap the factual position 
concerning carbon emissions. In 2005, the total carbon dioxide emissions 
for India, China, US and the world were: 1.1, 5.1, 5.8 and 27.1 billion tonnes 
respectively, whereas their per capita emissions in the same order are 1, 3.8, 
19.6 and 4.2 tonnes. It has been estimated that China’s emissions could 
reach 9 billion tonnes soon—although the figure of  6.5 billion tonnes has 
also been mentioned.
It follows from this that it is wrong to club India and China in the same 
group of  carbon emitters. China’s total emission is comparable to that of  
the US (and may indeed have surpassed this level), whereas India’s is only 
Posted on South Asia Masala, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/southasiamasala/, 20 
August 2009; posted on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 4 September 
2009.
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about a fifth of  China’s. In terms of  per capita emissions, China is close to 
the world average whereas India’s per capita emissions are less than a quarter 
of  the world average.
In terms of  outcomes for humans, the picture is even bleaker. For 
instance, India’s per capita annual electricity consumption is only 500 units 
compared to 8,000–10,000 units per capita consumed by Western societies. 
Nearly 550 million Indians do not have formal access to any source of  
electricity. In this context Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told former US 
President George W. Bush in 2008 that this was like the entire population of  
the United States and half  of  the European Union living without any regular 
access to electricity. An unthinkable proposition indeed!
Thus, it is quite reasonable to expect that India’s per capita electricity 
consumption will go up—from the present 500 units to at least 3,000 units 
in the next 10 years. But India will still consume less than half  of  the present 
per capita electricity consumed by the West.
India has argued that it will keep its per capita emissions below the world 
average, but Western governments are disinclined to accept this. Their 
efforts, if  successful, would cap emissions in such a manner that it will 
become difficult for India to meet the basic energy needs of  the people 
using local resources. This is unjustified. Nevertheless, the global climate 
challenge has to be addressed. Hence, compensatory mechanisms need to 
be put in place.
The global carbon emissions trading scheme (ETS) being canvassed as 
a way out may or may not control carbon emissions, but its developmental 
and policy implications are eminently obvious, though less advertised.
By definition, the global ETS would involve international trade in permits 
for carbon emissions. Typically, economically developed, high-carbon (at 
least in per capita terms) countries would buy carbon emission permits from 
the economically poorer, low-carbon (again, at least in per capita terms) 
countries. This would involve a transfer of  funds from the richer to the 
poorer countries and a concomitant commitment from the latter to restrict 
carbon emissions whereas the former would be able to emit more carbon 
than would have been possible in a world with firm quantitative restrictions 
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on emissions but no global ETS.
The inflow of  foreign exchange into economies such as India would not be 
an unmixed blessing as it would lead to an appreciation of  their real exchange 
rates vis-à-vis the rich countries, thus lowering their export competitiveness. 
Concurrently, the relative export competitiveness of  the richer countries 
would be enhanced. The impact of  the global ETS on countries such as 
India would thus be like ‘Dutch disease’. The less developed countries would 
sell a good fraction of  the carbon emission permits that they were allotted 
to the rich countries. By selling their carbon permits to richer countries, 
less developed countries would sign away their opportunity to emit carbon, 
which would lower the pace of  their industrialisation, thus hurting their 
growth prospects and hampering their efforts at reducing mass poverty. 
Thus, countries such as India would be doubly disadvantaged.
Hence, the global ETS has an antidevelopment content. Whereas the 
quantitative impact of  the global ETS on countries such as India can be 
tempered by staggering their carbon reduction requirements over a longer 
time horizon and giving them a more generous initial allocation of  carbon 
permits, these efforts need to be supplemented with a qualitative change in 
efforts to address the carbon issue. In particular, countries like India need 
to get accelerated access to new technology for carbon reduction and for 
generation of  energy from non-traditional sources. The global ETS needs 
to be supplemented with a well-thought-out technology transfer policy to 
which even the emerging economies can be expected to make contributions 
in cash and human resources. Without such efforts, the global ETS is likely 





Can China rescue the world climate change 
negotiations?
The three main propositions around which the current global climate change 
negotiations are structured were agreed at the United Nations Climate 
Change Conference in Bali, December 2007. The first is that developed 
countries should commit to binding emission reduction targets. The second 
is that developing countries should adopt policies and measures to reduce 
emissions below what they would otherwise have been. The third is that 
developed countries should support developing ones, principally by the 
supply of  finance, to reduce emissions and to adapt to climate change.
This is a different framework to that of  the Kyoto Protocol, which placed 
obligations only on developed countries. Under the Bali Roadmap, everyone 
acts, but different metrics are used to measure obligations in developed and 
developing countries: targets for developed countries, policies for developing 
countries.
While there is agreement on the three propositions, it extends only to the 
acceptance that they should constitute the negotiating framework. On the first 
point, most developed countries have now put forward emissions reduction 
targets for 2020. My assessment is that the offers made add up to a 10–20 
per cent reduction for developed countries over 1990 levels. Developing 
countries think this isn’t nearly enough. They argue for reductions in the 
range of  25–40 per cent.
Published in APEC economies newsletter, September 2009; posted on East Asia Forum, http://
www.eastasiaforum.org/, 1 September 2009. This article is a summary of  Stephen Howes, 
‘Can China rescue the global climate change negotiations’, which appears as chapter 18 in 
China’s New Place in a World of  Crisis: Economic, Geopolitical and Environmental Dimensions, Ross 
Garnaut, Ligang Song and Wing Thye Woo (eds), Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009.
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On financing, the third point, there’s also a gulf. Developing countries 
are asking for hundreds of  billions of  dollars and want it delivered through 
government channels. Developed countries, on the other hand, stress the role 
of  the markets in delivering carbon finance, are reluctant to commit public 
funds, and overall tend to downplay the need for international funding. In 
this regard, though, a June 2009 speech by the UK Prime Minister, Gordon 
Brown, is encouraging and does suggest that there is a belated recognition 
by the developed countries that they will have to put significant volumes of  
public funding on the table if  they want to see a deal.
I’ve put the second plank, developing-country policies, last, because 
here there is not so much a gulf  as simply confusion. What sort of  policies 
developing countries might commit to, how their policy commitments would 
be registered internationally, what these policies might add up to, remains 
unclear, even at this stage, just a few months out from Copenhagen.
Summing up, the two main challenges in relation to the current negotiations 
are that developed countries need to commit to do more (in terms of  both 
targets and financing) and that developing countries need to indicate more 
clearly what they are prepared to do. These two challenges are interrelated: 
progress on one will require progress on the other.
This is where China could come in. China of  course has enormous 
influence. It is a superpower and a leader among developing countries. It is 
the world’s largest emitter. It has been responsible for most of  the recent 
global growth in emissions. It already has domestic policies in place—for 
reasons that go well beyond climate change—to improve energy efficiency 
and to diversify into renewable and nuclear energy. And, importantly, China 
is yet to play its hand in the current negotiations.
China already has a target to reduce its energy intensity (the ratio of  
energy used to output or GDP) by 20 per cent between 2005 and 2010, and 
a renewable energy target of  15 per cent by 2020. China is now thinking 
about targets for the twelfth Five-Year Plan from 2011 to 2015. It appears 
likely that China will extend its current policy targets. Perhaps China might 
announce a target of  halving energy intensity by 2020. Perhaps China might 
convert this into an emissions intensity target, a ratio of  greenhouse gas, or 
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simply carbon dioxide emissions, to GDP.
We also already know, from the anticipatory response from the US, that 
adoption of  such a target out to 2015 or 2020 would be seen as ambitious. 
My own analysis confirms this. It will not be easy for China to halve its 
emissions intensity by 2020. China hasn’t had much success in achieving 
its current target of  a 20 per cent reduction in energy intensity by 2010. 
It’s only in 2008 that China’s energy intensity really started to fall, and that 
was because of  the global downturn, which hit energy-intensive industries 
particularly hard. By my estimation, by the end of  2008 China had only 
achieved an 8 per cent reduction in energy intensity from 2005, well short 
of  the 20 per cent target, and with only two years to go.
If  China announces targets for energy or emissions intensity, but resists 
giving them legal international standing, it will not take us very far. It will 
make ratification by the US Senate (where a two-thirds majority is required) 
difficult if  not impossible, for the same reason that the Kyoto Protocol 
was never ratified by the US: namely, that it places obligations on the US 
but not on China. Unwillingness by China to give its policies international 
standing would also be interpreted as a signal that China is not taking climate 
change mitigation sufficiently seriously. The US, indeed the world, needs to 
be able to say that China is also bound in some way to reduce emissions, 
even if  it is not through the ‘targets and timetables’ approach being applied 
to developed countries.
The real question, then, is whether China will be prepared to table its 
policies internationally, as part of  a climate change treaty. Would China sign 
up, say, to an intensity pledge, essentially a commitment to introduce policies 
with the aim of  halving emissions intensity by 2020?
Such a target would be non-binding in the sense that there would be no 
penalty for not meeting it. So it wouldn’t be very costly for China to sign up, 
but it wouldn’t be costless either. It would open China up to some sort of  
international monitoring, and it would be seen as a step along the road to 
China taking on binding targets at a later stage. However, these costs should 
be manageable. If  the US passes its cap-and-trade legislation, pressure on 
China will increase. More than anything, though, what China is willing to 
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offer will come down to whether it sees an effective global agreement on 
climate change to be in its interests. There are increasing signs that it does.
The world climate change mitigation regime has languished over the last 
decade because of  a lack of  leadership from the United States. Getting the 
US back in the negotiating room was the first precondition for achieving a 
post-Kyoto agreement. But negotiations are still stuck. Developed countries 
need to do more, but need to have a reason to do more. China, by virtue of  
its superpower status and its evolving domestic policy stance, seems to be in 
a better position than any other developing country to send a positive signal 






Big task to tackle at Bali forum
As a region which includes some of  the world’s most resilient autocracies, 
democracy is always going to be a difficult subject for Asian governments. 
Asian leaders may no longer justify less-than-democratic regimes on the 
basis of  ‘Asian values’. But they still tend to shy away from discussing the 
internal politics of  their neighbours, and if  they do they almost never talk 
about it in terms of  democracy.
This is about to change. Next week (10 December) all East Asian 
governments will convene in Bali, Indonesia, to place the issue of  democracy 
squarely on Asia’s regional agenda. This meeting, co-chaired by Australian 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, will include not just long-established democracies, such as 
Australia, India and Japan, but also assuredly non-democratic states such 
as China, Burma and Vietnam. Only North Korea has missed the regional 
A slightly edited version was published in Canberra Times, 11 December 2008.
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dance card.
Putting democracy on the agenda of  such a diverse range of  regimes 
will not be easy. But it is well past due. Most other major world regions 
now include an explicit commitment to democracy as part of  their regional 
membership requirements.
The European Union, for example, requires all countries to meet stringent 
conditions of  political openness, human rights and a free press before they 
can be considered for membership. This has done more than anything since 
the fall of  communism to encourage freedom in Eastern Europe.
Similarly, the membership rules of  both the African Union and Latin 
America’s Mercosur grouping today include specific commitments to 
democratic rule. Countries which fail these criteria are suspended from the 
club until they return to democracy.
No such commitments exist in Asia. Democracy is not mentioned in the 
founding statutes of  East Asian regional bodies such as the Association 
of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or ASEAN+3 (which adds China, 
Japan and Korea). If  it did, most member countries would be ineligible. 
Today, only Japan, Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines would likely pass 
the mark.
The Bali Democracy Forum is thus a historic attempt to put the issue of  
democracy squarely on Asia’s international agenda. While it is unlikely to 
produce any major breakthroughs, the mere fact that it is taking place at all 
is significant in several respects.
First, it represents a coming out party for Indonesian democracy itself. 
The political progress made in that country over the past decade is little 
short of  remarkable. Ten years ago Indonesia was one of  the region’s 
most enduring autocracies. Today, Indonesia is easily Southeast Asia’s most 
democratic state, with competitive elections, a vibrant media and social 
pluralism. It is also one the world’s very few examples of  genuine democracy 
in a Muslim country. Its success gives the lie to oft-heard claims about the 
incompatibility of  Islam and democracy.
The invitation list for the Bali Democracy Forum also deserves attention. It 
defines Asia broadly along geographic rather than cultural lines. In so doing, 
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it includes participation not just from ASEAN and core Asian civilisations 
such as China, Japan and Korea, but also India, as well as Australia and 
New Zealand. This essentially mirrors the composition of  the nascent East 
Asia Summit (which is due to hold its fourth meeting in Thailand on 17 
December) and marks an increasingly influential vision of  the region as a 
geographic rather than a cultural entity.
This broadness is also a weakness, however. In the name of  inclusiveness, 
the forum includes some of  Asia’s most repressive regimes. At the same time, 
it excludes the United States, which has been sponsoring its own alternative 
grouping, the Asia Pacific Democracy Partnership (APDP), which met for 
the first time in Seoul in October. Naturally enough, the APDP includes the 
US and excludes the region’s non-democracies. But the limited enthusiasm 
shown in the region for this initiative suggests it is unlikely to survive the 
end of  the Bush administration.
The Bali Democracy Forum, by contrast, has the potential to be an 
important step not just for democracy in Indonesia but also for Asia more 
broadly. And it underlines the fact that, contrary to proponents of  ‘Asian 
values’, Asia’s past record of  authoritarianism is unlikely to guide its future.





Israel is enthusiastic about promoting its democratic ideals to the world, yet 
any Israeli who dares criticise the nation’s policies towards Palestinians can 
testify to some undemocratic treatment from Israeli authority figures. Such 
voices of  dissent have been systematically discredited by people in positions 
of  power. The most recent case centres on an opinion piece published by Dr 
Neve Gordon in the Los Angeles Times last month, arguing for the pressing 
need for foreign governments, institutions and donors to boycott Israel in 
order to pressure it to renounce its apartheid policies.
Gordon’s piece stimulated a heated debate in Israel, not least because 
Professor Carmi, the president of  the Ben-Gurion University to which 
Gordon belongs, wrote a stern letter addressed to all university staff. In it 
she stressed the disastrous effects that opinion pieces such as these have 
on the university, which relies on donations from the Jewish Diaspora. She 
further suggested that such views published abroad would have serious 
ramifications for the university’s capacity to sustain itself  in the future. This 
was a veiled threat.
Recently I had the chance to ask a senior Israeli official in Australia 
about this issue and he responded by noting, appropriately, that everyone is 
entitled to their own opinion. But he then added that he awaits the day when 
Palestinians will be able to criticise their own regime—a day that he believes 
will signal their readiness for peace. For him, the ability to express such 
views is a mark of  Israel’s strong commitment to democratic values.
The official then continued to detail his reservations about the piece, 
surprisingly not about its content and arguments but rather its style: 
Published as ‘How Israel silences its own’, Canberra Times, 22 September 2009.
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suggesting that the opinion piece was written and published under suspect 
circumstances. He further opined that the fact that the Los Angeles Times 
published the piece, despite the range of  views held by Jews in Los Angeles, 
is indicative of  its agenda. He then continued to emphasise that Gordon’s 
own motives were dubious. What followed was an attack that focused on the 
reasons Gordon chose to publish the piece in English (not in Hebrew) and 
sign off  on it as an academic teaching at Ben-Gurion University.
I am familiar with such arguments; I experienced them not long ago 
following an opinion piece I wrote for The Australian during the Gaza 
assault. In that case, it would have been difficult to accuse The Australian of  
anti-Israel/Semitic bias as, during the same week, the Israeli Ambassador 
wrote a piece in favour of  the Gaza war, and another Australian-based 
Israeli academic followed up my article with a strong rebuke. Both were 
writing in English and both signed off  their essays with their professional 
designations.
Speaking about Israel for an outside audience in English was precisely 
Gordon’s intention; for him Israel ‘had to be saved from itself ’, which I 
understand to be a call for help. The piece was intended for the international 
community and the Diaspora to pressure Israel and awaken it, for it has 
become increasingly numb to the daily sufferings of  others.
This does not mean that in Israel there is no debate; indeed, there is often 
vigorous debate, but, unfortunately, as a friend observed, there are few who 
will listen or, perhaps, can listen. Gordon’s opinion piece drew much of  its 
currency and power from the fact that he was courageously willing to air 
‘our dirty laundry’ in public—something we (Israelis) are most reluctant to 
do for fear that our enemies will use it against us.
But such ‘caution’ that we are ‘encouraged’ to exercise from an early age 
has an insidious side to it. It means as Jews and Israelis we keep putting up 
a wall around us and that those daring to puncture the wall of  silence are 
systematically discredited by people in positions of  authority and subjected 
to ad hominem attacks and derogatory terms, such as traitors and cowards: a 
fifth column in the heart of  the nation.
The senior Israeli official’s castigation of  Dr Gordon’s use of  his title and 
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designation also belies his earlier celebration of  Israel’s democratic ideals. 
For he does not genuinely seek a plurality of  opinion, rather, such castigation 
is a testimony to the culture of  self-censorship among Israelis, enforced by 
those in positions of  authority.
Dr Gordon’s capacity to identify the cruel effects of  Israeli policies 
should be encouraged in the Diaspora for it is a product of  his own personal 
history and experience, which is inseparable from his academic training, and 
offers a valuable contribution to debates outside Israel. No doubt following 
his essay Dr Gordon and his family have had to brace themselves against 
the well-oiled, state-supported propaganda machine of  the Jewish/Israeli 
media. Unfortunately, Rivka Carmi’s (un)veiled threats will have long-lasting 
effects—one of  Gordon’s colleagues confided to me recently that he is yet 
to secure tenure and, despite sharing Gordon’s views, would think hard 
before risking his family’s welfare to voice his opinion. A luxury, I would 







Debate, not a boycott, needed to address racism
The United Nations conference to review the 2001 Durban World Conference 
against racism will be held in Geneva in April 2009. As it draws closer, 
the pressure on Australia to withdraw from the conference increases. Some 
commentators have argued that Australia should join Canada and Israel in 
boycotting the conference on the basis that it will simply be a forum for anti-
Semitism. For example, Christopher Pyne, opposition spokesman on justice 
and border security, has called on the Australian government not to attend a 
potential ‘hatefest’. This is a troubling charge and it is important to examine 
the evidence proffered to support it.
The original Durban conference, held in September 2001, adopted a 
lengthy declaration on the elimination of  racism. It is fair to say that the 
politics of  the Durban conference were fraught, with the situation in the 
Middle East attracting much attention. All major UN conferences are 
First published in Canberra Times, 2 February 2009.
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accompanied by parallel conferences of  non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and the Durban NGO event was blighted by some appalling anti-
Semitic statements from irresponsible NGOs. For example, some NGOs 
distributed pamphlets supporting Hitler’s Holocaust on the Jewish people.
The Durban Declaration adopted by the official conference condemned 
anti-Semitism, as well as Islamophobia. It recalled the Holocaust as an 
event never to be forgotten and referred specifically both to Israel’s right to 
security and to the plight of  the Palestinian people. This was controversial, 
however, and a number of  countries, including Israel, United States, Canada 
and Australia, objected to any specific references to Israel’s treatment of  the 
Palestinians on the grounds that the declaration did not refer to any other 
examples of  racism.
Critics regard the Durban Declaration as fundamentally flawed for this 
reason; and they view the preparations for the Geneva review conference 
as deeply biased against Israel. But the evidence provided for this fear 
is partial. It is true that Libya is chairing the conference and that Cuba, 
Iran, Russia and Pakistan are among the 20 vice-chairs. But other vice-
chairs include Belgium, Greece, Norway, Croatia, South Africa, India and 
Argentina, elected on the basis of  regional groupings. The chair and vice-
chairs form a bureau for the conference, monitoring reports produced by 
UN officials. Thus far, this disparate group of  countries has been able to 
achieve consensus on procedural issues but would act as a check if  extreme 
positions were proposed.
Racism is a major cause of  conflict and violence across the world today 
and it is tragic that the Geneva review conference may be undermined on 
the basis of  a single situation in which racism plays a complex, but not a 
defining, role.
We should take a larger and longer-term view of  the value of  the Geneva 
review conference. The 2001 Durban Declaration contains detailed analysis 
of  racism against classes of  people such as refugees, migrants, indigenous 
peoples and against specific peoples such as the Roma, Jews and Muslims. 
It called for strong antidiscrimination legislation, improved education about 
racism, and better remedies and resources for victims of  racism. There have 
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been some important advances since Durban—for example, the creation of  
national institutes to combat racism in some countries, and constitutional 
and legislative changes to outlaw racism in others. The election of  an 
African-American as US president is a great symbol of  progress. And Prime 
Minister Rudd’s 2008 apology to the Stolen Generations is a local example 
of  a creative and positive response to racism. But many racist practices 
continue to exist across the globe.
At the Geneva review conference governments will report on their 
implementation of  the commitments they made eight years ago at Durban. 
The conference will allow both the progress made in combating racism 
and the many remaining problems to be assessed, national experience to be 
shared and attempts made to devise better solutions.
Racism is not easy to acknowledge. United Nations conferences among 
its 192 member states will inevitably involve politics and compromise. 
This can be frustrating, but it is also a chance to work creatively across 
cultural and religious divides. The preparatory documents available for the 
Geneva review conference are not perfect and require much more work. For 
example, proposals for elimination of  the ‘defamation of  religions’ being 
aired in background documents are worrying; they seem aimed at preventing 
criticism of  religions in a blanket manner and are an attack on freedom of  
speech.
But such issues surely indicate the value of  engagement and debate in 
Geneva in April rather than a boycott: Australia should attend the Geneva 
conference this April and help to steer it in a productive direction.




Who owns your genes?
So your genes belong to you—all 23,299 of  them. But the moment they 
leave your body your genes are ‘isolated’. They have been transferred into 
an artificial state—a foreign place. And in this new state patent law says 
they are patentable subject matter. As a result thousands of  patents have 
been granted to biotechnology companies, universities and others, including 
scientists. The scientists responsible for this act of  transformation are named 
on these patents as ‘inventors’. In 2005 a study published in the prestigious 
science journal Science disclosed that some 20 per cent of  the human genome 
was ‘the subject of  US IP’. In other words, US inventors claimed to have 
invented 20 per cent of  your genes.
‘How is this happening?’ you ask. ‘Patents are granted to people who 
invent things,’ you say. ‘My genes weren’t invented; my parents gave me my 
genes,’ you react, surprised and now a little miffed by the idea that someone is 
claiming to be the inventor of  some of  your genome. Yet, that’s what’s been 
happening for more than 20 years, and in 1998 the European Parliament 
passed a law called the European Biotechnology Directive to make it legal. 
Today the European Patent Office in Munich accepts that an isolated human 
gene is patentable subject matter. It has to. That’s the law.
In the United States and Australia, however, moves are afoot to stop the 
patenting of  your genes, which, let’s face it, no one invented. We all know 
that our genes belong to us and that they are natural phenomena. Just like all 
living things on this planet, they have either been created by God, if  you’re 
a creationist, or have evolved, if  you subscribe to Darwin’s theory. Either 
way, they are products of  nature and according to the US Supreme Court are 
Published as ‘A gene inventor? Patent nonsense’, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 July 2009.
Human Rights and Ethics 27
things that are ‘free to all men and reserved exclusively to none’.
Throughout 2009 the Australian Senate’s Community Affairs Committee 
is conducting an inquiry into gene patents and their impact on the Australian 
people. In May in the United States the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) launched legal proceedings against the United States Patent Office 
and Myriad Genetics. The law suit challenges the validity of  US patents 
granted to Myriad over the gene mutations that are responsible for causing 
breast and ovarian cancer in women who come from families that are 
predisposed to these forms of  cancers. ‘The primary claim’, says Chris 
Hansen, the ACLU’s attorney, ‘is that you cannot patent a product of  nature 
or a law of  nature. It has long been a principal of  law in the United States 
that you can’t patent a product of  nature, like a basic element such as gold, 
and you can’t patent a law of  nature such as gravity or E=mc2. It is our 
position that many of  the patent claims when they cover the gene itself, 
or the gene in certain mutated forms, represent both laws of  nature and 
products of  nature and are therefore inappropriate for patenting.’
On 3 August the Senate’s public hearings commence in Melbourne, but 
will also take place in Sydney and Canberra later that week. Witnesses have 
been selected from among those that filed written submissions. They will 
be examined by the Senators Rachel Siewert (Chair, Greens, WA), Claire 
Moore (Deputy-Chair, Labor, Qld), Judith Adams (Liberal, WA), Sue Boyce 
(Liberal, Qld), Carol Brown (Labor, Tas), John Williams (National, NSW) 
and Bill Heffernan (Liberal, NSW).
The Senate was galvanised into action in November last year after Senator 
Bill Heffernan first raised the issue in committee. His interest was stoked by a 
lawyer’s letter that Genetic Technologies Limited, a publicly listed Australian 
company controlled by Dr Mervyn Jacobson, sent to every publicly funded 
laboratory that performed a genetic test designed to detect mutations to the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. The BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are in everyone, 
but mutations to these genes have been linked to breast and ovarian cancer. 
In the letter the laboratories were given seven days to confirm in writing 
that they would ‘cease using the Patents’ and ‘refer the performance of  all 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing to Genetic Technologies’.
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Genetic Technologies acquired the Australian patent rights from Myriad 
in 2002 and, after trying to assert its patent rights at the time, subsequently 
retreated, supposedly making a gift of  them to the Australian people, after 
the Howard government ordered the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) to undertake an inquiry into gene patents. After 18 months, in June 
2004 the ALRC delivered its report to the government. Though it made a 
number of  recommendations, strangely it did not recommend that gene 
patents be banned. In any event, the Howard government never responded 
to the report and the Rudd government, so far, hasn’t either.
Government inaction is probably the reason why Genetic Technologies, 
forgetting about its gift, tried once again to assert its patent rights over the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in July last year.
This time, the Senate has acted. Of  course, no matter what the Senate’s 
report recommends it will ultimately be up to the Rudd government to take 
the next step. In the meantime, over in the United States, it will be another 
six years before the ACLU’s attempt to invalidate the Myriad’s US BRCA 
patents will be definitely decided by the US Supreme Court.




Shameful responses to UN rights expert should be 
binned
A United Nations expert on indigenous people’s rights last week labelled 
the Northern Territory emergency response as discriminatory and described 
Australia as suffering from entrenched racism. James Anaya expressed 
concern over policies that ‘stigmatize already stigmatized communities’ and 
pointed to the need for a real partnership between the government and 
indigenous Australians.
In response, the former minister who launched the intervention 
expressed annoyance at ‘pontificating about human rights’. The current 
one also dismissed the special rapporteur’s remarks. The Liberal spokesman 
for indigenous affairs described the comments as ‘nonsense’. A senior 
Aboriginal figure in the Labor Party called for the findings to be dropped in 
the bin ‘the same as every other rapporteur’s report’.
All this is reminiscent of  how political leaders in Asia react to critiques 
of  their human rights problems. The ousted prime minister of  Thailand, 
Thaksin Shinawatra, once countered that ‘the UN is not my father’ when 
challenged over his policy to enable the murder of  alleged drug dealers. He 
told a special representative studying human rights defenders to go take a 
look at her own country, Pakistan, and stop bothering him.
His neighbour, Hun Sen, informed journalists that he wouldn’t meet an 
expert assigned to examine human rights in Cambodia within a thousand 
years. And the Philippines justice secretary accused left-wing groups of  
brainwashing the rapporteur on extrajudicial executions—Philip Alston, an 
Published as ‘Leading the world in hypocrisy and intolerance’, Canberra Times, 4 September 
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Australian—into believing stories of  state-sponsored killings.
Australia is usually ready to join in criticism of  others, but apparently 
its politicians are just as intolerant as Thaksin or Hun Sen when it comes 
to people telling them what they think of  our record. Not only is this 
hypocritical, but it also undermines those parts of  the international human 
rights system that need to be defended, including the group of  special 
procedures to which the rapporteurs belong.
The barrage of  complaints which followed Anaya’s statement was 
particularly inappropriate for a number of  reasons.
First, the Australian government formally invited him here. Having done 
that, whether or not politicians agree with what he had to say, they should at 
least listen politely. The government is entitled to adopt or reject whatever 
he recommends, but with decency and courtesy, upon receiving his written 
report.
Second, the task of  a rapporteur is to assess a country against existing 
international standards. Anaya did this. He pointed to two human rights 
treaties that Australia appears to have breached, one on racial discrimination, 
the other on civil and political rights. Australia joined these voluntarily. Clearly 
it is not Anaya who missed the point, as an editor for The Australian fumed, 
but the people who either ignored or were ignorant of  his assignment.
Third, the rapporteur is a volunteer. He is not one of  the ‘UN’s self-
important bureaucrats’, as a writer in The Sunday Telegraph put it. Rapporteurs 
receive no pay. They are not part of  the system. They commit time and 
energy to work that they believe is important. Because they are outsiders, 
they can speak and act relatively freely. They can move fast to publicise 
and respond to urgent human rights concerns. They help to keep the UN 
relevant and act as a check against its bureaucratic tendencies.
Not only do rapporteurs deserve Australia’s support, but they need it now 
more than ever. In recent years many governments have tried to cripple or 
eliminate the special procedures. This June, 35 regional and international 
groups addressed the Human Rights Council over ‘extraordinary personal 
attacks’ on mandate holders. These attacks have taken place both inside and 
outside the council. Among those targeted was the Australian rapporteur, 
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Philip Alston.
Governments are angry with rapporteurs and other procedures not 
because they are doing a bad job but for the opposite reason. They are 
angry because rapporteurs create debate on serious human rights problems 
that others do not. Rapporteurs bring accounts and analyses of  those abuses 
to levels that others cannot. They say and do things that make policymakers 
and power brokers uncomfortable.
Whether James Anaya is right or wrong about Australia, the sharp 
rebukes of  his assessment were an insult to him and a disservice to us all. 
They were out of  line. They have diminished Australia’s stature abroad and 
can but embolden politicians and autocrats in other countries who seek to 
ridicule universal human rights and the people who monitor them. It is not 







In January 2005, I attached myself  as a volunteer to a team of  over 20 
Australian surgeons, paramedics, nurses and healthcare managers who had 
flown to Banda Aceh after the tsunami surged across Aceh’s coastal zones, 
killing around 160,000 people. The Australian team had set up in one of  
Banda Aceh’s private hospitals, and there they performed many life-saving 
operations. They brought a planeload of  sophisticated medical equipment 
and supplies with them and dazzled the local Indonesian staff  with their 
skills, techniques and treatments.
But—at least when I joined them—no member of  the team was able to 
speak more than a few words of  Indonesian. Doctors doing their rounds had 
great difficulty asking patients basic questions like ‘Where does it hurt?’ let 
alone explaining complicated medical procedures or the treatments patients 
would need to follow after being discharged. Many of  the patients and their 
First posted on Inside Story, http://inside.org.au/lost-in-translation/, 20 February 2009.
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relatives were distressed that they couldn’t ask the doctors what was wrong 
with them or about their prospects of  recovery.
With no other practical skills of  my own to help survivors, it was a great 
relief  to be able to use my knowledge of  Indonesian language to work as 
an interpreter for the Australian team. In doing so, I joined several other 
Australians—mostly exchange students, NGO workers and the like—who 
helped out in this way because they happened to be in Indonesia at the 
time. It was a moving experience to help, in a very minor way, this team of  
Australian health professionals working in the aftermath of  an enormous 
tragedy. Many of  the survivors had horrific lower-body injuries, caused by 
pieces of  tin or other objects in the swirling waters. The doctors performed 
what seemed to me to be miraculous surgery, patching over gaping wounds 
and pulling people back from the edge of  death. They also treated their 
patients with warmth and humanity. The memory of  the assistance they 
rendered, and of  the gratitude of  those they helped, remains vivid.
But the lack of  Indonesian speakers on the team struck a jarring note. 
Certainly, I do not mean to criticise in any way the team members who went 
to Banda Aceh and performed such great service. I don’t know whether it 
had proven impossible to find Australian health professionals who spoke 
Indonesian fluently, or whether doing so had been forgotten in the rush to 
put the team together. But the absence of  Indonesian speakers seemed a 
sad reflection of  the state of  relations between Indonesia and Australia: at 
a moment of  such great need, when the Australian government and some 
of  its people were making a generous and life-saving gesture, a basic and 
serious communication gap remained.
Last night, Kevin Rudd launched a major conference on Australia–
Indonesia relations in Sydney. No doubt the conference will conclude 
with many fine-sounding statements about how relations between our two 
countries have never been closer. Government spokespeople will make much 
of  Australia’s commitment to forging greater understanding of  Indonesia.
My experiences in Banda Aceh suggest that in some ways the relations 
between Australia and Indonesia are much narrower and more fragile than 
they are often portrayed. But things could get worse still, as one of  the 
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unacknowledged foundations of  good Australia–Indonesia relations is in 
crisis. The study of  Indonesian society and language has never reached 
critical mass in the Australian education system. It would be unusual to find 
an Indonesian speaker in any randomly selected group of  20 Australian 
professionals in any field. But at least the study opportunity has been 
available for many years to most Australian university students who want it. 
Now, Indonesian studies at Australian universities is feeling the impact of  
a decade-long decline in funding and activity. It is approaching a terminal 
phase. And not only is the Rudd government doing nothing to save it, some 
of  its policies are actually worsening the situation.
Kevin Rudd has said that promoting ‘Asia literacy’ is a key goal of  
his government. In a speech in Singapore last August he declared that 
he was ‘committed to making Australia the most Asia-literate country in 
the collective West’. His vision, he said, was ‘for the next generation of  
Australian businessmen and women, economists, accountants, lawyers, 
architects, artists, filmmakers and performers to develop language skills 
which open their region to them’. There are few signs that he has acted to 
make this happen.
For decades, Australia has been a leading centre for research and teaching 
about Indonesia. Australian universities have produced a large group of  
graduates who are fluent in the Indonesian language and understand the 
culture, history and politics of  the country. These people are now a crucial part 
of  the connective tissue at the heart of  the Australia–Indonesia relationship. 
They populate the government departments, businesses, NGOs and the aid 
organisations that work in or on Indonesia, and they teach Australian school 
children. European, Japanese and American policymakers and government 
officials who visit Indonesia often express amazement at the number of  
knowledgeable Australians they meet.
This cohort of  Indonesia-savvy Australians is an invaluable resource for 
our country. They are one factor that elevates Australia’s relationship with 
Indonesia above that which that country shares with other Western countries. 
Yet the framework that produced this layer of  people is now under threat. 
University after university has either closed its Indonesian program or is 
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considering doing so. Indonesian experts who were trained and recruited 
in the heady days of  the late 1960s and 1970s are retiring and not being 
replaced.
Less than a decade ago our largest city, Sydney, had Indonesian language 
and studies programs available at or through all five of  its major universities 
(University of  New South Wales, University of  Western Sydney, University 
of  Technology Sydney, Macquarie University and University of  Sydney), with 
full majors offered at three of  them. Now a full program only survives at the 
University of  Sydney, and the only other university still teaching Indonesian, 
the University of  NSW (which a decade ago had one of  the most vibrant 
programs in the country), has this year replaced its major with a minor. 
In Perth, a city with an especially large Indonesian community only three 
hours flying time from Jakarta, Indonesian programs have either closed or 
are under threat in two of  the three universities where they have traditionally 
been offered. Our third city, Brisbane, used to have three separate Indonesian 
programs, but these have now been replaced by a consortium arrangement 
that allows students from Queensland University of  Technology and Griffith 
University to learn Indonesian through the University of  Queensland. At 
Melbourne University, until a couple of  years ago another major centre, 
most of  the key staff  have retired or resigned and not been replaced. At most 
universities, staff  in Indonesian studies programs sense the axe swinging ever 
closer to their necks. Nationally, perhaps a third of  all Indonesian language 
courses are under threat of  closure in the next 12 months.
In part, the decline of  Indonesian studies is a result of  funding pressures 
in a tertiary sector now driven almost entirely by market forces. Long ago, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, Indonesian studies attracted large enrolments, but it 
has not done so for decades. Instead, a spread of  small programs provided 
Australia with a steady stream, rather than a flood, of  Indonesia-literate 
graduates. Over the past decade or so, student numbers have dwindled as 
students get turned off  by the economic, political and security problems in 
Indonesia.
When added together, though, these many small programs still make 
Australia the world leader (outside Indonesia itself) in advanced training 
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and research about Indonesia. No other country has the breadth of  tertiary 
sector expertise on Indonesia, and it is this breadth that provides depth for 
both our knowledge of  Indonesia and our varied relationships with it.
But small programs cannot survive when the logic of  the market dictates 
all. Deans in financially pressed faculties have to make hard decisions to 
balance their budgets. Having to justify to their staff  which programs to close, 
they understandably target the smallest ones first, which means Indonesian 
studies is often in the firing line. Australia’s foreign policy priorities count 
for little in such decisions.
In the absence of  national planning, Indonesian studies dies the death 
of  a thousand cuts. Here and there, high-flying academics are able to win 
big grants and carve out temporary Indonesian studies fiefdoms. Others 
shelter under the protection of  unusually sympathetic deans or directors. 
But they do so with few guarantees of  long-term survival and without the 
institutional continuity and ballast that has made Australia the pre -eminent 
country for Indonesian studies.
In this context, it is significant that arguably the only Australian 
university where Indonesian studies has maintained a major presence and 
has not declined or experienced significant threat over the last 10 years is 
The Australian National University. The unparalleled depth of  Indonesia 
expertise here is made possible by special federal funding that subsidises 
the ANU’s Institute of  Advanced Studies, one section of  which focuses on 
Asia and the Pacific. Without similar federal priority on a broader level it is 
hard to imagine a long-term future for Indonesian studies at most Australian 
universities.
In the early 1990s, the Keating government backed its rhetorical 
commitment to Asia literacy by funding the National Asian Languages and 
Studies in Australian Schools (NALSAS) Strategy. The Rudd government 
promised to revive this program but has so far only initiated National 
Asian Languages and Studies in Schools Program (NALSSP), a pale 
and parsimoniously funded imitation. In the Keating years, the study of  
Indonesia, and Asia more broadly, experienced a renaissance in Australian 
universities. So far, despite all the rhetoric, there have been no signs of  
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equivalent leadership from the new government.
More than just sitting on its hands, the Rudd government has actively 
harmed Indonesian studies in Australia by issuing overcautious travel 
warnings to Australian citizens who plan to visit Indonesia. Wishing to 
cover itself  against any risk of  criticism for not warning of  possible threats, 
and responding to popular fears aroused by the 2002 Bali bombings, the 
government has consistently exaggerated the threat of  further terrorist 
attacks. No independent expert on Indonesian terrorism or security 
issues gives credence to the government’s evaluation of  the risks, and the 
Australian warnings have consistently been more alarmist than those of  
other countries.
The travel warnings have done great damage to Indonesian studies in 
Australia: parents forbid their children from studying Indonesian; schools 
cancel study tours and close language programs; universities ban or restrict 
their students and staff  from visiting the country. The travel warnings mean 
that, despite all the feel-good talk about better relations and Asia literacy, a 
culture of  fearfulness and risk aversion permeates all facets of  Australia’s 
relationship with Indonesia, from the top down.
As the Australia–Indonesia bilateral relations conference begins, I can’t 
help remembering my experiences in Banda Aceh and Kevin Rudd’s aim 
of  fostering Australian professionals—including health professionals, one 
would hope—who speak Asian languages. This week’s conference is a 
fitting time for the government to put flesh on the bones of  its rhetorical 
commitment to Asia literacy. It is also an opportunity to move away from 
the obsession with terrorism and security that dominated the Howard 
government’s attitude to Indonesia. Revising the travel warnings would be 
a start. Putting real resources behind teaching and research about Asia in 
Australian schools and universities would be even more significant.





There are strong arguments in favour of  a much higher degree of  bilingualism 
and multilingualism in Australia and a far greater knowledge of  Asian 
languages. I am strongly in favour of  actively pursuing these, but I suspect 
that the arguments advanced in favour of  either one do not necessarily help 
the case for the other. In fact, they may be in conflict. So we badly need 
much more discussion and debate about what we are trying to achieve.
The report, Building an Asia-Literate Australia, from the Griffith Asia 
Institute Australian Strategy for Asian Language Proficiency headed by 
Michael Wesley, proposes that Australia needs half  of  its population 
to be fluent in an Asian language within 30 years and that two-thirds of  
Australians under 40 should speak an Asian language, arguing that we must 
abandon Australia’s monolingual mindset if  we are to keep up with the 
four (increasingly multilingual) Asian powerhouses. It outlines an A$11.3 
billion, 30-year plan with three implementation phases, aiming to integrate a 
language teaching program from early primary school to university level.
That all points in a desirable direction, but there is one set of  basic 
questions I feel we must answer about our objectives before embarking on 
it. Do we want so many Asian-language speakers for essentially economic or 
vocational reasons—to be able to communicate better with our customers 
and suppliers there—or for a broader sociocultural reason, to draw us into 
closer engagement with our Asian neighbours? Or, if  a bit of  both, how 
much? And how many of  those Asian-language speakers will be able to find 
jobs where that knowledge is relevant to their employment? At present, the 
prospects are not enticing.
First published in The Australian, 24 June 2009.
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In ‘Don’t start with Asian tongues’ (The Australian Higher Education 
Supplement, 17 June), Luke Slattery also seeks to abolish our monolingual 
mindset, but argues that while bilingualism must be our minimal aim, the 
emphasis should be on cognate languages with which English has an affinity: 
German, French, Spanish and Italian. The study of  character-based Asian 
languages should be reserved for Anglophones who have already cut their 
teeth on a European language, since it takes three times as many tuition 
hours for English speakers to learn character-based languages. That sort of  
cognate apprentice tongue would then give students an appetite for more 
and a useful understanding of  how foreign languages differ from ours. But 
in that case Chinese and Japanese will have to take their place as third in the 
multilingual queue, not second.
Indonesian may be an exception as a second-language option, however, 
since it is not character-based and is relatively easy to get started on. If  we 
were to cut it loose from the constraining framework of  other traditional 
year-long, three-classes-a-week university language courses and create a far 
greater diversity of  intensive short-course options (preferably linked into 
full-immersion periods of  in-country study to add real social and cultural 
familiarity), we could do better with Indonesian in the next few years than 
we have during the past fifty.
In the half  century since it was first introduced into Australia, Indonesian 
has not made as much impact as we initially hoped on the highly Eurocentric 
character of  our university curriculums or on the thinking of  our academic 
colleagues, or on the attitudes of  Australians more broadly towards 
Indonesia. Nor have large numbers of  students ever taken it up, and those 
numbers have been falling for over a decade, during the Howard era.
Our one success has been to create a core group of  Indonesia specialists in 
our universities, a few government departments, the army and (some) parts 
of  the media, which now forms an invaluable national asset of  the highest 
international standing. But will even that small group survive much longer 
as many of  its senior members approach retirement? I hope to provoke 
some debate on these issues in a paper, ‘The past and future of  Indonesian 
studies’, at the Indonesia Council conference at the University of  Sydney in 
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mid-July. But the debate must range far wider than that if  we are ever to find 
the most appropriate solutions here.
2 September 2009
THE AUSTrALIAN
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Speak, and ye shall find knowledge
Languages are back in the news. As part of  the national curriculum debate, 
English is one of  the first cabs off  the rank and Languages Other Than 
English are following in the second group. The National Asian Languages 
and Studies in Schools Program also adds limited funding for the next three 
years to promoting four targeted languages. Moreover, there is the slow burn 
of  the crisis of  language learning at both secondary level, where a pitiful 12 
per cent of  students who complete secondary schooling take languages in 
their final exams, and at the tertiary level, where the number of  languages 
taught has fallen from 66 to less than 30 in the past decade.
This discourse is taking place against the backdrop of  the financial crisis, 
which only heightens how important languages are in our rapidly and deeply 
globalised world, where the pension incomes of  Australians are tied to the 
economic fortunes of  North Americans, Asians and Europeans. This is what 
globalisation ultimately means: international dependency of  a depth that has 
never been experienced in human history. When the economic and social 
fortunes of  all countries are so directly and closely tied to those of  other 
countries, a debate about overcoming the all-too-real language education 
First published in The Australian, 2 September 2009; posted as ‘The language education 
debate: speak, and ye shall find knowledge’, on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.
org/, 8 September 2009.
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crisis in Australia is very much to be welcomed.
However, the way the national conversation about languages is framed 
is disappointing and ultimately futile. Australia has unique potential as 
an Anglophone but multilingual country with European institutions and 
traditions, at the edge of  the fastest growing and most dynamic part of  
the world, with Asian friends and neighbours. Few would believe we have 
lived up to our national potential, which is only available through a rich 
understanding of  a multitude of  languages.
Despite recent intensified interest in language education we are concerned 
that today’s debates risk entrenching three fallacies. The first is the ‘English 
will do’ fallacy. The second is that we have to choose between Asia and 
Europe. The third is that language education serves only a utilitarian purpose: 
a fallacy which argues that we need foreign language skills exclusively to 
serve the utilitarian purpose of  promoting trade and international political 
relations.
Let us examine each of  these misconceptions in turn. Too many advocates 
of  languages fear that recognition of  the unique and unparalleled importance 
of  English in the world diminishes the case for other languages. We feel 
the complete opposite is true. The reality of  the global lingua franca role of  
English is undeniable. Recent estimates are that close to one-third of  the 
population of  the world either knows or is studying English. Australia has 
a vast benefit derived in English-medium education. To remove the native-
speaker advantage, countries in Asia, Europe and the Americas whose 
national languages are not English increasingly offer specialised business, 
technology and science programs in English to compete in this promising 
market. So why is this not bad news for other languages? Because the millions 
of  Chinese, Germans and Paraguayans who are learning and using English 
to communicate with Bulgarians and Americans alike are adding English 
to their Chinese, German and Spanish. As they become bilingual, it is only 
native speakers of  English who remain monolingual. The disadvantage 
is reversed. While not knowing English is a disadvantage, knowing only 
English is a disadvantage too.
The second fallacy is the categorical choice we are often enjoined to 
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make. Put aside Europe, we are part of  Asia; or reject Asia and cleave to 
Europe. The dichotomy is absurdly false. Is the French and Spanish spoken 
throughout the Pacific an Asian or European language; what about the 
Cantonese spoken in Canada? More significant than the silliness of  trying 
to apply Middle-Age typology to a twenty-first century mobile world, we 
need national language capability in both so-called Asian and European 
languages.
Each particular language has its distinctive needs. What Australia needs 
to do to ensure a national language capability in Vietnamese and Hindi, 
Spanish and German, is unique to each of  those languages. There is no 
Asian language category; even so-called character-based languages are 
radically different from each other. We must teach in our schools and 
universities the key languages of  Asia and the key languages of  Europe. We 
must also support languages that do not fit neatly into secure geographic 
categorisations but which are important for Australian national interests 
(Arabic, Russian and world languages such as Spanish). Moreover, a humane 
and sophisticated languages policy sensitive to national need must find ways 
to support Aboriginal and community languages.
We should have a policy that aims to conserve the remarkable contribution 
that immigrant communities from all over the world make to the nation. Of  
course we agree that our schools cannot teach all languages, but students 
and communities provide these programs in vast numbers.
The final fallacy, and in some ways the deepest and most troubling, is the 
almost exclusively utilitarian approach to language learning that much of  
the recent discussion has taken. Of  course, the trade and security reasons 
for studying languages are enormously important on a variety of  levels, 
but ultimately the reason students should learn and study languages is a 
humanistic one.
We know that students may start a language for utilitarian purposes, but the 
research also teaches that it is what language brings beyond some potential 
future job that keeps students studying until their language proficiency is 
functionally useful. Studying languages allows our students to encounter 
human differences in their most natural way and thereby to open themselves 
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to an exploring and understanding of  the self  based on learning about the 
other.
There will always be a need for short-term and specialised niche language 
teaching in particular languages, but the providers of  this kind of  training 
can do so best on the basis of  a successful apprenticeship in bilingualism in 
schools. Ultimately this is why we compel young Australians to be schooled. 
We want them to experience rich, humanistic education that asks questions 
about the civilisations of  Europe and Asia, not to mention the Americas 
and Africa.
A language education policy that takes seriously the highest intellectual, 
cultural and civilisational ideals of  the great experiences of  humanity must 
be global, taking in both Asian and European and fusing these together to 






One fish, two fish, no fish
Introduction
The past fifty years has seen a massive expansion in fishing capacity that 
has overexploited many fisheries to the point that reducing fishing would 
increase overall profits from harvesting, perhaps by as much as US$50 
billion per year. About a quarter of  the world fisheries are also overexploited 
in the biological sense that current harvests are less than what they could be 
if  fishing effort were reduced and stocks were allowed to increase. Fishing 
has contributed to the stock collapses that account for about 15 per cent 
of  exploited fisheries, has changed the age structure and stability of  fish 
populations and the trophic level of  exploited species, and has altered the 
This paper is drawn from chapter one (with co-authors Ray Hilborn, Dale Squires and 
Meryl Williams) of  Handbook of  Marine Fisheries Conservation and Management, edited by 
R. Quentin Grafton, Ray Hilborn, Dale Squires, Maree Tait and Meryl Williams, to be 
published by Oxford University Press later this year. An edited version was posted on Inside 
Story, http://inside.org.au/one-fish-two-fish-no-fish/, 18 August 2009.
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species composition of  fish communities. Destructive fishing has also 
damaged marine ecosystems.
The impact of  these changes is that the world harvest of  capture fisheries 
reached a plateau in the early 1990s at about 85 million metric tons, and much 
of  the future supply of  fish will come largely from aquaculture. Aquaculture 
already supplies about half  of  the fish people directly consume. However, 
many of  the highly valued aquaculture species depend on fish protein from 
capture fisheries to provide the bulk of  their feed. This so-called ‘fish-meal 
trap’, however, does not apply to shellfish, but it could become an issue even 
for herbivorous farmed fish as protein-rich feeds can increase growth rates 
of  all fish species. The evidence to date, however, suggests that the limits 
in terms of  the supply of  fish-meal have not had an appreciable impact 
on aquaculture’s rapid growth although this may change for high-valued 
farmed fish (such as salmon) if  prices of  fish-meal rise appreciably. If  the 
fish-meal trap were to eventuate, it would be a major concern, as would 
any further declines or collapse in wild fisheries on which many poor and 
fishing-dependent communities rely for the bulk of  their protein intake.
As salmon stocks have declined, primarily due to habitat deterioration 
and even loss, farmed Atlantic salmon from Norway, Chile, Australia and 
other countries have become increasingly important sources of  supply. This 
has benefited consumers, primarily in rich countries, who now have access 
to a greatly increased supply of  salmon and also other premium species 
such as shrimps/prawns at much reduced prices. In turn, lower fish prices 
have reduced the profitability of  harvesting wild stocks as has happened in 
Australia’s Northern Prawn Fishery.
The difficulties of  managing fisheries extend well beyond concerns 
about overfishing and include environmental, ecological and biodiversity 
considerations. Overlaying these challenges is international trade that 
allows high-income nations to potentially export their marine conservation 
problems to lower-income countries while importing their fish to consume. 
A key issue is how to develop the appropriate mix of  private benefits (that 
accrue solely to their user) from fishing with the environmental, ecological 
and public good benefits (that are available to all and are non-rivalrous) 
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aspects of  the marine environment to achieve the most socially desirable 
outcome.
In an increasingly interconnected world, conservation and management 
issues extend beyond the boundaries of  a single nation, including the high 
seas. Conservation and management issues of  trans-boundary resources face 
an additional issue: how to achieve the cooperation of  multiple nations when 
each country wishes to preserve its own sovereignty and freedom of  action. 
The potential for decline in marine capture fisheries poses major dilemmas 
for the 200 million or so fishers and others employed in fish supply chains 
that, along with their families, depend directly on them for their livelihood. 
Managing fish stocks and conserving the marine environment on which 
these communities depend represent the greatest human challenge facing 
ocean management.
The challenges of  overfishing and conservation are exacerbated by global 
dilemmas such as climate change. Acidification of  the world’s oceans, rising 
sea levels, changes in salinity and water temperature, and increased variability 
of  ocean currents associated with climate change all represent risks that 
must be effectively managed to ensure the sustainability of  the world’s 
fisheries. In all likelihood, effective mitigation on anthropogenic emissions 
of  greenhouse gases is decades away, so we must prepare for and adapt to an 
increasingly uncertain ocean environment. The best way to face these global 
challenges is to resolve present-day problems that have remedies.
The causes and remedies for overfishing
The many differences across fisheries, fish stocks and their habitats, however, 
obscure the commonalities across the world’s oceans. Four key traits are 
shared by almost all fisheries; these account for why many fisheries are 
overexploited and offer insights into the way forward to implement effective 
marine conservation.
Fisheries as common-pool resources
Fish stocks are common-pool resources where (1) catches are rivalrous, 
and (2) it is costly to effectively control the access and the harvest from 
them. The first characteristic means that fishing by one person reduces 
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the catch available to others. In the absence of  property rights over the 
right to catch fish and effective control of  fishing effort, this means that 
individual fishers will catch too many fish because they will fail to consider 
the costs they impose on others from their own actions. This is not because 
fishers do not care about sustainability of  the stocks on which they depend, 
but because conservation efforts by any one individual will simply end up 
benefiting someone else in the absence of  effective collective management 
and control.
The second characteristic of  a common-pool resource is that it is 
difficult and expensive for centralised governments or international bodies 
to control or limit the industry. This is because harvesting, often by many 
different individuals, occurs at sea. In contrast to those working in terrestrial 
environments, fishers are difficult to monitor and regulations are difficult 
to enforce. The complexity is compounded in transnational fisheries and 
among highly migratory species, when harvesting is carried out by individuals 
from many different nations. Adequate observer programs, and other means 
to see what, when and where fish are caught, are affordable only in high-
value fisheries. In the absence of  such coverage, managers must infer what 
is happening at sea.
The difficulty in implementing adequate monitoring, control and 
surveillance is one reason that in many fisheries the incentives do not exist for 
fishers to behave in a way that promotes both their own individual long-term 
interest and the sustainability of  the resource. This problem is compounded 
for highly migratory and trans-boundary species such as tunas.
Fisheries in an uncertain world
Fisheries are subject to large, and sometimes unforeseen, fluctuations. For 
example, ocean currents may shift direction in one year, resulting in the 
collapse of  populations that depend on the nutrients that these currents 
provide. There are inherent uncertainties in marine capture fisheries that will 
never be overcome, and many of  the fluctuations in fish stocks are a result 
of  environmental changes over which we have no control. Thus, effective 
management of  fisheries requires explicit recognition of  these uncertainties. 
This not only demands ‘robust’ methods of  management that offer a degree 
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of  control under different conditions but also makes resilience, or the ability 
of  marine ecosystems to ‘bounce back’ in response to negative shocks, an 
important goal of  fisheries management.
Uncertainty about the current and future state of  fisheries and the 
marine environment requires management approaches that can formulate 
different actions for different scenarios. Unfortunately, many fisheries 
managers lack the capacity and resources to fully model and consider a 
full range of  scenarios and different states. In these situations, and as an 
alternative, knowledgeable stakeholders can be recruited to provide ongoing 
information on sustainability of  stocks and habitat, while community and 
traditional management structures can be supported to limit fishing effort 
on vulnerable locations and species.
Although modelling is helpful to fisheries managers, it is not a prerequisite 
to implement adaptive management, which can be described as a situation 
whereby managers have quantifiable goals and objectives, monitor outcomes 
as best they can and, where necessary, both learn and adapt their strategies 
depending on the states of  the world. Given the prevailing uncertainties, 
adaptive management is necessary for successful marine conservation in the 
long run because simply setting regulations on ‘autopilot’ and hoping for the 
best cannot be the best strategy in every state of  the world.
Fishers before fish
Putting fish before fishers has contributed to the current problems of  
overfishing. This is because many regulations and approaches to management 
are first designed around achieving levels of  fishing mortality with little 
consideration as to how these levels of  harvest can realistically be achieved. 
For example, managers may restrict the number of  fishing vessels allowed 
into a fishery. However, in the absence of  controls on these vessels, fishing 
effort will continue to expand if  it is profitable to do so. Subsequently, 
managers may also limit the length of  vessels permitted to fish, but as long 
as fishers find it in their financial interest, they will substitute other inputs, 
such as increasing the width or volume of  their vessels or switching to gear 
that is unregulated.
An alternative to a top-down approach to fisheries starts with understanding 
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fishers, the most important of  all predators. It recognises that approaches 
that help to ensure that the individual incentives of  fishers coincide with the 
overall interests of  the fishery will be much more successful than approaches 
that force fishers to act in ways that are contrary to their interests. These 
incentives-based approaches share a common feature: they allow fishers, 
either individually or collectively, to have ‘catch shares’ or rights over 
particular fishing locations. These have been successfully implemented in 
key Commonwealth fisheries in Australia, such as the southeast trawl fishery, 
in a number of  state fisheries, and in other countries such as New Zealand 
and Iceland.
By providing fishers with a dedicated share of  the allowable catch, 
harvesters have a long-term incentive to conserve fish stocks as they 
directly benefit from conservation. The dynamic of  fishing behaviour also 
changes from one of  racing to catch the fish before someone else to one of  
minimising harvesting costs and protecting the future returns from fishing. 
Transferability of  the catch shares allows fishers to voluntarily exit from 
fishing.
Fishing, fisheries and marine ecosystems
Fish stocks are part of  marine ecosystems. Some of  these interactions are 
direct in that big fish eat small fish and are part of  the many food webs 
linking phytoplankton up to the largest predators. Fishing often targets only 
a few components of  ecosystems, primarily, but not exclusively, the larger 
predators. This affects not only the targeted species but also, through the 
complex interactions across species and their habitats, influences other parts 
of  the marine environment.
Recognition of  the impacts of  fishing on marine ecosystems has led to 
the development of  ecosystem approaches to fisheries management. Such 
approaches take a broader perspective that goes beyond the sustainability 
of  targeted fish stocks and tries to account for the overall ecosystem health. 
These approaches are precautionary and seek to promote resilience of  
ecosystems and the sustainability of  fisheries. The ecosystem approach is in 
contrast to what has been viewed as a ‘single-species management’ whereby 
fishing on specific target species is regulated with little consideration of  the 
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effects of  harvesting on other species or habitats.
The challenge with ecosystem approaches is to understand the species 
interactions well enough to improve on existing practice and then to translate 
this understanding into management strategies that result in better outcomes. 
This is a difficult enough task in rich countries with strong research capacity 
and well-developed management. It is impossible in the national fisheries 
of  many developing countries, where even single-species management is 
not done effectively. This suggests that bottom-up approaches that provide 
incentives for fishers to sustain marine ecosystems, and not just the fish on 
which their livelihood depends, will be critical to achieving the worthy goals 
of  the ecosystem approach to fisheries.
The future
The path ahead is difficult, but there are reasons to be hopeful. Fisheries 
management can, and has, generated turnarounds in fish stocks when fishers 
are considered to be part of  the solution and not just viewed as a problem 
that can be regulated out of  existence. The insights from the successes and 
failures in marine conservation and fisheries management show that if  best 
practices were implemented today, there would be enormous gains in both 
public and private benefits from the world’s oceans.




Nuclear energy is neither a monster nor a panacea
Nuclear power for Australia is one of  those issues that just will not go 
away. In his speech to the Sydney Institute on Tuesday, national secretary 
of  the Australian Workers Union, Paul Howes, did not so much reopen the 
debate by suggesting that Australia let go of  its ‘superstitions’ and embrace 
nuclear energy, as bring back to the surface the gurgling undercurrents of  a 
discussion that never really disappears.
Nor should it disappear. Howes’s detractors will argue nuclear energy is 
too expensive or too hazardous for Australia to seriously consider it as an 
option. Others may be tempted to jump too strongly on his bandwagon and 
suggest nuclear energy is the single answer for Australia’s (and the world’s) 
energy and greenhouse gas challenges. But neither of  these extremes holds. 
Nuclear energy is neither a monster nor a panacea, and that is one reason 
the debate continues.
Howes has made three nuclear proposals. First, that Australia increase the 
scale of  uranium mining to meet growing international demand, in which 
case Queensland needs to get with the program and drop its opposition. 
Second, that Australia build a domestic nuclear energy generation capacity as 
part of  a more sustainable mix of  energy sources. And third, that Australia 
develop the capacity to ‘process’ its own uranium to use in its own civilian 
reactors.
The first two of  these ideas have significant merit. The third, which is 
elsewhere called uranium conversion and enrichment, could be unnecessary 
and risky for Australia. An expansion in uranium mining is already occurring 
in Western Australia and South Australia. Uranium oxide still accounts for 
First published in The Age, 20 August 2009.
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less than 1 per cent of  total Australian mineral and energy sales, but as the 
holder of  the world’s largest available uranium deposits, Australia can still 
benefit significantly from the expansion in international demand for nuclear 
fuels, regardless of  the political climate in Queensland.
Also, for the time being at least, Canberra does not have to contemplate 
the sale of  uranium to India, which would contravene the established policy 
of  exporting only to countries in good standing with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. This quiet interlude in Australia-India nuclear relations 
is due to the Rudd government’s willingness at the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
to let other countries cooperate with India’s nuclear industry.
The creation of  a serious civilian nuclear power generation capacity would 
break new ground in Australia. Howes’s estimate that this might not occur 
before 2020 probably underestimates the time it would take, even under 
the best circumstances. It would be an expensive choice and could only be 
justified as a long-term investment. Australia would need to carry out careful 
diplomacy to reassure neighbours that they had nothing to fear from an 
Australian civilian nuclear program.
In fact, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that Australia should choose to 
say no to nuclear energy. But the consequences of  such a choice need to be 
recognised. If  Australians want plentiful energy, it means a continuing over-
reliance on coal with a resulting heavy carbon footprint and the rapid use of  
Australia’s natural gas reserves. Or it means an energy mix of  non-nuclear 
renewable sources, which would reduce greenhouse emissions but would 
generate so little power that drastic and very uncomfortable changes in the 
way Australians live, work and play would be required.
If  Australians want to have their cake and eat it too—continuing their 
high levels of  energy consumption while somehow moderating their 
country’s large per capita carbon footprint—then having some nuclear 
energy probably needs to be part of  the answer.
Whatever else it chooses to do on the nuclear energy front, Australia 
probably should not look to process its own uranium for its own nuclear 
reactors. Howes’s notion that this would add value is off  the mark. 
Enrichment is an especially expensive business and it is not clear that a 
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country with Australia’s population and just a few reactors could ever justify 
such a move.
It would be cheaper for Australia to rely on someone else to do the low-
level enrichment needed to make uranium suitable for use in civilian nuclear 
plants, even if  that means reimporting Australian uranium ‘processed’ 
offshore.
Like other responsible countries in the world, Australia has little interest 
in seeing the spread of  enrichment capacities. Insisting on its own right 
to do so may open Australia up to charges that it really did have ulterior 
motives with its embrace of  nuclear energy, unless Australia could somehow 
get itself  chosen as one of  the locations where internationally controlled 
and endorsed enrichment was to take place.
Yet if  Australia is looking to offer its services to the world as a good 
nuclear energy citizen, it should look no further than the need for 
international depositories for long-term waste. Australia is an old, vast and 
stable continent, and there is hardly anywhere else in the world that is a 
less-bad choice for such a facility. But this would require even more political 
leadership and courage than would be needed if  Australia were to take a 





Shutting down the Taliban is key to success
The decision of  the Obama administration to send a further 17,000 troops 
to Afghanistan points to a decisive shift in focus from the era of  the Bush 
administration, in which Iraq proved a fatal distraction. ‘In Afghanistan’, a 
senior Bush official remarked, ‘we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we 
must.’ Thankfully, President Barack Obama shows signs of  having moved 
away from this dismal logic.
But where this will lead is still not clear, in part because a US policy review 
under a senior official, Bruce Riedel, is yet to be completed. This, together 
with disturbing news stories from Afghanistan, has created a pervasive sense 
of  unease about where US policy is headed and where Washington’s allies 
might be led.
The temptation to see Afghanistan as another Vietnam-style quagmire, 
to suggest that foreign forces always meet with resistance, and to argue that 
First published in The Age, 24 February 2009.
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bolstering Pakistan is more important is seemingly quite strong. Yet much 
of  this narrative is suspect, based on dubious history, on isolated pieces of  
information taken out of  context and on a reluctance to face up to other 
harsh truths about Afghanistan’s neighbourhood.
There is no doubt that Afghanistan faces very serious challenges. The 
Karzai government was in several respects handed a poisoned chalice. At 
the 2001 Bonn meeting that set the direction for Afghanistan’s transition, 
control of  ‘departments’ of  the future Afghan state was delivered to 
patronage networks, setting the scene for dysfunctional politicking.
This problem was compounded when the Bush administration blocked 
the expansion beyond Kabul of  the new International Security Assistance 
Force, thereby remitting control of  much of  the countryside to non-state 
actors, some of  them deeply unappetising. Added to this was a flood of  aid 
money, much of  it directed to private contractors with little understanding 
of  Afghanistan’s complexities, but with a mandate to spend it, fast. All this 
made inefficiency and corruption virtually inevitable.
Yet despite this, recent, serious survey research points to a great resilience 
on the Afghans’ part and a continued preference for the transition that 
began in 2001. A carefully designed June–July 2008 Asia Foundation survey 
found that 67 per cent of  respondents gave a positive assessment of  the 
central authorities and 78 per cent regarded democracy as the best form of  
government. Insecurity (36 per cent) and unemployment (31 per cent) far 
exceeded corruption (14 per cent) in respondents’ listings of  Afghanistan’s 
biggest problem.
The problem of  the Afghan state is not fundamentally one of  illegitimacy 
but of  incapacity, and this highlights the need for a new package of  aid for 
state-building that equips the Afghan state to perform a few key tasks well.
It is also the case that Afghans greatly prefer the current situation to an 
alternative that might give some space to the Taliban, as a BBC/ABC poll 
conducted in all Afghan provinces in January 2009 shows. Some 82 per 
cent said they would rather have the current government rule the country 
(compared with 4 per cent preferring the Taliban); 58 per cent named the 
Taliban as the biggest danger to the country. A striking 69 per cent concluded 
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it was good that US forces had come in 2001 to overthrow the Taliban, and 
63 per cent supported the presence of  US forces now (with 59 per cent 
supporting the presence of  NATO/International Security Assistance Force 
operatives).
And in response to those who would promote negotiation with the 
Taliban, 71 per cent said this should happen only if  the Taliban first stopped 
fighting, with 64 per cent adding that the Taliban remain the same as when 
they ruled before 2001.
Contrary to florid claims that the Taliban ‘control’ 70 per cent of  
Afghanistan, in this survey 63 per cent of  respondents stated that the 
Taliban had ‘no significant presence at all’ in their local areas, 67 per cent 
saw the central government as having a strong presence in their area, and 52 
per cent of  respondents rated the work of  President Karzai as ‘excellent’ or 
‘good’. But that said, the survey also confirmed popular hostility to US air 
strikes, with 77 per cent finding them unacceptable because of  the risk of  
civilian casualties.
All this points to the need for much more nuanced diagnoses of  
Afghanistan’s problems. Some areas in Afghanistan are profoundly and 
dispiritingly insecure, but for the most part they are the regions nearest 
the sanctuaries in Pakistan where the Taliban leaders, and their allies in the 
Hezb-e Islami and the so-called ‘Haqqani network’, are based. Ultimately, 
Afghanistan will remain at risk until the sanctuaries are shut down.
This is not something the Pakistan military will readily countenance. As 
Bruce Riedel himself  put it in 2008, ‘Pakistan helped engineer the alliance 
between al-Qaeda and the Taliban and ensured the Taliban’s safety in 
Afghanistan.’ Indeed, as recently as May last year, Pakistan’s army chief  
reportedly referred to Haqqani as a ‘strategic asset’.
But Pakistan itself  is now profoundly threatened by the forces it unleashed 
when it promoted the Taliban in the 1990s, and it should be pressed 
relentlessly to arrest the Taliban leaders in their Quetta sanctuary.
This is well within Pakistan’s capacity, it would give a huge psychological 
boost to moderates throughout the region, and it would help ensure that 
any additional Australian troops deployed to protect ordinary Afghans in 





Afghanistan’s elections: the eye of the storm
At 6 am on 20 August, I headed out from my hotel in the Kabul Shahr-e 
Naw district to join a team of  observers visiting polling places in different 
parts of  the Afghan capital. Most election observation by international 
observer teams is as much an exercise in confidence building as in detailed 
monitoring, since at best one can witness only a tiny fraction of  the vote-
casting even at a single polling station. My own day proved quite uneventful. 
A bomb blast in a nearby suburb and a gunfight downtown did nothing to 
disrupt my monitoring and, in the polling places I visited, the polling staff  
conducted themselves well, right down to the proper recording of  serial 
numbers on the tamper-proof  seals that hold the lids of  ballot boxes in 
place. Many journalists in Kabul saw much the same thing, and this lent a 
distinct tone of  relief  to reporting of  election day.
Yet this represents only a small part of  the story. Across Afghanistan, 
there were roughly six times as many violent incidents as one would expect 
on a ‘normal’ late summer day, and it is now clear that this, along with a 
generalised fear of  carnage, had a major impact on turnout, especially of  
women. In the entire province of  Uruzgan, in which Australian troops are 
based, only six polling stations for women actually opened, meaning that 
only 3,600 ballot papers were available for women. And in the province 
of  Kandahar, informed international staff  concluded that even a suggested 
turnout figure of  5 per cent was a gross exaggeration. This is part of  a 
different and alarming story about what actually happened on polling day.
When turnout is low, an often-overlooked implication is that there are 
likely to be large numbers of  blank ballot papers that can be put to nefarious 
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use. And as time goes by, it seems more and more likely that Afghanistan’s 
troubled provinces of  Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Ghazni and Helmand 
were witness to industrial-scale fraud, driven by backers of  the president but 
facilitated by electoral staff  who had been effectively suborned. Fraud on 
this scale not only puts the credibility of  the election on the line but poses a 
hideous challenge for the international community.
On the evening of  22 August, a report surfaced in Kabul that President 
Karzai had won over 70 per cent of  the vote. Since turnout by all accounts 
was lowest in the areas where he had done best in 2004, and he had won only 
55.4 per cent in 2004 when everything worked in his favour, such a figure 
(or indeed any figure that would give President Karzai a first-round victory) 
strains credulity to breaking-point. To those with long memories, it recalls 
the 1977 Pakistan election, when associates and supporters of  Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, keen to give him a memorable victory, did just that—producing an 
outcome so lopsided that it triggered Bhutto’s downfall. President Karzai may 
have been similarly ill served by his supporters, since his personal standing 
will be permanently stained if  he is perceived to have retained office on the 
strength of  stuffed ballot boxes and falsified vote tallies. The real victims of  
all this, however, would be the ordinary people of  Afghanistan.
It is difficult to overstate the threat that a corrupted election would pose 
to the prospects for Afghanistan’s transition. Some figures seem to think 
that Afghanistan has muddled through problems in the past, and that the 
same will happen this time. Such a sanguine approach fails to recognise that 
the 2009 election has brought Afghanistan to a fundamental tipping point in 
terms of  governmental legitimacy.
Some (US) figures apparently fear that a second round of  voting could 
sharpen ethnic rivalries. But a Karzai victory that was perceived to have been 
dependent on fraud would do far more to ignite ethnic tensions than any 
run-off  could possibly do. Furthermore, the international community would 
lose all credibility in the eyes of  many Afghans if  it signed off  on the result. 
But even more seriously, ordinary Afghans would likely give up all hope of  
being able to use peaceful, political means to procure political change. The 
main beneficiaries of  this would of  course be the Taliban.
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In all the circumstances, a run-off  election between the incumbent 
president and his main challenger seems not only the best, but probably 
the only, way of  forestalling either a catastrophic political crisis or the total 
loss of  any momentum for Afghanistan’s state-building experiment. This 
will put enormous pressure in the coming weeks not only on the Electoral 
Complaints Commission, headed by Grant Kippen, but also on the United 
States, the European Union, the United Nations and those actors in 
international society that purport to value both the idea of  free and fair 





When soldiers die, our political leaders speak of  the nation’s shared grief. In 
the big wars of  the last century, when so many soldiers died and so many 
families grieved, that may have carried some truth. But when soldiers die in 
small wars, the grief  is not shared in any meaningful way, and it is dishonest 
to say otherwise. In reality, the awful price is paid by just a few—the dead 
soldier’s family and friends. How do we weigh their grief  in the cost-benefit 
calculations of  strategic policy, when the rest of  us do not and cannot share 
it?
Few of  us are pacifists, so most of  us accept that such decisions must 
sometimes be made. But in Australia we have not faced them for a long 
time. Not since Vietnam have Australian leaders, and Australian voters, had 
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to take responsibility for deliberately committing fellow citizens to military 
operations in which we expect some of  them will be killed. Today we do face 
that responsibility. Eleven members of  the Australian Defence Force (ADF) 
have now been killed in action in Afghanistan. As this toll has mounted, 
something important has changed in the nature of  Australia’s engagement 
in this war. Their deaths are no longer exceptional and unexpected. They 
have become the normal and expected consequence of  the government’s 
policy choices.
Of  course, 11 is not many compared with our losses in the wars of  
the last century. Nor is it many compared with the losses of  some of  our 
partners in Afghanistan: Canada has lost over 120. But 11 is enough, surely, 
to weigh in the balance as we consider the future of  Australia’s commitment 
and to bring into focus the wider questions about this war and the choices 
we make about it. In coming months the Rudd government will be pressed 
by Washington to send more troops to Afghanistan and to assign them more 
dangerous roles. Saying ‘yes’ would virtually ensure that more Australians will 
be killed. Ministers will have to decide whether to impose on a few families 
an unbearable burden of  grief, as the price of  achieving the purposes for 
which the war is being fought.
What are those purposes again? We hear four different reasons why 
Afghanistan’s future matters so much to Australia. One is a sense of  
obligation to the Afghans: those who toppled the Taliban should help clean 
up the resulting mess. Fair enough, perhaps; but such obligations have limits, 
and surely we have passed them. We cannot be obliged to persist indefinitely 
in a costly, hopeless effort to do for the Afghan people what, in the end, only 
they can do for themselves.
The second reason to stay in Afghanistan—the one most often cited by our 
leaders—is that denying the Taliban control over Afghanistan helps protect 
our countries from terrorist attack. September 11 and the Bali bombing 
were nurtured from Afghanistan, they say, and that could happen again if  
the West withdrew. But denying bases in Afghanistan will not significantly 
reduce the risk of  terrorism in future, because terrorists can easily find bases 
elsewhere, and they already have. What happens in Afghanistan is therefore 
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incidental to the future terrorist threat: success there would not make us 
safe, failure would not increase the risk much, if  at all.
The third reason is that success in Afghanistan is essential to fixing the 
problem in Pakistan. Pakistan—where Islamist extremism, weak government 
and nuclear weapons mix—poses much greater dangers than Afghanistan. 
Arguably, success in Afghanistan is necessary for progress in Pakistan, but it 
is far from being sufficient. With or without peace in Afghanistan we have 
no solution to Pakistan’s problems. Indeed, the argument might better run 
the other way: the fact that we find it so hard to fix Afghanistan suggests 
that we have absolutely no chance of  fixing Pakistan, which has six times as 
many people.
Finally, of  course, there is the alliance. Everyone in Canberra knows 
that this is what Afghanistan is really about for Australia. It is an old story. 
Since Vietnam, Australia has proved its value as an ally by offering small, 
essentially symbolic contingents to support US military operations in and 
around the Gulf. This has worked well for us. The occasional small, low-cost 
deployment to the Gulf  has been a very cost-effective way to maintain our 
reputation as a close and reliable ally.
But does it still work? In the ‘war on terror’, the kind of  small, safe 
commitments we made in the 1980s and 1990s don’t cut much ice. In fact 
there is a real risk that Australia’s token efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have battered rather than burnished our standing in Washington. The gap 
between gung-ho rhetoric and timid reality has become too plain. John 
Howard’s personal rapport with Bush limited the damage on his watch, but 
Kevin Rudd has no special friend in the Oval Office. Obama will judge 
Australia unsentimentally, on its actions, and that judgement is unlikely to 
be generous.
This suggests that, if  the alliance is the real reason we are in Afghanistan, it 
is time to move beyond tokenism. We should send more troops and commit 
them to do the more dangerous jobs that the Americans would like us to 
take on. But that raises two deeper questions. First, does helping America 
so far from home still make sense when it requires not small, short, low-risk 
deployments, but bigger, longer and more dangerous ones? Interestingly, 
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the government’s new Defence White Paper suggests that it doesn’t. In an 
intriguing passage (paragraph 6.15), it says, ‘We must never put ourselves 
in the position where the price of  our own security is a requirement to put 
Australian troops at risk in distant theatres of  war where we have no direct 
interests at stake.’ Makes you wonder, doesn’t it?
Second, does this whole approach to alliance management match 
contemporary strategic circumstances? Deployments to distant places like 
the Gulf  and Afghanistan have been central to Australia’s alliance with 
America because, as long as Asia enjoyed uncontested US strategic primacy, 
there was nothing for a loyal ally like Australia to do closer to home. But 
that era may well be passing. The new Defence White Paper suggests that 
American strategic primacy in Asia faces a fundamental challenge from 
China. If  so, Australia’s alliance with America will rapidly focus back on 
Asia as Washington looks for our support in meeting Beijing’s challenge. 
Whether we agree to provide that support will have profound implications 
for the alliance. If  we do, any failings in Afghanistan will soon be forgotten. 
If  we decline, nothing we have done in Afghanistan will save the alliance. 
Either way, as Asia becomes more contested, what we do in Afghanistan 
matters less and less to the way we are seen in Washington.
All this suggests that there is little reason for Rudd to send more 
Australians into danger in Afghanistan. But it prompts a further question 
too: why stay at all? Where do we think it is going, and how will it end? 
Right now it does not look good. The election in August has done nothing 
to restore either the legitimacy of  President Karzai or the credibility of  the 
political system which has been sponsored by the Coalition over the past 
eight years. The hope has faded that the Taliban can quickly be defeated by 
applying the counter-insurgency tactics which apparently helped pacify parts 
of  Iraq. The Taliban seem to grow stronger and more capable. Coalition 
commanders keep asking for still more troops. And the numbers of  soldiers 
being killed grows.
No one can be sure that the intervention will fail. But seriously, no one in 
policy circles in Canberra really expects that it will succeed, and few of  them 
seem to believe that it matters much whether it does or not. By far the most 
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likely outcome, therefore, is that one day, after spending billions more dollars 
and who knows how many more lives, Australia will leave Afghanistan pretty 
much as we found it. So why not quit now, if  the interests at stake are 
illusory, and the chances of  success are so low?
The answer of  course is politics. Kevin Rudd’s approach to Afghanistan, 
like Barack Obama’s, began with a political calculation, not a strategic 
imperative. There is no evidence that, as they campaigned for office, either 
Rudd or Obama thought deeply about Afghanistan itself  or weighed the 
balance of  risks, costs and benefits of  the intervention before committing 
themselves, if  elected, to persevere in it. What they did consider was the need 
to show their national security credentials by offsetting plans to withdraw 
from Iraq with strong commitment to another, less unpopular, war.
Now, as that war too becomes unpopular, they find themselves in a fix. 
Western voters dislike long, costly and unsuccessful foreign wars, especially 
when there is no strong and clear national interest at stake. But they also 
hate military failure, and they punish politicians who seem not to have the 
stomach for a tough fight, even when they see that the fight is probably both 
pointless and hopeless. Kevin Rudd, like Obama, therefore finds himself  
squeezed between the voters’ growing dislike of  the war and their perennial 
predisposition to punish a quitter. Strangely enough, this vice squeezes 
harder as casualties climb, because, while the voters dislike casualties, they 
also dislike leaders who lack the guts to keep going when the coffins start 
coming home.
Rudd’s approach to this dilemma is simple enough. He will do as little as 
possible. He will maintain the commitment, but try to keep it as small and 
safe and short as possible. He will try to keep our troop numbers down, keep 
them away from more risky operations and offer the hope that we can leave 
before Afghanistan as a whole is fixed, once we have trained up local forces 
in Uruzgan. The problem is that this will achieve none of  our supposed 
objectives, either in the transformation of  Afghanistan or the maintenance 
of  our alliance. And it will still impose, on the families and friends of  those 





Government responsibility for bushfire tragedy
How much responsibility do governments have for the disastrous loss of  
life and property on Black Saturday, 7 February? The answer is unclear and 
likely to remain so. Too many human elements are involved, including the 
warped motives of  arsonists and the uncoordinated actions of  individual 
residents and property holders, to reach any definitive conclusions about 
who was responsible for what.
But some conclusions have become quickly apparent. First, the strong 
likelihood that a mega firestorm could result from such extreme climatic 
conditions was both predictable and actually predicted in the days leading 
up to the fires. If  people were taken by surprise, the reason does not lie 
in the supposed, and comforting, unpredictability of  nature but in a more 
worrying, and culpable, failure of  human communication. Responsibility for 
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this failure must lie, in large measure, with the public authorities tasked with 
informing their communities of  imminent threats to life and property.
Second, whatever the rights and wrongs of  fuel reduction in forests and 
around properties, the fact that governments have discouraged controlled 
burning and the removal of  trees near houses must have contributed to 
the severity of  the fires and to the loss of  life. Here the responsibility lies 
with all levels of  government, with the federal and state governments for 
the management of  forests and with local governments for the regulations 
governing individual properties. These policies all require a difficult balance 
between competing values, including the protection of  a green environment 
and the safety of  those who choose to live in or near forests. But where that 
balance is struck is a political decision for which elected governments must 
take responsibility.
Now is not the time for blame, we are told. But if  blame is put on hold, 
so too is responsibility and admission of  failure. Our system of  government 
requires our political leaders to take responsibility for the collective failures 
of  the governments they lead. We do not expect them to take personal 
blame for everything that goes wrong, still less to have all the answers at their 
fingertips. But we have a right to hear them accept that the policies of  their 
government have failed (as they clearly have), to express collective regret on 
the part of  the governments they lead, and to promise future improvements. 
So far, however, there has been no clear admission of  responsibility. We have 
been told that existing policies have served us well in the past and may need 
to be revised for the future. But what we need to hear is that existing policies 
actually failed us on Black Saturday. Official statements that effective plans 
were drawn up have an air of  Sir Humphrey-like unreality. How can plans 
have been effective if  they failed to work?
Premier Brumby’s appointment of  a royal commission to investigate all 
aspects of  the fires is a necessary process in discovering the truth in all its 
complexity. But it should not be allowed to deflect all public discussion of  
policy or to shield ministers from legitimate questioning about what went 
wrong. If  the commission is used to distance ministers from responsibility, 
it will deprive the public of  their best chance of  imposing the necessary 
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changes. Only if  ministers own all aspects of  the policy, including its 
spectacular failure this month, will their political opponents have incentives 
to exploit their vulnerability. Without effective political articulation as part 
of  the cut and thrust of  party politics, policy recommendations will simply 
gather dust until the next time the authorities are overwhelmed.
When single individuals suffer from major government incompetence—
when a pregnant mother miscarries in a hospital toilet or an Australian citizen 
is wrongly deported—political oppositions and angry critics are all over the 
responsible ministers, who are then forced into implementing remedies. But 
when tragedies occur on a mass scale, the only legitimate public emotions 
seem to be compassion for those affected and admiration for those who 
come to their aid. Politics is muted as prime ministers and premiers lead the 
nation in mourning, as if  they were solely spectators in a tragedy to which 
they have contributed.
By all means, communities should unite in common grief  for those who 
have lost their lives and property and in gratitude to the outstanding efforts 
of  emergency workers and other helpers. But we should not be asked to 
suppress all anger at the outcome or to blunt our immediate demand for 
answers. Unless public anger continues, albeit channelled by rational concern 
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Evidence-based policy
The notion of  ‘evidence-based policy’ exerts a strong rhetorical pull. Who 
could possibly be against it? But in this case, why is it so rare? Why is 
evidence so often overlooked or left undiscovered? The alcopops tax and 
Fuel Watch spring obviously to mind, but the list is a long one. In a recent 
lecture (‘Evidence-based policy-making: What is it? How do we get it’), 
Gary Banks, Chairman of  the Productivity Commission, gave an excellent 
analysis of  the role of  evidence in policymaking. Indeed, the Productivity 
Commission itself  can be seen as the leading government agency for policy-
related research, particularly since it blunted the harder ideological edge of  its 
predecessor, the Industry Commission. Its chairman is therefore well placed 
to reflect on the use that governments make of  research-based evidence.
Two general points emerge from the analysis. First, evidence can rarely 
provide conclusive answers to policy problems. Other factors will always 
be important in policymaking, including values and competing political 
interests. Decisions often need to be made on the run without time for 
careful research. Evidence itself  is often incomplete and contested. Cost-
benefit analysis, which underpins much of  the commission’s work, often 
requires judgements about inherently intangible and subjective benefits. 
Banks certainly does not oversell the role that evidence can play.
Secondly, however, on occasions when sound research could help to 
inform a decision, governments often fail to take advantage of  it. Sometimes 
the data are simply unavailable, and Banks makes a strong case for putting 
more resources into data collection. Sometimes governments prefer to seek 
input from consultants rather than from research institutes or academics. 
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Consultants are often better at cutting corners, sacrificing rigour in order to 
meet deadlines. Moreover, they are more likely to come up with conclusions 
that are congenial to the governments’ chosen direction.
Reliable, objective evidence can only be provided by independent 
researchers who are willing to follow the data wherever they may lead. It 
is of  most value to policymakers with open minds about which directions 
to take. By the same token, it can be threatening to policymakers whose 
minds are already made up. Much so-called ‘evidence’ is assembled after the 
event, to endorse decisions already taken—‘policy-based evidence’ rather 
than ‘evidence-based policy’.
The demand for supporting evidence is fuelled by our secular, scientific 
world view. Members of  other cultures seeking to clinch an argument often 
rely on a passage from a sacred text like the Bible or the Koran or use a 
quote from a revered leader. For modern Westerners, however, coherent 
argument and sound evidence trump all other methods of  justification. 
Hence, policymakers are naturally drawn to methods of  policy analysis 
based on these principles.
The so-called ‘rational’ model of  policymaking, which figures in all 
standard public policy textbooks, assumes a sequence of  logically ordered 
steps: identify the policy problem, define the relevant objectives, outline 
the possible policy options, compare the options in terms of  their costs 
and benefits predicted on the basis of  reliable evidence, make a decision, 
implement that decision.
However, as all standard public policy textbooks also go on to point out 
and Banks himself  concedes, the rational model is very rarely observed in 
practice. ‘Problems’ are typically framed in terms of  competing values and 
perspectives which cannot be conclusively settled by appeals to evidence. 
Similarly, objectives are usually multiple and conflicting, requiring trade-
offs which, again, are matters of  subjective choice not empirical discovery. 
Empirical evidence, while often relevant, is rarely conclusive, requiring 
decision-makers to back their hunches rather than hold out for definitive 
answers. Policymaking is more a matter of  judgement in the handling of  
particular cases than the application of  generalised, scientific knowledge. 
Australia 69
Policies evolve in the process of  being put into practice, thus negating any 
sharp distinction between a decision and its implementation .
Though the rational model is rarely reflected in actual practice, its 
terminology and assumptions still permeate the language of  policy 
discussion. Policymaking may be a messy business of  political negotiation 
and compromise but it needs to be formulated as if  it followed rational 
processes. Public servants are still required to follow the model’s stages in 
presenting advice to ministers, even though they often know that decisions 
have already been made and the supposed evidential backing is not the real 
determining reason.
Politicians, in their political dialogue with the public, still justify their 
decisions in terms of  meeting agreed community objectives, such as 
economic growth or improved health outcomes, on the basis of  supposedly 
sound evidence. Their dominant reasons may be more pragmatic and self-
interested, to shore up electoral support or to pre-empt opposition attack. 
However, in our high-minded, and often hypocritical, political culture, these 
self-interested political motives dare not speak their name. Every political 
manoeuvre must be dressed up as a rationally based contribution to the 
public interest, backed by reliable-sounding evidence.
Other political players, too, need to join the same rational, evidence-
based game. Advocates for special interests, such as farmers or doctors 
or academics, cannot argue publicly that their main reason for supporting 
particular policies is to enrich the members who pay their wages. Instead, 
they couch their argument in terms of  benefits to the wider community. 
They produce statistical and other research-based evidence designed to 
show how a relatively modest outlay of  taxpayer assistance will bring major 
long-term advantages for the community and why failure to act will lead to 
dire economic and social consequences.
That politicians conceal ruthless self-interest behind the mask of  high-
sounding concern for the public interest is hardly news, having been expertly 
nailed over 2,000 years ago by the Greek historian Thucydides. The current 
emphasis on evidence and research as the key to policy plausibility is merely 
the latest twist in the history of  political rhetoric. It follows the massive 
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expansion of  the social sciences, particularly economics, in the second 
half  of  the twentieth century. Social science graduates, with a sympathy 
for technical, technocratic approaches to policy, now dominate most areas 
of  policymaking and control the conventions of  policy argument. They 
have helped to disparage the legitimacy of  openly political solutions based 
on bargaining and consensus between competing interests. Instead, the 
dominant discourse now favours theoretical generalisations about the public 
interest backed by empirical research.
The dominance of  rational rhetoric creates a demand from powerful 
political interests for arguments and evidence that will back up their preferred 
policy standpoints. Major organised interest groups now allocate significant 
resources to their own research sections. Specialist consultants are in the 
market to provide relevant research. Think-tanks publish reports aimed at 
bolstering their own ideological positions.
In the United Kingdom, the Blair Labour government gave a new boost 
to the status of  the rational approach by spruiking the merits of  ‘evidence-
based policy’. The fashion suited Blair’s ‘third way’ pose of  avoiding the 
ideological extremes of  both left and right in favour of  ‘what works’ in 
practice. It has held similar appeal for Kevin Rudd and his ministers, wanting 
to transcend the crippling effects of  the culture wars in areas such as 
education and indigenous policy. Nailing its colours to the ‘evidence-based 
policy’ mast suits the Rudd government’s image of  technocratic reform. 
Behind the scenes, however, values clash, deals are done, and politics 
continues as usual.
That robust evidence is often overlooked, or never sought in the first place, 
should hardly surprise. In many cases, the appearance of  evidence is more 
important than the reality. Yet, as always, hypocrisy is the homage that vice 
pays to virtue. Pseudo-evidence (or policy-based evidence) underlines our 
respect for policy that is genuinely informed by independent and objective 
evidence. We can still hope to pick up the real thing from time to time, even 





Public opinion and the 2009 Defence White Paper
Defence works differently on the voter’s mind than most other major 
aspects of  government. Public opinion about health, education, welfare or 
law and order are to some degree at least based on direct experience by 
individuals or families of  the services that the government provides: how 
long are the hospital waiting lists, how high is unemployment, how big are 
school classes?
Most of  us have no comparable personal experience of  the service that 
government delivers in return for the 2 per cent of  gross domestic product 
(GDP) they spend for us on defence. Unless we happen to have been 
evacuated by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) from a regional trouble 
spot or caught up in a conflict somewhere where they have been engaged, 
we have no first hand knowledge of  the work they do or how well they do 
it.
This has two important implications for the way defence policy works 
in our political system. First, it means that the public’s opinion of  defence 
issues is more heavily shaped by what the government says and how the 
media report it than what is actually delivered.
Contemporary views are also shaped by potent historic images of  the 
ADF—Gallipoli, Kokoda and Long Tan. These images, however important 
they may be to our national self-image, have little to do with the practical 
business of  developing and delivering defence capability today, but they 
frame attitudes to defence in a way that is easy to manipulate.
Second, it means that the kind of  direct voter feedback that governments 
receive about the quality of  their work in most policy areas is not available 
Published as ‘Historic images shaping views on Defence spending’, Canberra Times, 29 April 
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in defence. As long as governments have a good story to tell and can link 
that story to resonant historical images, they can get away with poor policy at 
little political cost. There is thus little political incentive to do defence policy 
well. That makes it hard not to do it badly.
Later this week or early next week Kevin Rudd will unveil his take on 
Australian defence policy when he releases the new Defence White Paper. 
The state of  public opinion into which this document will be delivered has 
been interestingly mapped by two enterprises in recent weeks. Two weeks 
ago the government released the report of  a public consultation program 
led by ex-Senator Stephen Loosley. Today ANU has released the latest in 
Professor Ian McAllister’s ANUpoll series, focusing this time specifically on 
defence issues.
Three of  the key conclusions from the ANU poll are particularly 
interesting. First, the public seems to credit John Howard with a substantial 
increase in Australia’s military capacity over the second half  of  his term as 
prime minister—the years after East Timor and the 2000 white paper. The 
proportions of  Australians who believe that the ADF is stronger now than 
10 years ago went up sharply after 2001 and has stayed high ever since.
Why should this be so? Since 2000 defence spending has increased 
steadily by 3 per cent per annum in real terms, and the ADF has deployed 
continually on high-profile operations in our region and beyond. Big plans 
have been announced for the future. But in terms of  concrete additions to 
capability it is hard to see that the ADF is much more capable today than it 
was in 2000.
It is notable that Rudd and his defence minister Joel Fitzgibbon seem 
intent on denting Howard’s crown on this issue. They have begun something 
of  a campaign about the deficiencies of  the current force and the need to 
remediate what they regard as the neglect of  Howard and his ministers to 
make sure the ADF actually delivered the capability it had invested in.
Second, the public seems to think that defence spending has grown 
enough. For the first time in over 20 years, more Australians think the 
government should cut defence spending than increase it. That may in part 
reflect the public’s recognition that tough fiscal times are ahead thanks to the 
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global economic crisis. But such a sharp dip in support for increased defence 
spending suggests that something more is in the air.
Whatever the cause, this is probably good news for Rudd. He has 
repeatedly committed to sustain Howard’s long-term trajectory of  defence-
spending increases, but it seems almost certain that the forthcoming budget 
will at least slow the rate of  defence spending growth over the next few years. 
Moreover, if  the recession turns out to be prolonged, the fiscal pressure to 
cut defence spending may become irresistible, especially once the economy 
starts to recover and the government’s priorities move from stimulating the 
economy to getting out of  deficit. That is traditionally when recessions hit 
defence budgets hardest.
Thirdly, the ANU poll shows a fascinating set of  attitudes towards 
the conflict in Afghanistan. Over half  of  those polled approve of  our 
involvement in the war in Afghanistan, but 69 per cent believe we are not 
winning the war. That suggests a significant number of  us think we should 
be there even if  we are not winning.
The explanation can perhaps be found in the responses to questions 
about the US alliance, which show that Australians’ regard for the alliance 
has recovered from the dent made by George W. Bush. The proportions 
who think it is very important to Australia have gone up sharply since 2007, 
and confidence that the US would come to our aid if  we are attacked has 
risen too.
This may suggest that Australians understand the implicit linkage between 
Afghanistan and the US alliance. Though Kevin Rudd says the threat of  
terrorism is the key reason for our involvement in Afghanistan, it has much 
more to do with sustaining our reputation in Washington as a good ally.
This too is good news for Rudd, suggesting that there will be a degree of  
acceptance if, as seems almost certain, he decides to send more troops to 
support Barack Obama’s surge. But the poll contains a warning, too: the slim 
majority who support the war is balanced by a large minority who oppose it. 
More casualties could easily turn the balance of  opinion around.





Two new reports show that although the Rudd government is tackling some 
of  the most difficult areas of  social policy we may need to borrow fresh 
thinking from our New Zealand neighbours. On 29 April the prime minister 
launched Time for Action, the report of  the National Council to Reduce 
Violence against Women and their Children. The federal government will 
take this report to the Council of  Australian Governments (COAG), and 
turn it into a government plan by 2010. Then, on 1 May, the prime minister 
launched the COAG report Protecting Children is Everyone’s Business. These 
reports join The Road Home: A National Approach to Reducing Homelessness as 
part of  a social policy reform agenda, with a disability strategy on the way.
We know there is a strong link between these three issues—domestic 
violence, child abuse and homelessness—and the reports acknowledge it. 
Reading them side by side, what is striking is the fact that it’s in the overlapping 
area between these issues that the government response seems likely to be 
weakest. Both of  the new reports acknowledge that indigenous women and 
children are being failed in devastating ways by the current system. Yet there 
seems to be a lack of  strength in the response, reflecting a government 
struggling with the intersection of  race and gender. Although the reports 
were launched by Kevin Rudd, this weakness partly reflects the fact that 
of  the two responsible ministers, Jenny Macklin and Tanya Plibersek, only 
one—Macklin—is in cabinet and able to influence the policy process more 
directly. The Minister for Housing and Women is not a cabinet post and, 
frankly, it should be.
These are landmark reports, yet they have not attracted the coverage they 
First posted on Inside Story, http://inside.org.au/grand-plans/, 14 May 2009.
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deserve. Perhaps this is because they make for such uncomfortable reading. 
Or perhaps it is the fact that Australians can still not focus on the lives of  
women and children or vulnerable families in the same way that we pay 
attention to swine flu, boat arrivals or terrorist threats.
They provide the figures that should be making headlines. Time for Action 
states that one in three Australian women will report being a victim of  
physical violence and almost one in five will report being a victim of  sexual 
violence during their lifetime, according to Australian Bureau of  Statistics 
figures. Approximately 350,000 women experience physical violence and 
125,000 women experience sexual violence each year. And violence against 
women comes at an enormous economic cost, A$13.6 billion a year, although 
it is mostly preventable.
According to Protecting Children, 55,120 cases of  child abuse and neglect 
were substantiated by child protection services in 2007–08. The rate has more 
than doubled over the past 10 years. Indigenous children are six times more 
likely to be the subject of  abuse or neglect than other children (although 
‘neglect’ in this context is contested). It is also clear that removing children 
is not always in the best long-term interests of  the child, with children in 
out-of-home care experiencing significantly poorer long-term outcomes. 
Despite this, the numbers of  children removed from their parents more 
than doubled over the past decade. On 30 June 2008 there were 31,166 
young people in out-of-home care.
In New South Wales alone, one in five children will be reported to statutory 
child protection services by the time they are 18. No public administration 
system, no matter how well funded, can cope with such numbers. Morgan 
Disney’s 2006 report on the transition from care revealed the huge cost 
to government and the community—an estimated A$2 billion a year—of  
young adults coming out of  foster care with poorer prospects for housing, 
mental health, employment, education, criminal justice and more.
Twenty years after Brian Burdekin’s report for the Human Rights 
Commission, Our Homeless Children, our policy responses on homelessness, 
violence and state care should have made more progress. The facts in 2008 
remain unchanged: a substantial number of  children and young people 
76 Capturing the Year — 2009
become homeless while still under state guardianship. In other words, coming 
into care, or attempting to have a child committed to care, creates a clear path 
to homelessness. In a 2007 radio interview, Burdekin reiterated that state 
care is the single predictive factor of  homelessness. This is unsustainable 
both in economic and in human terms.
The problems both national plans tackle are therefore ‘wicked’ in scale 
and complexity. The good news is that there are lots of  good ideas and 
resourcing in the plans. Protecting Children comes with an extra A$61.6 million 
over four years in Commonwealth funding. Commonwealth agencies such as 
Centrelink and Medicare are brought into information-sharing arrangements 
with the states and territories. The report’s framework promises that children 
in foster homes will receive a better basic standard of  care and that child-
protection workers will get more training to combat child abuse and neglect. 
The much-longed-for National Children’s Commissioner seems close to 
reality at last.
Time for Action sets clear targets and reads like a sensible, energetic way to 
make real progress against domestic violence, based on a commitment to 
the human rights and equality of  women. There is A$12.5 million for a new 
24-hour domestic violence and sexual assault telephone and online crisis 
service, A$26 million for ‘respectful relationships’ programs for schools, 
and A$17 million for social marketing focused on changing attitudes and 
behaviours that contribute to violence. The plan sets out a national scheme 
for registering domestic and family violence orders, allowing enforcement 
across state and territory borders. The Australian Law Reform Commission 
is given a reference to look at reform in the area, which is sorely needed. Time 
for Action also takes special note of  the role of  alcohol. In 2007 the Australian 
National Council on Drugs reported that 13 per cent of  children—over 
230,000 individuals—live in households where they are at risk of  exposure 
to at least one adult binge drinker.
What neither plan does well enough is address the current flaws in the 
system of  child removal and the nexus with domestic violence. All the 
incentives encourage child protection workers to avoid those terrible cases 
of  death and neglect that make the headlines. But the system provides very 
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little natural justice for anyone wishing to challenge a removal, and removals 
are increasingly in force until the child turns 18. It is very much an all-or-
nothing system, with all the legal weight on the side of  the department; 
the removal of  a child often happens very quickly with very little notice or 
discussion with the parent. The best interests of  the child are meant to be 
the paramount consideration, but this is very often interpreted in a very thin 
and short-term manner.
Authorities can and do get it wrong—especially those authorities that 
are in the business of  ‘protection’. When the consequence of  a wrong 
decision is removal of  a baby until age 18, then a measure of  natural justice 
is clearly necessary. Recently, in a 2008 judgment in the NSW Supreme 
Court, Justice Palmer referred to the NSW Department of  Community 
Services’ ‘intransigent refusal to acknowledge a mistake, regardless of  the 
consequences to the children’ in a case where children were removed on 
the basis of  the parents’ recreational cannabis use. The Palmer and Comrie 
reports into the Department of  Immigration show that public administration 
in such difficult areas functions best with more rather than less accountability 
and transparency, which then builds public confidence in the law.
The other challenge for both plans is to strengthen the actions to protect 
indigenous women and children on the basis of  their rights and full citizenship. 
‘Healing centres’ in remote areas, providing indigenous perpetrators with 
culturally appropriate counselling, are a good idea, but not at the expense of  
justice available to other Australian women. The focus must be on access to 
justice and providing a broader range of  choices to women, wherever they 
live in Australia, whatever their race. In fact, it may be the current moves to 
reform the legal profession and improve access to justice that have the most 
impact, including calls to provide incentives for lawyers to practice in rural 
and regional areas, and better funding and conditions for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander legal centres.
Both reports also fail to squarely address a very real failing of  the current 
system. After a woman reports domestic violence to police, or asks social 
services for help, her children can be removed. Once that happens, the 
woman often loses the right to public housing. Women tell of  their reluctance 
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to report violence due to the automatic trigger to child protection services. 
As Time for Action acknowledges, in some cases child protection authorities 
tell women that unless they leave a violent relationship and apply for an 
apprehended violence order their children will be removed.
This no-win cycle continues when parents are ineligible to stay in 
government accommodation because they no longer have the children. 
Some parents report being required to give up housing in order to attend 
a residential drug program. It is nearly impossible to get back into housing 
without your children: Housing says, ‘You don’t have your kids, you’re not 
eligible,’ and Child Protection says, ‘You can’t get your kids till you have 
suitable housing.’ In one NSW case a woman with three children, aged 
11, 8 and 4, living in a two bedroom government unit had her 11 year old 
daughter removed. After 18 months the child was returned on the basis that 
she would have a room of  her own, but Housing was unable to provide 
suitable accommodation. The mother was told that if  she put the four-year 
old and the eight-year old in her own bedroom, leaving the second bedroom 
for the 11-year old, she could have her daughter back. The mother complied 
with this request.
Women therefore often face difficult choices. ‘The government’—in the 
form of  police, schools, women’s support services and other agencies—
must make automatic notifications, and this creates a monolithic source of  
risk and threat rather than refuge. The instruments in our tool kit are too 
blunt, and we need to consider more creative ideas and acknowledge true 
community responsibility for the safety of  women and children.
The answer to this dilemma may lie within the reports, but it can be made 
clearer. The Road Home aimed to help women and children who experience 
domestic violence to stay safely in the family home to prevent homelessness. 
Protecting Children states that Australian governments ‘will expand models of  
integrated support to enable women and children experiencing domestic 
and family violence to remain at home safely’. Part of  this expansion must 
include new policies so that women reporting violence do not risk losing 
their children. This is the point of  the triangle which is not yet joined up.
Tasmania and New Zealand could offer us some innovative and cost 
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saving ways forward. The Tasmanian Department of  Justice runs a program 
called Safe at Home, based around the Family Violence Act 2004. Section 
3 states that ‘in the administration of  this Act, the safety, psychological 
wellbeing and interests of  people affected by family violence are the 
paramount considerations’. This translates to a pro-arrest policy by police 
on first contact with a domestic violence situation. The review of  the policy 
in 2008 reveals some real promise but, again, the concern was the 30 per 
cent increase in notifications to child protection authorities.
For almost two decades New Zealand has made working with families 
and extended family members a core principle in their legislation, policy and 
procedures for dealing with child safety. Family group conferences, based 
partly on Maori practices, provide families with a greater say in resolving 
both child protection and juvenile justice matters. When a notification is 
made to child protection services and the social worker has formed a belief  
that the child is in need of  care and protection, a mandatory family group 
conference begins a process in which families are offered support to explore 
the option of  caring for the child within the biological or extended family. 
It’s estimated that more than 50,000 conferences had been convened since 
1989, reflecting the central role they play in New Zealand’s child protection 
system.
The national action plans are full of  good ideas, and both promote 
research to investigate even more good ideas. What we need now is some 
coordinated political clout. Getting the Minister for Women and Housing 
into cabinet to complete the points of  the triangle might be the single most 
important step to achieving these plans. We need to always foreground the 
complex linkages between the areas of  family violence, child protection, 
alcohol abuse and homelessness. This does not fit into a headline, but it is 
the big news of  2009.




Australia and India: the good, the bad and the 
Section 420s
Just when you think you’re on the brink of  something good, bad things 
happen. In this case, young thugs and goons who come out at night to rob 
and terrify for fun and profit have stumbled across new targets: students and 
workers from India and other South Asian countries. They work late, have 
nice electronic gear and (the thinking might go) they are poorly equipped to 
complain. (Ever had your pocket picked in another country? Did you know 
what to do?)
For as long as India has been independent, Australians with an eye 
to Australia’s long-term interests have sought to put ‘substance’ into the 
Australia–India relationship. In the past three or four years, such ‘substance’ 
seemed to be arriving in the form of  wider and deeper human connections, 
driven mightily (though not entirely) by the 100,000 students from India and 
its neighbours now studying here.
The robberies and assaults undermine these developments and have taken 
on a nasty life of  their own. They make tasty morsels for a vast, 200-channel 
Indian television industry, hungry for stories. The attacks have also become 
a top story in India’s vast newspaper industry, which sells 90 million copies 
a day in a dozen languages.
Media ping-pong is a great game: Australian outlets pick up Indian 
stories, which bring out wackier voices in Australian public life, which in 
turn generate equally wacky Indian replies. And all of  this increases the 
possibility of  copycat crimes.
Posted as ‘The good, the bad and the Section 420s’, on Inside Story, http://inside.org.au/
good-bad-section-420s/, 4 June 2009.
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Why should these attacks and their handling be of  very, very serious 
concern to Australians who look to the future of  this country? Why 
should far-sighted Australians want a relationship with India that has more 
‘substance’? The answer is enlightened self-interest.
Australia is a population pimple on the Asia–Pacific elephant. It needs 
friends with genuine common interests. Since the days of  Ben Chifley and 
Jawaharlal Nehru, wise folk in both countries have seen that Australians and 
Indians have unique things in common and can work with each other as few 
countries can.
Only last week, for example, Australia’s best known election analyst, 
Malcolm Mackerras, celebrated the fact that the Indian political system has 
overcome a deficiency attributed to the Westminster model of  government. 
Manmohan Singh, India’s respected prime minister, sits in the upper house 
of  parliament. The fact that that house is indirectly elected—by members 
of  state legislatures—means that India can do something usually associated 
with the presidential systems inspired by the United States: it can bring into 
government outstanding people from other walks of  life who would not 
fight and could not win a down-and-dirty election. India also has election 
procedures—especially its electronic voting machines—which should be the 
envy of  electoral democracies everywhere. On the Australian side, we run 
things like schools, universities, museums, sporting bodies and a host of  
other institutions from whose practices and experience India can profit.
In a week when the world remembers—and the Chinese Communist Party 
encourages everyone to forget—the twentieth anniversary of  the Tiananmen 
massacres, it’s worth recalling that India staged a different political drama in 
1989. Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress government, which held a record majority 
of  more than 400 seats in a 545-seat house, called general elections, was 
defeated and surrendered office without complaint.
Such common conventions of  government, reinforced by India’s most 
recent elections, together with rapidly growing trade, give us a framework 
on which much should be built. Until now, this skeleton has lacked daily, 
material connections. One hundred thousand students now provide the 
potential for those flesh-and-blood links. The commercial opportunities 
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they discover, the holidays their parents take, the friendships and marriages 
they make and their general toing and froing bring Australia and India into 
concrete relationships that benefit both countries.
There is also language. About 5 per cent of  Indians use English 
extensively—that’s 60 million people or roughly three Australias. It is a 
substantial base on which to build relationships, a far more extensive head 
start than Australia has in other Asian, European or Latin American countries. 
The potential to partner India in global cultural industries is immense. And 
India’s global credentials—three Booker prizes to Indian authors in the past 
11 years and an Academy Award—are substantial.
What does this elusive ‘substance’ mean in international relations? And 
why is the recent growth of  the Indian student population so important for 
providing it? Substance means diverse and deep interests. It means trade—
and not merely volume but diversity. It means communications—constant, 
extensive exchange of  ideas and people. It means some common values and 
expectations—like regular elections and free (and therefore sometimes wacky) 
media. And it means a broadly shared view of  international interests.
In the past, far-sighted members of  Australia’s foreign affairs elite sought 
to enhance the relationship with India because they saw the advantages. But 
personal equations often got in the way. Robert Menzies and Jawaharlal Nehru 
talked past each other. To Nehru, Menzies was a second-rank imperialist 
whose small talk turned too often to cricket; to Menzies, Nehru was an 
underminer of  the British Empire who’d had the Cambridge education that 
one suspects Menzies craved. Mrs Gandhi was prickly; Morarji Desai was 
stiff  and of  another era. Only with the arrival of  Bob Hawke and Rajiv 
Gandhi did promising personal chemistry enter the equation, but that ended 
with Rajiv’s defeat in 1989 and murder in 1991, the same year Hawke gave 
way to Keating.
Even in the Menzies era, far-seeing Australian public servants like Sir 
Walter Crocker—twice high commissioner to India, who died at 100 
in 2002—had a vision and fascination that enabled him to write a fine 
biography of  Nehru. Crocker’s Nehru: A Contemporary Estimate, first published 
in 1966, was republished last year at the instigation of  a Crocker admirer, 
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the distinguished Indian scholar Ramachandra Guha. The book sold well 
enough to be reprinted a few months ago.
On the other side, India’s high commissioner to Australia from 1953–56, 
General K. M. ‘Kipper’ Cariappa, the first Indian to command the Indian 
army, made himself  feistily at home in Australian public life. According to 
historian David Walker, Cariappa was able to ‘expound the Upanishads and 
execute a perfect fox trot’ with equal ease—and simultaneously. Walker tells 
us that on one legendary occasion in Gundagai, ‘Cariappa and his Sikh driver 
found the local war memorial neglected and overgrown with weeds. These 
two spectacular figures got to work with spades and hoses and soon had the 
memorial looking ship-shape.’ Cariappa reminded townspeople, who came 
to see what was going on, about the need to respect the war dead. He had 
fought in the Middle East and Burma, on the same side as Australians.
In Cariappa’s time and until the 1990s, however, economic and global 
forces made Australia and India look in different directions. India’s economy 
grew like a snail in a strait-jacket, and its foreign policy outlook was northwest, 
towards the Soviet Union, Europe and North America. Australia tended to 
value its US alliance above all else.
Since the 1990s, India’s liberalising, fast-growing economy has brought 
large benefits for Australia. India has been the fastest growing destination 
for Australian exports since 2001, ranking sixth among trading partners in 
2007–08.
We share intense environmental problems. A shortage of  water plagues 
us both; we both need and consume vast quantities of  energy. Australia has 
the capacity to fuel India. India has the capacity to show Australia how to 
be economical. (Watch a village woman cook a meal, if  you seek models on 
which to base mindsets about careful use of  resources.)
A rich, interactive relationship with a country of  1,140 million people (60 
Australias) growing at 6 per cent in the recession year of  2008–09 is worth 
having. The current crop of  Indian students forge links that will make trade 
diversify and grow.
The presence of  those students promises to provide the ‘substance’ that 
has eluded the Australia–India relationship. The number of  Indian students 
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has grown by 40 per cent a year since 2002. Today, if  there are 100,000 
Indian students studying in Australia, their fees and living expenditure are 
worth about A$3.5 billion a year.
To minimise further harm to students and to the India–Australia 
relationship, a number of  things need to happen. Educational institutions 
need to identify the best support systems for their international students and 
ensure such systems are universally applied. We know there are good and 
bad operators: the best need to be imitated; the worst need to be shamed 
and made to improve.
Part of  the problem lies in the fact that Australian higher education 
has been inadequately funded for 15 years. Large class sizes, shortage of  
accommodation and the need of  cash-strapped institutions to trawl for fee-
paying students reduce their ability to provide the tender loving care that an 
alma mater (literally, a bounteous mother) should. The trawling, too, means 
that students from small towns, less familiar with big cities and foreign ways, 
are increasingly among the cohort of  international students. They need 
more support, not less; but less is what’s available.
More effective help to find suitable accommodation and more campus-
based accommodation are two ways to improve conditions. Visa rules also 
need to be examined. International students are allowed to work for a fixed 
number of  hours each week, but their visa conditions usually require them 
to be enrolled full time in a course too. So you study 40 hours a week and 
do paid work for another 20 hours, which is usually at night because classes 
are in the daytime. (You need, remember, to have A$30–40,000 a year to pay 
your fees and your bills.) And you don’t want to tangle with ‘authorities’ in 
case they decide you have violated your visa conditions. To ease some of  
these pressures, it might make sense to allow part-time enrolments.
At deeper, longer-term levels, more Australians need to get a grasp of  
India. It is not easy to learn about India and its neighbours in an Australian 
educational institution today. The recently inaugurated A$62 million National 
Asian Languages and Studies in Schools Program explicitly excludes study of  
India. Only those wanting to study China, Indonesia, Japan and Korea may 
apply. Twenty years ago you might have found 15 universities that could 
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help you if  you wanted to study India in Australia.; today you’ll be lucky to 
find three. No wonder officials and spokespeople seem ill at ease in trying to 
talk about the problems of  students from South Asia. There aren’t enough 
people in Australian public life who know Kannada from Canada.
The attacks on students reinforce stereotypes. Indians get described as 
poor, peaceful and nonconfrontational, living in crowded conditions, likely 
to bring down house prices and push up air, water and energy consumption. 
Australians, on the other hand, get branded as loud-mouthed, bullying, 
racist braggarts. Stereotypes are substitutes for knowledge, but they will get 
bellowed with abandon unless quick, clever and enduring steps are taken to 
make the night safe and punish goons and thugs.
You might have noticed an irony in the terms: goons and thugs. Good 
Indian words enriching English: goondahs—bad characters, hired toughs; 
thugs—the bandits who strangled their victims with a deftly twirled 
handkerchief. In India these days, the same sort of  people might be known 
as ‘Char Sau Biis’—420s, after Section 420 of  the criminal code which deals 
with nasty known offenders.
Another thing to remember is this. When you mess with India, you mess 
with people who have the professional and financial capacity to pursue 
you relentlessly through law courts and international forums. India exports 
outstanding lawyers, financiers and IT professionals. Two of  the world’s 
top ten billionaires are Indians, according to the Forbes list. There are no 
Chinese in the top ten. Or Australians. You want to be friends of  India, not 
antagonists.
The India–Australia relationship is on the cusp of  something good, deep, 
long-standing and mutually beneficial—genuine ‘substance’. We must not let 
Australia’s Section 420s wreck the chance.




Defence White Paper 2009
Since the beginning, Australia’s security has depended on the domination of  
the western Pacific by Anglo-Saxon maritime power. Almost continuously 
since 1788, Britain and America have successively exercised command of  
the oceans around this continent. Our darkest moments have been those 
when our ally’s maritime primacy was most under threat, and our best times 
have been those when it has been most assured.
The last 40 years have been very good indeed for Australia. Since Nixon 
went to China in 1972, American primacy in Asia has been uncontested, and 
that has assured Australians that East Asia would be spared large wars and 
that we would not face serious threats alone. But precisely because American 
primacy in Asia has been so fundamental, we take it for granted. It is easy 
to forget how important America is in shaping our region and assuring our 
security. Despite our talk of  independent middle-power diplomacy and self-
reliant defence, Australia’s international position today depends as much on 
American power as it ever has.
The most important question for Australian defence policy must 
therefore always be: how long can this last? The answer is largely a matter of  
economics. Strategic power—and especially maritime power—is ultimately 
based in economic power, and maritime primacy of  the Anglo-Saxons in 
Asia is no exception. Britain and America have successively dominated the 
oceans around Australia because they have successively been the richest 
country in the world. And maritime primacy shifted from Britain to America 
soon after America’s economy outstripped Britain’s in the 1880s. So it is a 
fair bet that American maritime primacy in the western Pacific will last as 
Published as ‘Punching below our weight’, in Australian Literary Review, 1 July 2009.
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long as the US remains the richest economy in the world, and not much 
longer.
That is why the most important sentence in the Rudd government’s 2009 
Defence White Paper is about economics. You can find it on the Department 
of  Defence website (http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/). Download 
the white paper, scroll to page 34, and look at paragraph 4.23. ‘By some 
measures China has the potential to overtake the United States as the 
world’s largest economy around 2020.’ This is a remarkable prediction, and 
it comes straight from Rudd himself: he used very similar words in a speech 
last September. It might turn out to be wrong, but don’t bet on that. On 
recent trends it is quite possible that in terms of  purchasing power—the 
most relevant measure—China’s economy will indeed overtake America’s 
to become the largest in the world by 2020. And if  not by 2020, then very 
probably by 2030, which is soon enough, and well within Australia’s defence 
planning horizon.
Let’s be clear: according to the white paper, America will cease to be 
the richest economy in the world well within Australia’s defence planning 
time-frames. The white paper is clear about the strategic implications of  
this economic power shift. Paragraph 4.13 says ‘…by 2030, any changes in 
economic power will affect the distribution of  strategic power’. Paragraph 
4.19 says, ‘As other powers rise, and the primacy of  the United States is 
increasingly tested, power relations will inevitably change.’ Paragraph 3.18 
puts it most starkly of  all:
In circumstances where a global transformation in economic power and 
commensurate redistribution of  strategic power continued to the point where 
its cumulative effect required us to alter our assumptions about the weight and 
reach of  US strategic primacy, the planning assumptions underpinning this 
White Paper would require fundamental reassessment.
The prose is inelegant, but the meaning is plain enough. Taken together these 
statements seem clearly to say that Australia’s strategic circumstances face 
seismic change, and our defence policy requires fundamental reassessment 
as a result. The question then becomes, when? If  economic primacy is set to 
pass to China as early as 2020, then the consequent strategic revolution will 
not be far behind. This suggests that Australia should start planning now to 
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build the forces it might need if  and when US primacy fades. This message 
is reinforced by suggestions that we cannot expect sufficient warning of  
major changes to build major new forces.
But this is not the white paper’s only message. In other places it sounds a 
much more optimistic—even complacent—note. Several passages breezily 
assert that American power will endure far into the future. Paragraph 4.14 
says, ‘The United States will remain the most powerful and influential strategic 
actor over the period to 2030—politically, economically and militarily.’ 
Paragraph 4.17 says, ‘It remains the case that no other power will have the 
military, economic or strategic capacity to challenge US global primacy over 
the period covered by the White Paper.’ And paragraph 3.17, while noting 
that ‘a transformation of  major power relations in the Asia-Pacific region 
would have a profound effect on our strategic circumstances’, dismisses this 
as ‘currently unlikely’. Some of  these statements seem directly to contradict 
those quoted earlier.
There is only one place in which the white paper attempts to reconcile 
its assessment that China’s economy will grow larger than America’s with 
its judgement that strategic power will stay with the US. It is the sentence 
immediately following the prediction that China may overtake the US 
economically around 2020. ‘However,’ it says, ‘economic strength is also 
a function of  trade, aid and financial flows, and by those market-exchange 
based measures, the US economy is likely to remain paramount.’ This seems 
to say that America’s trade, aid and financial positions are so strong that 
they will preserve American economic and strategic primacy even as China 
overtakes it in sheer output. But the opposite is true. America’s huge trade 
deficit and debts to China amplify rather than neutralise the economic and 
strategic power shift between them. And no one thinks America uses its aid 
more artfully than China to maximise strategic influence.
The new white paper’s conflicting messages about the most important 
question in Australian defence policy are a little unsettling. They seem to 
reflect a deep ambivalence within the government about Australia’s place 
in the world and how it is evolving. On the one hand, the white paper is 
commendably forthright in describing the long-term strategic challenges 
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Australia faces in the Asian century. On the other, it seems reluctant to 
address their implications for Australia’s defence policy, at least for the next 
decade or so. In fact the new white paper delivers a very conservative policy 
which essentially replicates John Howard’s defence plans for the next decade. 
The eye-catching initiatives—doubling the number of  submarines and 
nearly quadrupling the number of  big warships—lie safely beyond today’s 
political and fiscal horizons. They will cost little until after 2020 and deliver 
little before 2030. Indeed on the most probable schedule, Rudd’s target of  
12 submarines would only be reached in the mid 2040s—some 25 years after 
the white paper predicts that China might overtake America economically.
Do we have that long? Surely not. Think how quickly the balance between 
the US and China has shifted since 2000, when America’s power seemed 
so unlimited and unchallengeable. There is little reason to expect that this 
process will slow, and indeed the long-term implications of  the current 
economic crisis mean it is more likely to accelerate. So given that defence 
planning takes so long, the time to think about what Asia’s power shift means 
for Australia’s defence needs is now, not in two or three decades’ time. It is a 
big task, because a world without American economic and strategic primacy 
would be very different indeed for Australia, and it takes some imagination 
to grasp what it might mean. In fact many of  us find it impossible to believe 
that it could happen: after 130 years, American primacy seems the natural 
and unchangeable order.
In the grand sweep of  history, however, 130 years is not a long time. 
Viewed in a longer perspective, China’s rise looks more like the restoration of  
the natural order than a departure from it. China’s was the largest economy 
in the world for centuries until about 1820. Britain overtook it because the 
industrial revolution increased each worker’s output so much that 10 million 
Britons could suddenly produce more than 100 million Chinese. America 
overtook Britain in the 1880s because it applied the same productivity magic 
to a much bigger population, and it has remained the richest country in the 
world ever since simply because it has remained the most populous country 
to have done so. Now China is reaping the productivity gains of  the industrial 
revolution from a much larger workforce still. It was perhaps always only a 
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matter of  time before the weight of  China’s population came back into 
play, and the time has apparently come. Very fast, in only 30 years, China 
has applied the ideas that made the West rich and strong, and is growing 
richer and stronger itself. And 20 years after Tiananmen, there is no sign that 
China’s failure to embrace the constitutional principles of  liberal democracy 
will get in the way.
This raises a host of  big questions for Australia, many of  them quite 
different from any we have faced before. Should we support American 
efforts to maintain primacy against ever greater odds as China’s power 
grows, or urge Washington to concede gracefully and share power with 
Beijing? Should Australia build up its own armed forces as American power 
declines, or rely for our security on diplomacy and international goodwill? 
If  we decide to arm ourselves, how could it best be done and how much 
would it cost? Is it even possible for Australia to stand alone if  US power 
fades, or should we look for a new great and powerful friend—maybe China 
itself ? These are the hard and important questions that the new white paper 
dodged.
Many are tempted to reduce these questions to a single issue—is China 
a threat? It is easy to assume that as America’s power fades the threat from 
China grows, but China’s rise and America’s decline are not two sides of  the 
same coin. China, as it grows stronger, will not simply change places with 
America as Asia’s unchallenged hegemon. America will remain immensely 
strong and probably deeply engaged, and Japan and India will also shape 
Asia’s future. Other scenarios are therefore much more likely: sustained 
strategic competition between the US and China or between China and 
Japan, or a concert between the US, China, Japan and perhaps India in which 
power is shared. In any of  these scenarios Australia’s strategic risks would be 
greater, but not necessarily because of  any direct threat from China.
In fact the most questions we face at the start of  the Asian century are 
not about others, but about ourselves and the kind of  country we want 
to be. Australia has traditionally thought of  itself  as a middle power. That 
is certainly Kevin Rudd’s vision. But what do we mean by this? A middle 
power is a country that can influence the international system to enhance its 
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security and protect its interests through different instruments—economic, 
diplomatic and military. Throughout our history Australia has led a charmed 
life in which our international environment has been shaped for us by great 
and powerful friends. That is as true of  defence as it is of  any other area of  
policy. Only in a region dominated by America does Australia’s claim to be 
able to defend our continent and protect our interests have any credibility.
That means Australians have never seriously considered what would be 
involved in building armed forces that would provide Australia with the 
strategic weight of  a genuinely independent middle power. The eclipse of  
American primacy may finally make that question inescapable. How would 
we answer it? I think it may be possible for Australia to build and maintain 
such forces, but it would be hard and costly. It would require a much more 
rigorous approach to deciding what we want our armed forces to be able to 
do, and what forces we would need to do it. It would require a very different 
kind of  defence organisation to deliver it. Above all, it would need to start 
by moving past the evasions and equivocations of  the 2009 Defence White 
Paper to frankly acknowledge to ourselves that the era of  Anglo-Saxon 





‘Frozen in time’? The war crimes trial in Bangladesh
The Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported on 14 May 2009 that Pakistan’s 
Foreign Office ‘rejected Bangladesh’s demand for an apology over the alleged 
[emphasis added] 1971 atrocities’. The official response was that Bangladesh 
should not be ‘frozen in time’ but rather move ahead. Pakistan advised 
that Bangladesh should ‘let bygones be bygones’ and hoped that relations 
between the two countries would not become hostage to the past.
The most recent tension arose from the Bangladesh parliament’s adoption 
of  a resolution in early 2009 to try the alleged war criminals under the 
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (adopted on 3 December, UN 
Resolution 3074). The United Nations has also announced that it would 
assist Bangladesh in designing and setting up a war crimes tribunal.
Pakistan attracted global condemnation because of  its brutal army 
Posted on South Asia Masala, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/southasiamasala/, 9 July 
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crackdown in 1971 in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)—an event that resulted 
in mass atrocities and genocide. Estimates vary, but the widely accepted figure 
is that between one to three million people perished during the nine months of  
conflict, and a further eight to ten million were forced to leave their homeland. 
Also, 200,000 women were victims of  rape and sexual violence, with 25,000 
rapes resulting in forced impregnation. In addition, at least 30,000 Biharis and 
West Pakistanis were killed as a result of  the conflict.
Why now?
India and Pakistan signed the Simla Pact in 1972. There followed a series of  
meetings with Pakistan and Bangladesh, in which India agreed to return the 
93,000 prisoners of  war (POWs) to Pakistan. As a consequence of  intense 
diplomatic negotiations around these meetings, Bangladesh’s new leaders 
agreed in 1974 not to prosecute the POWs, except for 195 prisoners who were 
accused of  war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
Three important factors contributed to the rise of  the current justice-
seeking movement. First, following the declaration of  a state of  emergency 
by the caretaker government and the military ‘takeover’ behind the scenes in 
2007, civil society groups intensified their demands for the trial of  alleged war 
criminals. The groups assessed that the interim military-backed government 
would be more sympathetic to the movement.
Secondly, the normative values attached to the voter awareness campaigns 
by various agencies and civil society in 2008 focused heavily on democratisation 
and justice mechanisms. This contributed to the pledge by the now governing 
Awami League to address the war crimes issue should they be returned to 
power.
Finally, important factions of  the armed forces, led by the Chief-of-Staff, 
General Moeen U. Ahmed, supported the move to proceed with the war crimes 
trial. It was reported in the media that he approached the US and Pakistan to 
provide crucial documents to support the trial.
The Pakistan-Bangladesh Relationship
Pakistan is watching this recent move in Bangladesh cautiously. Bangladesh 
94 Capturing the Year — 2009
has raised the question of  individual and collective accountability of  the 
Pakistani state in both formal and informal meetings. It has stated that it 
is imperative for Pakistan to apologise for the genocide and mass atrocities 
of  1971, share assets and also repatriate the Biharis, who still remain in 
various camps in Bangladesh. Pakistan argues that this matter stands 
resolved under the 9 April 1974 tripartite agreement, under which Pakistan 
had stated ‘regrets’ but did not offer any formal apology. Some human rights 
and women’s rights groups from Pakistan on various occasions have offered 
public apologies.
Pakistan refuses to offer a formal apology, even as a symbolic gesture. 
For Pakistan this is a past ‘distraction’ during a time when it is facing 
insurmountable internal problems and is on the verge of  a state ‘failure’.
It could, however, be argued that the Pakistani political and military elite’s 
continued denials of  grave injustices committed against its own citizens in 
the ‘recent past’ entrenched deep injustice as a legacy that is now intrinsic 
in its political culture of  inequality and inequity. This legacy is reflected in 
Balochistan and Sind; in widespread militarisation of  society; and in gradual 
extremism that generated a devastating impact on the everyday lives of  
ordinary people of  Pakistan.
While the trauma of  1971 evokes profound emotions, Bangladesh must 
also be sensitive to these internal turmoils in Pakistan and especially to the 
traumatic experiences of  ordinary citizens and displaced populations in 
Pakistan. Establishing a civil society network that reaches across the bitter 
historical divide and promotes strategic dialogue about how meaningfully 
to deal with the past would be one crucial step towards reconciliation and 
healing for both sides.
The Future
There are, of  course, some serious challenges ahead. Some of  these are 
briefly noted here, along with opportunities for future reconciliation.
First, the Bangladesh government and the civil society must respond to 
the domestic opposition, which argues that the justice-seeking movement 
and consequent official actions are counterproductive. The government 
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should especially respond to the claim that the demands for justice are a 
political stunt to shift attention from important issues such as the economic 
slump and price hikes.
Secondly, the time gap between when the war crimes took place and the 
proposed establishment of  a civil and temporary tribunal have given the 
defendants time to destroy crucial evidence.
Thirdly, some of  the most daunting challenges are logistical. If  the 
war crimes trial is to succeed, an enquiry commission must be formed to 
investigate, gather evidence, and identify and recommend the arrest of  some 
of  the most senior and infamous war criminals in the first instance. The 
proposed commission must also consider the possibilities of  a simultaneous 
truth and reconciliation commission (TRC).
Finally, the finances of  the proposed trial must be sorted out. The media 
has reported that following the demand of  the Law Ministry, the Bangladesh 
Cabinet has approved 10 crore taka (approximately US$1.5 million) for this 
trial. This budget is not going to satisfactorily cover the costs relating even 
to the domestic judicial process.
The current political environment in favour of  a trial may not reoccur and 
if  the trial does not succeed there will be significant justice fatigue that would 
obstruct any possible future processes. It is important to ensure that the 
ordinary people who experienced violence during the war have meaningful 
access and are encouraged to participate in the proposed commissions and 
trial. If  these justice processes are considered to be elite or middle-class-
based initiatives, then the expected impact of  the trial would be seriously 
undermined, its legitimacy challenged, and people would feel cut off  from 
the entire initiative. The success of  the proposed trial of  alleged war criminals 
will be measured by its ability to create a legacy for future generations, not 





Aung San Suu Kyi and the generals*
The world has been understandably outraged by the ridiculous farce of  the 
Burmese military regime’s trial of  opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 
for breaching the ‘rules’ of  her own (illegal) detention.
So obsessed are Burma’s top generals with Aung San Suu Kyi that 
they fail to see that they could neutralise much criticism by allowing her a 
genuine degree of  personal freedom, even if  they continued to restrict her 
participation in Burma’s political future. As the length of  her unjustified 
detention grows, hostility towards their cruel and ruthless suppression of  
Suu Kyi increases, from inside as well as from outside the country.
Unprecedented gestures such as allowing diplomats or journalists access 
to the trial were minor concessions that did not divert the regime from their 
ultimate goal of  keeping her in detention, but also did not divert Suu Kyi’s 
supporters from coming out to support her, albeit in small numbers thanks 
Posted on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 8 June 2009.
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to the regime’s well-prepared security against protests.
The generals must have welcomed the foolish breach of  her detention by 
the American ‘do-gooder’ John Yettaw as a golden opportunity to extend 
her detention, but they absolutely failed to understand how much this also 
draws attention to their outrageous mistreatment of  her.
Even their ASEAN colleagues are (thankfully) appalled, although some 
ASEAN countries who share their lack of  tolerance of  political opposition 
could be accused of  double standards. The absolute bankruptcy of  Burma’s 
military leaders’ position is exposed when they claim that any dissent from 
their rule threatens national security. Public protests against the regime, 
including the mass street marches of  2007, are most notable for being 
unarmed, peaceful and legitimate exercises of  basic political rights.
Meanwhile, Burma’s military leaders continue to delay finalising 
arrangements for Burma’s 2010 elections, perhaps because they cannot 
make up their minds about the details of  these arrangements, among which 
is the issue of  international observers.
At the end of  the day, Burma’s elections must include Suu Kyi’s National 
League for Democracy (NLD), as the overwhelming vote winner in the 
1990 elections, and the military regime would be foolish in the extreme if  
they sought, however indirectly, to prevent NLD participation.
That would be disaster for all sides: the elections would be dismissed 
by the whole world as utterly without meaning; while the NLD would also 
be enormously diminished as a relevant political force if  they decided not 
to participate. The NLD is not a perfect political party, has arguably made 
some serious tactical errors, and badly needs to rejuvenate its leadership, 
but it still enjoys widespread if  not universal public backing. But an election 
without NLD participation will not be credible, and the NLD will not be 
credible politically if  it remains on the sidelines.
The 2010 elections cannot be expected to turn the situation in Burma 
around but they could mark the start of  important change. Countries such 
as Australia should support the elections as a first step, however flawed, but 
then press for further fundamental reform and change to help improve the 
situation of  the people of  Burma.





Last weekend the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, asked 
permission to visit Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma’s imprisoned pro-democracy 
leader. Predictably, Burma’s military supremo, Senior General Than Shwe, 
and his subordinates refused the request. The generals know that Aung San 
Suu Kyi’s dignified opposition remains a potent weapon against their rule. 
It is no surprise that they continue to isolate the country’s most famous 
prisoner. But is the focus on Burma’s best-known democracy activist 
stopping us from taking the military government seriously?
Countries like Australia and the United States hold up Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
incarceration as a symbol of  the persistent injustice, deadening political 
stalemate and egregious human rights situation that has prevailed for decades 
in Burma. Over the past 20 years they have repeatedly attacked the generals 
as unsophisticated thugs prepared to sacrifice their countrymen on an altar 
of  political expedience and economic control.
With this well-worn story in mind there is an understandable, and almost 
inevitable, reluctance to explain exactly how the Burmese generals stay in 
charge. Instead, we are easily distracted by the irregular flashes of  hope that 
catapult Burma onto the international agenda. In May 2009 we witnessed 
the most recent, and unusual, of  these episodes when an American intruder, 
John Yettaw, interrupted Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest by swimming to 
her lakeside residence. As a result, she faces a fresh batch of  charges, which 
have only served to motivate another chorus of  outrage against the generals. 
Her trial, adjourned for a month in curious circumstances, is expected to 
reconvene soon.
First posted on Inside Story, http://inside.org.au/burma-general-objectives/, 10 July 2009; 
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The consensus is that this incident provides the generals with a special 
opportunity to ensure Aung San Suu Kyi’s exclusion from the elections 
planned for next year. This is part of  an ongoing campaign against Aung 
San Suu Kyi and her political party, the National League for Democracy. 
The last time Burma held an election, in 1990, her party won 392 of  the 492 
seats, and that result remains the key plank in the resistance by Burma’s pro-
democracy campaigners. Their organising principle, and defiant mantra, is 
that an elected government exists; it has just never been allowed to assume 
its legitimate mandate to rule.
Unfortunately, the post-Cold War period has been unkind to Burma’s 
pro-democracy fighters. Year on year, decade on decade, they are forced into 
maintaining their rage against a government that has proven itself  impervious 
to international opprobrium. As Aung San Suu Kyi faces more years locked 
up, and the generals look set to engineer a crowning legitimisation through 
the 2010 elections, it is worth re-examining Burma’s politics.
The morality play of  virtuous democracy pitted against the despotic 
military machine is now two decades old. To recast the Burmese drama we 
must accept the reality of  the military government’s control. The generals 
are in charge and even in a hypothetical future where elected politicians hold 
formal sway it is likely that military men will remain power brokers. The 2008 
constitution which they drafted sets aside large numbers of  parliamentary 
seats for the military and—by restricting eligibility for high public office—
seeks to guarantee a political future in which the generals retain much of  
their influence.
As the country continues to prepare for the 2010 elections this reality 
has important implications for anyone who hopes to see change in the 
country. Aung San Suu Kyi embodies hopes for parliamentary democracy 
and political pluralism but she will likely be barred from any role in the 
elections. Even if, one day, she does come to power it is increasingly clear 
that without a concerted effort to totally reshape the armed forces she will 
be forced to accept compromises about the role of  the military in Burma’s 
public affairs.
Just as the militaries of  neighbouring Thailand and Bangladesh still 
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demonstrate their appetite for intervention, Burma’s army will probably 
need many years of  electoral experience before it finally disavows political 
power for good. Long after a consensus for post-military government has 
evolved it will be worth keeping an eye on the generals and the alternative 
they represent. This means that those of  us who hope to see positive political 
change in Burma need to learn more about the generals. We could begin by 
asking: how have they managed to stay in control for so long?
To answer this question it is worth highlighting those of  their strategies 
that have proven most effective. Their rule is coloured by four important, 
but hardly glorious, objectives: the suppression of  internal dissent, the 
implementation of  ceasefire deals, the management of  factional politics and 
the maintenance of  a strong external posture.
The pro-democracy protests spearheaded by Aung San Suu Kyi in 1988–
90 left the generals shaken. Those protests were organised in a pre-internet 
world, one in which the potential for widespread street demonstrations to 
coalesce into global news was more limited than it is today. Nonetheless, 
word of  brave defiance against the military machine seeped out. The generals 
learned an important lesson about resilience, the media and democracy.
That lesson was on show when news of  the protests of  September and 
October 2007’s abortive ‘saffron revolution’ spread around the world. Mass 
discontent with military rule was transmitted through the internet and out to 
a hungry media. Solidarity marches, activist blogs and supportive speeches 
marked a new period of  optimism, providing renewed impetus for Burmese 
and international efforts to undermine the government. But the force of  
those heady protests was short lived. In the end, they merely reinforced the 
success of  the generals in continuing to identify, intimidate and prosecute 
opponents, ensuring that the protests didn’t escalate beyond a manageable 
level. The long-term consequences of  those protests have been few. A new 
generation of  radicalised regime opponents were brought onto the streets 
and crushed.
The generals have also worked hard to secure ceasefire deals with two 
dozen rebel armies to provide a degree of  security and prosperity in formerly 
restless border areas. The agreements bring these armies, to a lesser or 
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greater extent, under the central government’s control. It’s no coincidence 
that the major ceasefires were confirmed in the years around Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s rise to political prominence: as pro-democracy sentiments ran through 
the cities the generals saw a need to co-opt their armed opponents. The 
commanders of  the ethnic armies were persuaded to cease their decades-long 
battles in exchange for wealth from the country’s economic liberalisation. 
Newly empowered ethnic armies took on a diverse portfolio of  commercial 
activities. The proceeds of  mining, logging and, of  course, narcotics lined 
the leaders’ wallets and filled the treasuries of  formerly rebellious armies 
across the country.
Only a few armies have yet to sign ceasefires. The most celebrated rebel 
force remains the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), which is 
currently facing a major challenge from Burmese government forces and 
their ethnic allies. Recently, one of  their last remaining strongholds fell and 
thousands of  refugees fled across the border to Thailand. The KNLA has 
been at war with a series of  Burmese governments for over 60 years. If  its 
forces capitulate in 2009, or are pushed deeper into jungle obscurity, it will 
mark the end of  an era for Burmese politics.
As the government moves towards the planned 2010 elections the generals 
are also working to neuter the armies that have already signed ceasefires. The 
generals hope to largely demobilise these armies and use remnant forces 
only as border guards. In the case of  the Kachin Independence Army, 
which has bases along the border with China, this would mean a transition 
from an armed strength of  around five thousand to only a few hundred. 
Their commanders have indicated an unwillingness to sign up to this new 
arrangement, although smaller, and weaker, armies have already made such 
deals. For the time being the Kachin Independence Army, and a handful of  
other large ceasefire armies, are keeping their guns.
Co-opting the ceasefire armies is an important goal for the long term but 
maintaining the generals’ own command cohesion is arguably a more crucial 
objective for ensuring their immediate survival. With an armed strength of  
almost 500,000, and countless potentially volatile factions, this is a significant 
task. Cohesion has been managed by a prestigious officer corps imbued 
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with a spirit that melds ancient Burmese martial chauvinism, British colonial 
military tradition and the experiences of  decades as politician-commanders. 
In such a system it remains remarkable that there are so few major schisms. 
Command loyalty and solidarity remains a hallmark of  the Burmese military 
system.
The purge of  former military intelligence chief  and prime minister, 
General Khin Nyunt, in 2004 was the crescendo of  one particularly 
challenging period for that system. The manoeuvring took considerable 
nous on the part of  the more senior officers, who reputedly feared the 
growing autonomy of  his intelligence network and worried, perhaps with 
some reason, that a plot was in motion to engineer the ‘retirements’ of  the 
most senior military commanders. The Than Shwe power clique moved first 
and Khin Nyunt subsequently disappeared. He reportedly enjoys a quiet life 
under house arrest in Yangon.
The management of  such potentially destabilising command politics 
remains a key government objective. The world continues to wait for 
a schism within the ruling clique to precipitate its end. During times of  
tension there is well-meaning speculation that a rebellion from within the 
ranks will undermine the top generals and lead to a more moderate faction 
taking control. Over the decades this expectation has become muted and it 
is now rare to hear anyone confidently predicting this outcome.
Finally, and most importantly, the generals have managed an external 
stance that discourages international efforts to remove them from power. 
They have cultivated strong ties with all of  the neighbouring countries, 
underpinned, in most cases, by increasingly ambitious economic integration. 
These neighbourhood ties are augmented by relationships with powerful 
countries—like Russia, North Korea and Israel—further afield. These 
distant friends offer much needed technical, logistical and financial support, 
and the Russian and North Korean governments are increasingly linked to 
the generals’ nascent nuclear ambitions.
At the same time, the United States, United Kingdom, European Union 
and Australia have continued to voice concern over Burma’s lack of  
democratic progress. However persuasive their moral arguments, they have 
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never been supported by a broad-based coalition. When a major Burma 
resolution was debated in the United Nations Security Council in 2007 it was 
defeated by vetoes from Russia and China. There is still no consensus about 
what Burma needs. The Russians and Chinese have come to the conclusion 
that, at least for the moment, the country needs to be left alone. The foreign 
policy objective of  the generals is now echoed by these powerful friends. So 
while the Burmese generals are regularly dismissed as unsophisticated and 
unsubtle, they have managed to defeat the efforts of  generations of  savvy 
diplomats, negotiators and activists working to undermine their government 
system. This is the overarching success of  their rule and the one that points, 
most starkly, to the challenge that their critics must face.
The objectives of  the Burmese generals need to be explained because 
there remains a lingering sense that they will inevitably stumble in their 
efforts to retain control. Is this likely? They have clearly proven adept at 
managing their military dictatorship. New revenue streams and international 
collaborations probably mean that they are far less vulnerable than many 
expect. Over the decades they have asserted control across the length and 
breadth of  the country in a way that previous governments, even the British 
colonial government, struggled to do. They have also inculcated a feeling 
of  normality that is largely ignored by outsiders. It often surprises first-time 
visitors to the country that life on the streets is not nearly as tense, difficult 
or militarised as they have been led to believe. Human rights abuses and 
outrages are, at least for the casual observer, largely kept out of  view.
We remain far from the day when Burma will be considered a ‘normal’ 
country. But the elections of  2010 are supposed to bring that distant 
future closer to reality. Managing this difficult period will test all of  the 
resources of  the generals and those who seek to break their yoke. Although 
Ban Ki-moon, Aung San Suu Kyi and others like them will have a part to 
play in these battles, it is increasingly obvious that international efforts to 
undermine the Burmese government must first come to grips with the day-
to-day mechanics of  military rule. A critical and unflinching understanding 
of  the generals and their objectives is the best starting point for any future 
effort to bring them down.





Review of  The State in Myanmar by Robert H. Taylor, London: Hurst, 2009.
This book is a new edition of  The State in Burma, originally published 
in 1987 and thought by many to be the most comprehensive account of  
Burma in the quarter century after Ne Win seized power in 1962. Taylor 
is a political scientist with strong historical interests who speaks and reads 
Burmese and has devoted his professional life to studying the country. He 
travels regularly to Myanmar and in recent years has held classes there. A 
native of  Ohio in the American Midwest, he has migrated through several 
citizenships—American, Australian, British—and now resides in London. 
He has been a consultant on Myanmar affairs to Premier Oil, a fact 
that he freely acknowledges in the book and discusses in his November 
2007 interview with New Mandala. In a field fraught with controversy, his 
association with Premier Oil comes up often in conversation about Taylor’s 
writings, views and objectivity. His critics and detractors see him as too close 
to the Myanmar regime.
During his undergraduate education at Ohio University Robert Taylor 
took courses with John F. Cady, who wrote A History of  Modern Burma, first 
published in 1956 and for many years the definitive history of  modern 
Burma. Still inspired by Cady’s teaching, Taylor refers approvingly to Cady’s 
wry views on foreign meddling in Burma’s domestic politics during the Cold 
War. Burmese governments have had good reason to be wary of  the West, 
and Taylor has principled objections to American policies that go back to 
the early 1950s. In 1960, on the eve of  the establishment of  the Burma 
Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), Cady published a revised edition of  his 
Posted on New Mandala, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/, 29 August 2009.
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history with a 34 page supplement.
Taylor has approached the task of  revising his own book in a similar 
manner by writing a supplement, rather than a completely new book, to cover 
the tumultuous events that occurred in Myanmar since the original edition 
appeared. Apart from some changes in verb tense and the confirmation 
of  a rumour about Ne Win’s heir apparent in 1983, the final pages of  the 
original edition are reproduced virtually unchanged. The fit between the old 
and new editions is seamless, except that the name of  the country changes 
inexplicably from Burma to Myanmar. Taylor’s favoured framework of  the 
state, which served to explain modern Burma after World War II until 1987, 
is intact and continues to explain what happened between 1988 and 2008.
The new chapter six is a small tome in itself. ‘The State Redux, 1988–
2008’ covers the end of  the party-state, the return of  army rule, political 
parties, the revival of  student politics, the ceasefire agreements, exile 
political groups, state–society relations, courts and the law, external relations, 
and politics within the ruling councils of  state—the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC) and the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC). To squeeze two decades into one hundred pages requires 
Taylor to give less than a full account of  the 1988 uprising and the violence 
that suppressed it. The protests led by monks in September 2007 are also 
given short shrift. His narrative frequently loops back to 1988 to illustrate 
continuities and breaks with the previous period. The BSPP had pursued a 
strategy of  autarky, or economic self-reliance, similar to juche, the ideology 
of  economic and political self-reliance developed by the late North Korean 
leader, Kim Il-sung. With the army putsch of  1988, autarky under ‘the state’s 
ageing managers’ was abandoned as the new leadership sought to meet the 
challenges of  globalisation and integrate the economy into the international 
order.
Taylor gives extensive coverage to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership of  
the National League for Democracy (NLD), to the 1990 elections and the 
NLD’s win of  392 out of  485 seats, to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s political 
philosophy and desire to transform the ‘Burmese mentality’, and to her 
detention under house arrest. He reiterates the SLORC position on the 
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election results, namely, that power would not be transferred until the elected 
representatives drew up a new constitution. This position, contested by the 
NLD which believed it had won the election and was entitled to form a 
government, became the stumbling block which led to the present stalemate. 
Burmese politics quickly became internationalised. In an appendix Taylor 
discusses the 2008 constitution that may or may not break the deadlock.
As a non-specialist in Burmese studies, I learned a lot from Taylor’s account 
of  exile politics, with its bewildering array of  alpha-names designating the 
groupings overseas. Taylor’s explanation for fragmentation in the exile 
community is that newly arrived activists in the Burmese diaspora have little 
faith in existing expatriate organisations which trace their lineage back into 
Burma. His contentious conclusion is that exile politics has had more impact 
outside the country than inside.
Taylor also gives extensive coverage to the ceasefire agreements and their 
impact. There are detailed tables on the major agreements, ethnic political 
parties, and estimates of  armed groups contesting for state power. Although 
the process is not yet completed, many of  the ethnic armies seem to have 
been converted into police forces and local militia, and most of  the groups, 
officially recognised as semi-autonomous entities, are allowed to establish 
legitimate businesses in the national economy. The Burmese government 
has effectively subcontracted its sovereignty to these groups.
Here and there may be found unflattering comments about the regime: 
‘scabrous cartoons and articles’ about Daw Aung San Suu Kyi published 
in the government-controlled press; torture and beatings still being used 
in 2002 in lieu of  proper interrogation methods; inept explanations to the 
outside world of  the government’s policies. While Taylor points out that 
the ethnically designated armies were deeply involved in smuggling opium, 
timber, cattle and gemstones, his handling of  collusion by the generals leaves 
something to be desired. Bertil Lintner, among others, has reported on this 
collusion, and it cannot be ignored.
I was disappointed in Taylor’s handling of  source material, not because 
he relied on official documents or statistics, but because of  materials not 
cited. He cautions on the use of  government sources, and he hedges many 
Burma 107
assessments with ‘seems to’ and ‘appears to be’. In any case, much can be 
learned from so-called propaganda if  it is used intelligently. Perhaps for 
reasons of  space—the length of  chapter six must already have been testing 
the publisher’s patience—some important work is not reported, such as the 
extensive analyses by the Macquarie University economist Sean Turnell who 
has written on banking, microfinance, chettiars, migrant workers, sustainable 
development, and sanctions. Another example is Taylor’s discussion of  
the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a mass 
organisation whose membership is compulsory for civil servants and those 
who do business with the state, and which has a branch in nearly every 
township, ward and village tract. An informative 90-page report that might 
have illuminated the discussion, produced in May 2006 by the Network for 
Democracy and Development, is not cited.
‘State’ in the book often seems little more than a synonym for government, 
so we have ‘state managers’ rather than ‘government officials’. Regime, which 
seems to suit the circumstances, is used infrequently, and junta, favoured by 
some observers, is never used. More to the point, Taylor does not believe 
the army has become the state, which it was in danger of  doing in the years 
immediately after 1988. ‘Had that happened, and the distinction between 
the state and the army been completely lost, the prospects of  significant 
political change in Myanmar, short of  war, could have dissipated’ (p. 402). 
But the army controls the state and in many ways functions as a state. It also 
claims to be the saviour of  the nation and strives to give life to that claim 
through USDA ceremonies and mega events.
What explains Taylor’s particular vantage point? In his New Mandala 
interview Taylor tells us that because of  visa restrictions for American citizens 
at the time, he was one of  the very few individuals to receive his PhD degree 
from Cornell University’s Southeast Asia Program without having visited 
his country of  study. He scrambled to overcome this disadvantage with 
extended visits inside Burma and advanced Burmese language study long 
after he had completed his doctorate in 1974. One of  Taylor’s classmates 
at Cornell was Thak Chaloemtiarana, who wrote a widely respected thesis, 
published as Thailand, the Politics of  Despotic Paternalism (1979, 2007), on Field 
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Marshal Sarit Thanarat, Thailand’s military dictator from 1957–63. Thak’s 
picture of  this military dictator does not exactly flatter Sarit, but it is also not 
harshly critical of  him. In fact, it is not critical at all. Thak simply wanted to 
understand the sources of  Sarit’s power and how Sarit’s regime had shaped 
Thailand’s political life at the height of  the Cold War. Taylor’s approach 
to the Burmese army’s domination of  Burmese politics since 1962 is quite 
similar.
As comparative political scientists with discipline and language training in 
area studies, both Thak and Taylor have tried to see things from the inside 
out. In Taylor’s case, he has asked himself  why the regime behaves the way 
it does, why it seems incapable of  engaging with the outside world in a more 
constructive manner, why its economic policies have not worked, and why, 
having abandoned autarky after 1988, it still has not managed to connect with 
the global economy and participate in the growth that other authoritarian 
regimes in the region, such as Vietnam, have managed to achieve. Taylor 
wants to understand what makes the Burmese army-state tick, not how to get 
rid of  it. He would doubtless agree with the military scholar, Mary Callahan, 
who has written that the current political deadlock cannot be reduced simply 
to an unequal contest between a victimised population and an invincible 
gang of  ‘trouser-wearing’ military officers.
Writing after army leadership brought an end to civil strife in October 
1958, John F. Cady declared:
The non-political cabinet of  General Ne Win, freed from the incubus of  partisan 
feuding and wielding genuine authority, accomplished notable improvements 
within a short time. Order was established and corruption curbed. But the very 
measure of  its successes discredited the principle of  representative government, 
which alone could provide an eventual escape from army dictatorship (1960, p. 
683).
The historical circumstances then and now are very different. At the end of  
chapter six, Taylor concedes that crisis management in Burma has become 
routine, and once again the state is run by ageing managers. Yet I wonder if  
Robert Taylor would agree with his teacher’s judgement in this last sentence 
if  it were applied at any point to the army-state that came to power in Burma 





Taiwan and Hu Jintao’s end-year overtures
Celebrating the 30th anniversary of  China’s first attempt at a 
nonconfrontational policy towards Taiwan, President Hu Jintao made a 
speech on the last day of  2008 containing six proposals for making progress 
on the broader issues of  cross-strait relations with Taiwan.
These proposals included a peace accord with exchanges between 
the two militaries, an end to political confrontation in a ‘one China’ 
framework, enhanced economic cooperation, strengthening common 
cultural links, personal exchanges with the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) and adequate arrangements for Taiwan to participate in international 
organisations.
The past year has already seen a lowering of  tensions across the Taiwan 
Strait with the more flexible policies of  President Ma Ying-jeou since he 
succeeded President Chen Shui-bian in May 2008 and a more nuanced policy 
Posted on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 13 January 2009.
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approach to Taiwan out of  Beijing.
Among recent developments have been the establishment of  direct 
air, sea and postal links across the strait and China’s stated willingness to 
help Taiwan financially in the context of  the global financial crisis. Hu’s six 
proposals seem to have taken that process further, although how far is yet to 
be determined. The debate on the meaning and intent of  the proposals will 
continue for some time.
Apart from the direct reference to the DPP, none of  Hu’s six proposals 
are new, but they are addressed to a different government in Taipei. The 
immediate response from Taiwanese officials, including the foreign minister, 
Francisco Ou, and from the ‘blue’ leaning media, has been positive, although 
Ma has as yet responded only briefly, indicating little at this stage.
The Hu proposals could be seen as a response, as Ma suggests, to a number 
of  propositions that he has put forward for improving cross-strait relations, 
including calling for a ‘diplomatic truce’ and a ‘mutual non-denial’ (that 
Taiwan and China should not deny each other’s existence). Unsurprisingly 
the independence-oriented DPP is less enthusiastic.
In a general sense, and in the use of  more restrained language, Hu’s 
proposals appear to contain positive elements and presumably they are 
meant to. They may nevertheless be difficult for Taiwan to take further. On 
the surface, Hu shows little sign of  compromise on the ‘one China principle’ 
and only a minor reference was made to the ‘1992 consensus’, that both sides 
recognise there is only one China but agree to differ on the definition of  
that one China. This consensus is an important basis for Ma’s approach to 
cross-strait relations and for Taiwan’s ongoing talks with the mainland, even 
though it is interpreted more narrowly by China. Ma has committed not to 
discuss politics with China in this administration, but this may be difficult 
in developing a peace accord and a means for participating in World Health 
Organization (WHO) meetings, a litmus test for Ma, without impinging on 
the claims to sovereignty of  one side or the other.
Yet the proposals for a peace accord and for non-confrontation do reflect 
a welcome lowering of  temperature in the relationship. A more substantial 
move to assuage Taiwanese fears of  China, however, would be to reduce 
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the thousand or so missiles targeting Taiwan across the strait—a move not 
mentioned by Hu although rumoured to be a possibility in Taiwan.
So is Hu’s speech a positive development? It’s certainly encouraging for the 
international community. It suggests a further lowering of  tensions across 
the strait and reduced risks for countries that could possibly be caught up in 
any cross-strait conflict—including Australia.
For the Taiwanese it depends upon whether they see their future tied 
more closely to China or whether these developments are seen as a part of  a 
clever move toward bringing Taiwan increasingly within China’s political as 
well as economic orbit. Presumably this, of  course, is China’s hope. Whether 
Ma will see them as an adequate response, given his own by no means 
universally welcomed flexibility towards China, may be open to question. 
More generally, although undoubtedly a positive development potentially, 
and one that ameliorates if  not resolves the bilateral issues, we have yet to 




Fifty years on, what do we really know about Tibet?
This week Tibet is back in the headlines. One year on from the violent 
clashes that turned Lhasa into a war zone, another spate of  protests marks 
the 50th anniversary (10 March) of  the Dalai Lama’s flight into exile.
Unfortunately for Western audiences, journalists go weak in the knees 
when it comes to the Dalai Lama or Tibet. Reading some Western coverage 
Posted as ‘50 years on, what do we know about Tibet?’ on East Asia Forum, http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/, 16 March 2009.
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on the issues is almost as exasperating as reading Chinese Communist Party 
propaganda. An editorial in The Age this week (12 March) is a case in point. 
It denounces China with accusations of  ‘colonialism’ and ‘cultural genocide’. 
Its sensationalist moralising plays to popular perceptions, but it distorts the 
facts and closes the door on serious discussion about what is going on inside 
Tibet.
Journalists also write about ‘Tibet’ as if  there is only one Tibet and 
everyone knows where it is. They don’t. Within China Tibet usually refers 
to the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) where approximately 2,500,000 
ethnic Tibetans live. Then there are the Tibetan prefectures and counties 
located within neighbouring provinces—an even larger area than the TAR 
in which an even larger number of  ethnic Tibetans live. Then there are the 
exiles—a community of  120,000 with its government in India, the Central 
Tibetan Administration, and members scattered across the globe. Among 
these groups there are various religious and linguistic communities with 
different views on life, the universe and the status of  Tibet.
When journalists write about the ‘Tibetan cause’ they are typically 
writing about the Tibetan exile cause, which, as the Dalai Lama has so often 
repeated, is a struggle not for independence but for ‘meaningful autonomy’ 
for Tibet. Even though the exiles are divided into different camps with 
different aspirations for Tibet, most rally around the Dalai Lama’s call for 
‘meaningful autonomy’ rather than independence.
Fair enough. But if  that’s the crux of  the ‘Tibet question’ then 
commentators would do well to examine what ‘meaningful autonomy’ might 
look like in the context of  a one-party state. They could start by looking 
at the exile government’s demands—outlined on their website, www.tibet.
net. The Government of  Tibet in Exile insists that Tibetan autonomy be 
expressed through the creation of  a new political entity encompassing the 
entire region in which ethnic Tibetans make up the majority of  the local 
population—a greater Tibetan nation covering up to a quarter of  China’s 
territory. These demands were repeated at the most recent ‘discussions’ 
between exile representatives and Beijing. China’s leaders have responded to 
them with derision, as they always have done.
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But while the exiles rally pro bono international lawyers for their 
improbable grand design, other Tibetans are working towards gradual 
change from within the system. From their various positions in all levels of  
government, religious associations, universities, NGOs and other groups, 
these Tibetans deliberately stay out of  the limelight, but they will probably 
have more impact than the exiles in the long run. Some of  their efforts 
are already paying off. Anyone accusing China of  ‘cultural genocide’ just 
hasn’t spent much time in Tibetan areas. Tibetan religion and culture has 
been flourishing in recent decades. Tibetan monasteries have been rebuilt 
and expanded, many with state grants, as Tibetan Buddhism attracts an 
increasing number of  adherents. There are now more Tibetan monks and 
nuns in China than there are Tibetans outside China (see the chapter by 
Matthew Kapstein in Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers, Morris Rossabi 
(ed.), Seattle: University of  Washington Press, 2004). In many Tibetan 
areas, local officials are using Tibetan identity and culture as a draw card 
for tourism and economic development. Despite criticisms that this has led 
to a commodification and, therefore, debasing of  Tibetan culture, there is 
evidence that tourism-led development is renewing local pride in Tibet’s 
cultural heritage and creating an environment where Tibet’s heritage can be 
appreciated by all Chinese citizens.
But the cultural revival has created political problems too. Monasteries that 
have regained influence in recent decades pose a challenge to state authority 
(see my article ‘Monasticism and the local state: autonomy and authority in a 
Tibetan prefecture’, The China Journal, no. 54, July 2005, 22–52). Monasteries 
have also long been hotbeds of  Tibetan nationalism, seen by China’s leaders 
as threatening to both China’s territorial integrity and Communist Party 
authority. So while Tibetans are mostly free to practise their religion (visit 
any one of  hundreds of  sacred Tibetan Buddhist sites throughout China 
to see ordinary people going about their daily religious rituals), the Chinese 
government has placed tough restrictions on organised Tibetan Buddhist 
institutions. While the level of  intervention varies between locales, monks 
are often forced to demonstrate their allegiance to the Chinese government 
by denouncing the Dalai Lama and by attending patriotic education classes. 
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These major intrusions into monastic life are a major source of  grievance 
for Tibetan monks. When they get fed up, street protest is their only outlet. 
Lay people join them in sympathy and it escalates. That’s what happened in 
1989 and it’s what happened again in 2008.
However, the media’s frequent depiction of  the Tibet issue as the struggle 
of  an oppressed people against a colonising force is overly simplistic. Among 
Tibetans, as with every other community in China, there are haves and have-
nots, satisfied people and not so satisfied people. China’s policies in the 
region have benefited some Tibetans, but not others. State-led development 
strategies have raised incomes for the urban middle classes, but opened 
the door to non-Tibetan migrants who out-compete less-skilled Tibetan 
workers for jobs (see my article in Far Eastern Economic Review, April 2008). 
Many rural parts of  Tibet are just as poor as they have been for decades and 
even centuries. China’s policymakers need to rethink the way the billions in 
subsidies are being spent. Far more resources need to go into education, 
health and inclusive development programs in rural Tibetan areas. But these 
are development policy challenges for all of  China. Tibetan-area protests 
must be viewed alongside the 100,000 protests that took place across rural 
China in 2008—many of  which are reactions to local injustice.
Nevertheless, the continuation of  protests across a wide swathe of  Tibetan 
areas is a clear indication that China’s policies in Tibet aren’t working. China’s 
leaders need to rethink their coercive approaches to governing Tibetan areas 
or risk further alienating the Tibetan population. But neither should the 
protests be read as a sign that the exiles’ campaign is gaining ground. For 
the last two decades the exiles have rallied sympathisers from around the 
globe, including Hollywood stars, to exert pressure on China. In doing so, 
they’ve succeeded in making Tibet an international cause célèbre, but they’ve 
had zero influence on China’s Tibet policy. When the 73-year-old Dalai 
Lama eventually passes away, the various exile factions will likely lose the 
little leverage they have. Some of  the more aggressive groups could resort 
to violence, which would prolong Tibet’s misery.
Sensible debate about China’s Tibet policy is long overdue, but extremists 
in both camps continue to dominate the airwaves. The international media 
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are not helping much either. International journalists need to do a better job 
of  informing public debate about Tibet. Rolling out the ‘good guys versus 
bad guys’ script merely puts wind in the sails of  the exiles’ sinking ship. 
It also feeds the Chinese government’s defensiveness and helps to justify 
coercion within government and military circles.
International journalists would do well to start thinking about Tibetan 
issues in the context of  Chinese policy and broader political change in 
China. Tibetan autonomy is a good thing, but it will remain meaningless in 




Let the stimulus package work in China
For the first time in modern economic history there is a joint effort underway 
among major economies in the world to stimulate economic growth 
through fiscal means in the middle of  the global economic downturn. 
China’s stimulus package is equivalent to 3.2 per cent of  GDP in 2009, well 
above the 2 per cent of  GDP recommended by the International Monetary 
Fund. This is not so much because China’s fiscal fundamentals are relatively 
sound and enable China to do more than others, but mainly because too 
much is at stake for China to maintain a reasonably high growth rate against 
the backdrop of  steeply falling exports and an abrupt easing of  domestic 
economic activities.
With much investment still needed for job creation, infrastructure 
First published in APEC economies newsletter, April 2009; posted as ‘Making the stimulus 
package work in China’, on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 7 April 2009.
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development and the provision of  public goods, the room for fiscal 
expansion in China is considerable. Fiscal measures to boost the economy 
are needed because abundant liquidity makes monetary policy less effective. 
The efficacy of  implementing such large-scale fiscal expansion will depend 
on how it can be directed to restructuring the Chinese economy at this stage 
of  its industrialisation.
With a growth rate of  nearly 10 per cent per annum during the past 30 
years, China’s economy is like a fully loaded truck travelling at a high speed 
on a superhighway powered largely by capital investment and strong exports. 
Imagine how precarious it would be if  the truck not only needed to decelerate 
quickly, because of  the economic slowdown, but was also forced to make 
a sudden turn (shift) from being highly dependent on exports to reliance 
on domestic consumption. Such a shift is generally regarded as necessary 
in resolving the problems of  global imbalance. Failure to change direction 
increases the risk of  running the economy into ‘deflation’, increasing 
unemployment and causing social instability.
China’s stimulus package might boost domestic demand and accelerate 
growth, but it may not be able to rebalance the economy towards a new 
pattern of  growth driven primarily by domestic consumption. At the same 
time, if  it is not implemented well, the package could set back ongoing 
institutional reform aimed at reducing the direct involvement of  local 
governments in generating growth. The package’s underlying growth target 
could also undermine the government’s goals of  reducing the energy (as well 
as pollution) intensity of  its industries, set as part of  China’s commitment to 
deal with energy and environmental problems.
Can China’s stimulus package work more effectively so as not only to 
generate more growth and more employment, but also to enhance the 
ongoing reform, at the core of  China’s success in the past, and to promote 
industrial upgrading through technological advancement and innovation, 
and increase domestic consumption through boosting rural development 
and strengthening the social security system? Both are crucially important to 
a more sustainable growth path in the long term.
For the stimulus to work the government will have to impose strong 
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disciplinary measures on different levels of  government to ensure that 
investment accords with government planning and priorities. Investment by 
local governments is prone to inefficiency both because of  irregularities in its 
use or its allocation to financially non-viable projects. Since it is effectiveness 
which ultimately determines the real impact of  the spending package, the 
importance of  continuing systemic reform is paramount.
Implementation of  the package has to be combined with other 
macroeconomic policies, including policy measures ranging from easing 
monetary policies to increase bank lending to reducing taxation for both 
enterprises and households. Direct government payments to low-income 
groups in both urban and rural areas must also aim to increase domestic 
consumption.
It is important that the huge expansion of  government spending from 
all government sources doesn’t crowd out non-state and private investment 
which now accounts for more than 70 per cent of  China’s total fixed 
asset investment. The stimulus package inevitably strengthens the role of  
governments which might go against the grain of  market-oriented reform.
One challenge will be to frame the stimulus package so that it encourages 
further investment from the private sector, which has played a pivotal role in 
driving growth in the past and holds the key for reviving the economy. With 
many factories already being closed down, government support in the form 
of  finance and credit will be essential for small and medium sized private 
firms which continue to rely heavily on borrowing from informal financial 
sources at much higher cost. One policy option is to quicken the pace of  
liberalising the informal financial sector and integrating it with the formal 
financial sector.
The stimulus package won’t work unless both China and its trading 
partners keep their markets open to each other. Guarding against rising 
protectionism will require both China and its main trading partners to 
make some adjustments both domestically and internationally. As one of  
the largest beneficiaries from open trade, China can contribute to global 
economic recovery by importing more goods and by liberalising trading 
arrangements with its trading partners.
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There is no room for complacency on the viability of  the commercial 
banks in China even though the overall ratio of  their non-performing loans 
has been falling. This could be reversed when the economic slow-down starts 
impacting on firms’ ability to repay their bank loans. Commercial banks will 
also be lending money to fill the funding gap in the stimulus package, further 
increasing the financial risk for them.
China is conscious of  the need for fiscal sustainability in spite of  the 
estimated budget deficit for 2009 accounting for only 2.9 per cent of  GDP 
(lower than the internationally recognised alert level). Fiscal expansion has, 
however, been accompanied by substantial reduction of  taxation for both 
enterprises and households, weakening the government’s fiscal position in 
the short term. And a large proportion of  funding in the stimulus package 
comes from local governments, many of  which are already heavily in debt.
For China, a failure to deepen its economic, governmental and institutional 
reform in time of  crisis will not only undermine the efficacy of  implementing 
its stimulus package but also pose more medium to long-term difficulties 
in confronting the challenges in the post-crisis world in which China is 
expected to play a more important role.
The current crisis is likely to get worse before it gets better. But the 
possibilities for further high growth in China have not been exhausted 
because the fundamentals which have driven past Chinese growth remain 
basically unchanged. The room for further rapid growth and industrialisation 
is large, given China’s present level of  per capita income, its continuing 
urbanisation, the scope for further improving productivity by deepening 
reform and institutional change. The preservation of  an open global trading 
regime is important to the resumption of  fast growth in China that will also 





Can China embrace its history and Zhao Ziyang’s 
memoir?
As one whose task it was—together with some excellent colleagues—to 
report and try to make sense of  events as they unfolded in China from 1988 
to their tragic denouement on the night of  3–4 June 1989, Zhao’s account 
comes as very welcome confirmation that, basically, we got it right.
Against a background of  growing popular concern over corruption and 
inflation, the broad outlines were clear enough: Zhao’s intensifying struggle 
with his more conservative opponents, the way his efforts to defuse an 
increasingly tense situation following the death of  Hu Yaobang on 15 April 
were systematically sabotaged, the cutting off  of  Zhao’s direct access to 
Deng Xiaoping, the subsequent monopolisation of  information going to 
Deng by ‘a small handful’ (to use the phraseology of  the time) of  Zhao’s 
enemies, Deng’s final loss of  confidence in Zhao, Zhao’s loss of  power, 
martial law, the massacre and its aftermath.
What Zhao gives us, though, is the detail of  the events as he himself  lived 
them; and also the lacunae, things that others may have been aware of  but he 
himself  not. And this is itself  a useful reminder that just because someone 
played a crucial role in major historical events doesn’t necessarily mean they 
knew everything that was going on. This applies both to the machinations 
taking place behind his back and also to aspects of  the situation as it 
developed in the streets.
What was not generally known at the time to outside observers was Zhao’s 
determination, mentioned several times in the book, that he not go down 
in history as the general secretary who approved unleashing the People’s 
Posted on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 24 May 2009.
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Liberation Army (PLA) against the demonstrators. In so doing he sealed 
his political fate, but also ensured his name would be added to the (all too 
long) list of  upright officials who throughout Chinese history did the right 
thing—to their cost, but to their own, and China’s, ultimate credit.
The fascination of  the book, though, goes much further than Zhao’s 
account of  the 4 June events. It will be mined in great detail by many for 
the insights it provides into the evolution of  the economic reform program, 
the twists and turns of  internal party struggles, the paramount role of  Deng 
Xiaoping (but even his power was not unlimited), the serious differences 
within the reform camp over political reform (and, in Zhao’s case, the 
way his thinking on this issue changed and continued to do so following 
his removal from power), Zhao’s insightful pen-portraits of  his erstwhile 
colleagues, and his frank admissions of  various policy mistakes (in particular 
the mishandling of  the price reform of  1988).
Most of  all, the book stands out as the sole account of  how things 
worked—and in some, but not all, ways presumably still do—at the very top 
of  the Chinese political system, by one who was there.
The difference now, regarding this latter point, is of  course that there is 
no longer a Deng, or a Deng equivalent. Zhao tells us that at the time of  
the removal of  Hu Yaobang, Chen Yun had expressed concern about how 
Hu’s resignation would be received, both domestically and internationally, 
and made sure the announcement explained that it was legal and in accord 
with proper procedures.
‘Deng himself ’, says Zhao, ‘never took such matters seriously.’ Quite. 
None of  the current leaders are cut from this cloth nor have Deng’s power, 
deriving not from office but from who he was and what he’d done.
The book is in fact almost as much about Deng as it is about Zhao, 
and here the portrait is appropriately complex. While Zhao emerges very 
clearly as the man who was really responsible for the thinking through and 
execution of  the reform and opening program, it would never have happened 
without Deng. Equally, without Deng other things that might have happened 
didn’t—most particularly, really meaningful political reform.
Zhao makes it quite clear that for Deng political reform meant doing 
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whatever it took to strengthen the position of  the Communist Party as the 
sole ruling force in China. He was implacably opposed to anything that 
smacked of  multiparty democracy or the separation of  powers.
In this sense, the current leadership stands in a direct line of  succession 
to Deng, as expressed most recently by the widely reported comments of  
Wu Bangguo; but it is good to be reminded that there have been, and are, 
other views within the party itself. At the same time, Zhao demonstrates 
with equal clarity the support given him by Deng at various crucial junctures 
against the conservative forces that sought to turn the clock back on reform 
and opening.
Commenting on the 4 June events, Deng said, famously, ‘This storm was 
bound to happen.’ Zhao shows that this was not necessarily the case—or at 
least that there was nothing inevitable about the way in which it was handled. 
Had he had his way, it was perfectly possible that the situation could have 
been resolved peacefully (as was quite obvious to almost anybody there at the 
time, other than to those who had an interest in what actually happened).
Going further back, had Hu Yaobang not been forced from power in 
1987, Zhao believes the subsequent political trajectory would have been quite 
different (although, intriguingly, Zhao reveals that one of  the accusations 
against Hu was that he had been too enthusiastic in his support of  Kim 
Il-sung!).
A few days ago, responding to a foreign journalist’s question about a 
possible reappraisal of  4 June, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman 
said that this and all related issues had been settled years ago. I have too 
high an opinion of  the Chinese Ministry of  Foreign Affairs to believe that 
the spokesman believed this to be true, or that his hearers would believe it 
either.
Sooner or later—and later is still more likely than sooner—the issue 
will be reappraised. When it is, Zhao’s memoirs will play an important 
role in reassessing this vital episode in the history of  modern China. In 
the meantime, thanks to access to modern means of  communication—an 
important aspect of  the reform and opening program for which Deng, 
Zhao, Hu and their successors can all claim credit—whatever measures are 
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taken to impede them, thousands of  people across China will find ways of  




Chinalco fiasco exposes our national ignorance
Last week the deal that would have seen Chinalco (the big Chinese metals 
conglomerate) take a US$19.5 billion stake in Anglo-Australian mining giant 
Rio Tinto fell over.
This was not just another of  the many Chinese resource investment 
deals on the block. It would have been the largest-ever Chinese commercial 
investment abroad and would have led to the creation of  the first great Anglo-
Australian-Chinese mining and metals company, probably headquartered in 
Australia. This company would have been positioned to play a lead role in 
the Chinese market. It was not just significant in the Australian scheme of  
things. It would have been significant in the Chinese and the world scheme 
of  things.
Quite apart from whether it influenced the commercial outcome 
announced on Friday, the kerfuffle over the proposal in Australia prompts 
reflection on how Australia is managing the relationship with China. 
Australia’s management of  its relationship with China is not merely of  
national significance; it is of  regional and global importance because of  
Australia’s strategic role as an energy and resource supplier to China and, 
Posted as ‘Australia needs to get its act together on China, and fast’, on East Asia Forum, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 7 June 2009; published in Australian Financial Review, 9 June 
2009.
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indeed, the whole Northeast Asian region.
No one comes out of  the Rio-Chinalco experiment looking good. The 
Australian press fell hook, line and sinker for the feed of  Australian vested 
interests in the play. Unfortunately, there’s little ballast in the way of  Chinese 
expertise in the fourth estate. Australian policymakers directly responsible 
for the deal looked like a bunch of  stumblebums and will have to work hard 
to restore confidence in the Australian investment environment. Chinalco 
made some seriously bad calls while Rio was a house divided against itself. 
Opposition political leaders (Turnbull, Costello and Hockey) performed like 
a bunch of  clowns (on a par with the self-confessed ignorance of  Joyce 
and Xenophon) who couldn’t be trusted with managing the national estate. 
Australia’s political leadership was missing in action. And the analysts, like 
me, assumed too readily that lessons learned in the past are lessons learned 
permanently.
Unless there is a massive effort to get things sorted out quickly, don’t 
think that there will be no fallout from this episode for Australia. The fallout 
has nothing to do with iron ore price negotiations or peripheral noise in 
the commercial relationship with China. It has to do with the damage to 
Australia’s standing as an investment destination, especially in China but 
also among other global investors, and with our position in this business in 
the world.
Still far too few in Australia comprehend the scale and importance of  
what is going on in China, be it in the economy or politically, let alone the 
importance of  China in terms of  its palpable impact on our region and on 
the structure of  world economic and political power. Fortunately, we have 
a prime minister who knows more than most, but that is not enough. His 
understanding needs confirmation and articulation in a national statement 
that serves to put the madder ideas out there (not only in the community 
but also deep in the policy process) about what we have to deal with, and 
what the opportunities and risks are in how we deal with it, under forensic 
scrutiny and rigorous assessment.
If  you’d just had a round of  intensive interaction with top players in the 
Chinese policy world, as I have over the past several days, the one thing you’d 
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take away about Australia’s position in China is what a good run we still get 
there. There is generosity, to a fault, about what failings we might have in 
the Chinese scheme of  things. There is generosity when we don’t run the 
same line on whatever issue. Above all, there is a genuine warmness towards 
Australia in the press and in the vast community that is China today. Senior 
officials puzzle over why it is that Australia is so liked in China—pretty well 
from the top to the bottom of  Chinese society. This is a huge and precious 
asset. But in these affairs, it is an asset that can be easily wasted.
There’s not an issue of  international importance on which Australia can 
afford now not to take into account the China dimension. This is true for 
many countries, even great powers like America. But it is acutely the case for 
Australia, given where we sit in the world.
We need to get our act together on and with China, and quickly.
On the proximate issue, Australia needs closer engagement with Chinese 
authorities and policy and commercial circles on China’s ‘going abroad 
strategy’, to enhance understanding of  how the market works in China and 
what dynamics now drive it in terms of  competition, corporate governance, 
financial transparency and going out into the international market.
But much more than that, Australia needs, as a matter of  top policy 
priority, a well worked over and publicly debated national strategy paper, 
with intelligent input welcomed from both sides of  the relationship, as a 
reference point to keep the relationship on a positive track and to realise the 




GErEMIE r. BArMé WITH EvAN OSNOS
Q & A on Chinese military parades
Why does China still conduct military parades? On Thursday, 1 October, 
Beijing will host the 60th anniversary celebration of  the founding of  the 
People’s Republic. The Communist Party leadership has elevated the event 
into a state-religious holiday, of  sorts, centred on a massive military parade—
including 5,000 soldiers arranged partly by height—followed by a civilians’ 
parade involving 100,000 citizens.
I asked Barmé about the imagery and significance of  these spectacles. 
Our exchange follows.
The iconography of  a military parade seems at odds with China’s general effort to 
avoid arousing international concern about its rise, suggesting, instead, that this is for a 
domestic audience. What is the message, and who exactly is it supposed to persuade?
China’s party-state often expresses its contradictory impulses between state-
orchestrated displays of  martial vigour and celebratory spectacles of  civil 
achievement. I would note that, originally, Qin Entombed Warriors in the 
form of  gargantuan puppets (piying) were to feature in one scene of  the 
Zhang Yimou-designed Olympic Opening Ceremony of  8 August 2008. 
The phalanx of  warriors was choreographed to perform a victory march 
into the Bird’s Nest Stadium during the show. At the last minute, however, 
the scene was deleted by party leaders who were concerned that it would 
send the wrong kind of  message—that of  triumphalism—to the world.
The primary aim of  the 1 October 2009 military parade, which is after all 
only one part of  the Grand Parade (Da yuebing) designed for Tiananmen that 
First published as ‘Q. & A.: Geremie R. Barmé’, in the blog, Letter from China: Dispatches 
by Evan Osnos, The New Yorker, 29 September 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/online/
blogs/evanosnos/2009/09/geremie-r-barme.html.
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day, was stated in rather stark terms some months ago. In the ‘Propaganda 
and education outline for the military parade in the capital on the occasion 
of  the celebration of  the sixtieth anniversary of  the founding of  New 
China’, produced by the PLA Logistics Department and published in the 
PLA News (Jiefang jun bao) on 10 February, it says that:
This military parade is a comprehensive display of  the party’s ability to rule and 
of  the overall might of  the nation. It has a profound political significance in 
that it bolsters confidence in the party’s leadership and belief  in socialism with 
Chinese characteristics…This Grand Parade is the first of  its kind in the new 
century. It is a crucial manifestation of  the recent victory of  the people who 
have achieved the construction of  an overall moderately prosperous society 
under the party’s leadership and represents the realisation of  the great revival of  
the Chinese nation as a result of  tireless struggle.
What was once fairly much of  an internal affair observed eagerly by 
Zhongnanhai-watchers anxious to gauge the pecking order of  China’s 
secretive leadership has become, this time around, quite a media circus. 
China’s leadership politics is as opaque as ever, but the parade remains an 
event primarily designed for the domestic audience. It is meant to educate, 
excite, unite and entertain. If  a tad of  ‘shock and awe’ is delivered around 
the world, all well and good. But as the old party cliché holds, such events 
must essentially satisfy the ‘two olds’ (er lao): the ‘Old Cadres’ (lao ganbu) and 
the ‘Old Hundred Names’ (lao baixing), that is, the broad masses of  Chinese 
people.
Having said this, we should remember that, apart from those up on the 
rostrum of  Tiananmen Gate, the parade and the festivities are primarily 
produced for a TV audience (as well as spin-off  internet and DVD viewers). 
As they have for 60 long years, the residents of  the capital provide the 
fodder, the backdrop, the crowds, and the logistical wherewithal for the 
lavish display, but they are not its target audience. For the most part, locals 
are required to stay off  the streets, keep indoors and make like the rest of  
the country: behave and watch the show on the tube. In the past, as in 1999, 
for instance, the masses were allowed out onto Tiananmen the following 
day to look at and be photographed with the amassed floats (caiche) that have 
featured in the day’s parade and the evening’s carefully managed ‘party’.
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Did China have a tradition of  military parades before the rule of  the Communist 
Party and, if  not, what element of  party psychology drives this?
The first recorded details of  this kind of  ‘triumph’, to use a term familiar 
to your readers from Roman history, can be found in the ancient Chinese 
classic Book of  Change (Yi jing). Dating from as early as the eighth century 
BCE, a second-century BCE version of  this famous book of  divination was 
unearthed in 1973. The well-known translator John Minford has used this 
version in his upcoming retranslation of  the text.
In this second-century BCE text, Hexagram XXX, or Li, contains the 
following lines:






Not from the enemy.
No harm.
In imperial times, victory parades were frequently organised for the emperor. 
In the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), for example, the emperor would review 
such displays from his throne atop the Meridian Gate (Wu men), the formal 
entrance to the Forbidden City, as booty and enslaved enemies were arranged 
in the large square below. Trophies included plundered riches, as well as the 
heads and left ears of  enemies. Indeed, there is a specific and very ancient 
word, guo, that is specifically used to denote the left ear cut off  a prisoner.
During the Qing era, the Kangxi emperor revived the ancient tradition 
of  ‘tours of  the south’ (nanxun), that is, imperial tours of  the southern 
provinces. He made six such tours, which allowed him to familiarise himself  
with the newly conquered empire at the same time as displaying his imperial 
authority, as well as his vast military might. These tours were like a moving 
triumph or parade of  strength. The most recent ‘tour of  the south’ was 
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conducted by Deng Xiaoping and his entourage in 1992.
But there are other, more recent dimensions to such orchestrated displays. 
It shouldn’t be forgotten that China and its Communist Party rulers have 
been enmeshed with Hollywood and its culture of  spectacle for decades. 
Just as Taylorism and the idea of  ‘scientific management’ in the US gave 
V. I. Lenin ideas about assembly-line production, time-management, and 
the power of  statistics in the Soviet Union, so too has Hollywood long 
been giving China cues about staging public events. Early Hollywood mega 
flicks and cinematic versions of  the Ziegfeld Follies fed into both Soviet and 
Chinese designs for mass rallies and proletarian tableaux vivants. Hollywood 
turned choreography and synchronised gymnastics into mesmerising cinema. 
The socialist world adapted such cog-in-the-machine balletics to celebrate 
the state and its unrivalled power.
The Chinese revolution featured parades from its earliest days. Of  course, 
I’m referring to the Republican revolution of  the 1910s (now all too easily 
forgotten or overshadowed by the successful Communist insurgency of  
1946–49). Yuan Shikai, president of  the republic, reviewed troops from the 
newly built Xinhua (New China) Gate, built as the formal entrance to the 
government compound of  the Lake Palaces (zhongnan hai), which is still the 
heart of  the country’s political power. He even mounted a steed and joined 
the review himself  along what is now Chang’an Avenue.
Local parades have been a feature of  the Communist Party’s revolutionary 
politics since the 1920s. Party organisers encouraged local uprisings and 
then enjoined the peasants to parade members of  the gentry before ritual 
denunciations and executions. Similar displays, called youdou, were a common 
feature of  life in the early years of  the People’s Republic and again during the 
Cultural Revolution. Ritualised public displays of  criminals in lorries before 
and after public trials and executions have also been a feature of  party rule. 
However, the days of  violent and militant slogans in National Day parades, 
and before an international audience, although common in the 1950s and 
1960s, are long gone. Now harmony and light reign supreme.
Over the life of  the People’s Republic, the National Day celebrations have been a 
barometer of  the national psyche at that moment. As you see it, what are some of  the 
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most revealing moments or details from previous military parades and mass spectacles?
One favourite but rather recondite moment (given the fact that the 
documentary footage is something of  a rare item) is the extravagant 1969 
parade when army soldiers paraded their killing skills for the leader, Mao 
Zedong. The official, though later banned, film of  the parade shows 
how they had been instructed not to point their bayonets at the rostrum 
of  Tiananmen, where the sacrosanct Great Leader stood to witness the 
spectacle. The 1984 parade celebrating the 35th anniversary of  the People’s 
Republic and, by fortunate coincidence, Deng Xiaoping’s 80th birthday, 
featured a rare spontaneous moment: a group of  Peking University students 
marching in the parade held up a home-made sign that said ‘Xiaoping, nin 
hao!’ (Hello, Xiaoping!). Of  course, the official filmmakers didn’t have the 
outburst in their script, so they failed to capture the moment on film. After 
discussion, negotiation and high-level agreement, the spontaneous outburst 
was restaged, filmed and duly edited into the official account of  the parade. 
Such good-natured outpourings of  emotion have not been a feature of  
subsequent National Day parades, of  which the 1989 celebration, coming 
so soon after 4 June was particularly grim. Perhaps this 1 October some 
fortuitous event will slip through the heavily policed merriment of  the 
occasion?
I noticed that in 1999 the ‘long live’ slogans seem to have been set aside. What are some 
of  the details you will be looking for this time as a measure of  the Chinese state of  
mind?
The selection of  slogans has always been a gauge of  the party-state’s mood at 
the moment of  the parade. Sadly, since the 1980s, the lacklustre bureaucratese 
of  Deng Xiaoping and his technocratic successors has consistently assured 
us of  bland and turgid sloganeering. Invariably, this time around there will be 
the usual nostrums related to Hu Jintao’s much touted but deeply troubled 
‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui) and the ‘scientific developmental strategy’, 
which is his vaunted theoretical contribution to ‘Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought-Deng Xiaoping Theory and Jiang Zemin-ideas’. These 
will appear along with the usual array of  wholesome homilies in the national 
media.
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National unity will also be a feature, something aimed at symbolically 
assuring everyone that the borderland uprisings since 2008 are but the work 
of  a few malcontents in cahoots with international splittist schemers. Those 
in doubt just have to see the police and military hardware that will be out 
in force. And, I daresay, as with the Olympic Opening Ceremony, there 
will be a series of  vague formulations about China’s peaceful rise on the 
world stage and its non-aggressive and inclusive approach to global affairs. 
As we all know, design by committee might produce good mass spectacle, 
but anything truly inventive or quirky ends up as an outtake. Zhang Yimou, 
the overall director of  the civilian parade and party, is more than familiar 





Fiji: the cruel hoax
On 9 April, the Fiji Court of  Appeal, the country’s second-highest court, 
ruled that the December 2006 military coup against Laisenia Qarase’s 
democratically elected government was illegal, as was the installation soon 
afterwards by President Josefa Iloilo of  Commodore Frank Bainimarama’s 
interim administration. The president’s supposed sovereign powers were 
found to be nonexistent. He was required to work within the provisions of  
the 1997 constitution and the court recommended the president appoint 
a distinguished Fiji citizen, other than Laisenia Qarase or Bainimarama, to 
head a caretaker government and prepare the country for fresh parliamentary 
elections.
Later that evening, Bainimarama, appearing relaxed and informal, told 
the nation that he had resigned as prime minister and was returning to the 
barracks. Many in Fiji applauded, thinking that the rule of  law might now 
First published in The Age, 14 April 2009.
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finally prevail. This optimism was short lived.
Bainimarama’s words were a cruel hoax played on an unsuspecting nation. 
The next day, President Iloilo addressed the nation. He praised Bainimarama’s 
interim administration for creating ‘opportunities for new ideas’ and for 
adhering to the president’s controversial mandate. Then, in a statement full 
of  strange irony, he said that to ‘facilitate the holding of  true democratic 
and parliamentary elections’, he was abrogating the 1997 constitution (for 
which he, then serving as a senator, had voted), appointing himself  the head 
of  state and revoking the appointment of  all judicial officers. By Saturday 
morning, Iloilo reappointed Bainimarama as interim prime minister. The old 
regime was back in office, back in business, in a new set of  clothes.
The regime’s supporters argued that the Appeal Court’s decision left Iloilo 
with no option but to abrogate the constitution. This is simply not true. 
Exercising emergency powers, the president could properly have appointed 
an interim cabinet to take the country to the next parliamentary elections. 
But the president was not the free, impartial head of  state the world imagined 
him to be. Visibly in ill health, painfully struggling through a speech written 
for him, he was, in truth, an instrument in the hands of  the military.
The military wanted the constitution abrogated, and they used a pliant 
president to do the deed, to give the treasonous action a semblance of  
legitimacy. A titular head of  state, akin to the Governor-General in Australia, 
was expected to protect the honour and integrity of  the constitution; instead, 
he trashed it at the behest of  the military. In effect, he carried out the 
country’s fifth coup in two decades. Fiji is under hastily decreed emergency 
regulations. Freedom of  movement and speech are severely curtailed, and 
military and police are stationed in the country’s media offices to monitor 
the publication of  news. The media had already been under attack, with land 
forces commander Pita Driti threatening to shut down the Fiji Times. The 
home of  the newspaper’s editor, Netani Rika, had been the target of  a fire 
bomb a week ago. Other prominent pro-democracy leaders were similarly 
attacked. Intimidation is working. Self-censorship is the order of  the day in 
Fiji.
There is no doubt whatsoever that the country is effectively run by a 
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shadowy Military Council. Commodore Bainimarama has publicly admitted 
heeding their advice. So what does the military want? They said, when they 
took over government in December 2006, they wanted to clean the country 
of  corruption. But the ‘clean-up’ campaign has lost all credibility. No one 
has been prosecuted so far.
The military says they want Fiji to have a new electoral system, the 
proportional representation open list system, not the alternative vote system 
now in place. There is emerging consensus that Fiji needs to move away 
from its present race-based, quasi-consociational (power-sharing) system. 
Whatever electoral system is in place, unless there is basic respect for the 
rule of  law, nothing will work. The real cause of  political instability in Fiji is 
not its electoral system, but a large standing army in an unruly environment 
characterised by a blatant disregard for the verdict of  the ballot box. Unless 
the military is reined in or its size substantially reduced, Fiji’s political 
stability will remain at risk. But the military sees for itself  an enhanced role 
in the public life of  Fiji and any new constitution that is drawn up will shore 
up the military’s power. The military wants to introduce the principles of  
good governance through a so-called people’s charter. Full of  motherhood 
statements about how to run a happy and harmonious society (Sociology 
101, in truth), the charter is a mantra its officers chant ad nauseam. While the 
charter is a harmless enough planning document, the military sees no irony 
in introducing good governance principles at the point of  a gun and against 
the wishes of  most indigenous Fijians, if  the stance of  the Methodist Church, 
the Fijian Teachers Association and the former ruling Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
Lewenivanua (SDL) party is anything to go by. Bainimarama and his Military 
Council have ignored the advice of  Fiji’s regional neighbours, represented by 
the Pacific Islands Forum leaders. The Commonwealth Secretariat’s plea for 
dialogue and peaceful resolution of  the impasse has similarly fallen on deaf  
ears. The European Union’s funds for the restructure of  the country’s ailing 
sugar industry are on hold. The immediate future of  the Fijian economy 
looks grim. In these times of  global financial crisis, no one will invest capital 
in an environment characterised by systemic political instability. Two weeks 
ago, Bainimarama instructed his permanent secretaries to cut the operating 
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budgets of  their departments by 50 per cent. And the Reserve Bank has 
placed strict financial control on capital outflow.
These, more than anything else, give the truest picture of  the dire situation 
facing Fiji. As the impasse remains unresolved and the political dialogue 
process stalls, as the military entrenches its position and as the international 
condemnations continue, Fiji does not have much room for optimism as it 
looks to its immediate future.
In 1985, Fiji was described by Pope John Paul II as ‘the way the world 
should be’. That period has now vanished beyond recall. After several coups 





Coup leader’s brittle strategy
The decision by Fiji’s military-backed government to abrogate the 
constitution, sack the judiciary and suspend elections until 2014 was met 
with international outrage. Yet the reaction within Fiji has been much more 
muted.
In Thailand and Madagascar, protestors rallied to the defence of  
governments ousted by coups. In Fiji there has been a sullen—if  
begrudging—acceptance of  the 27-month-old military regime, despite its 
preparedness to now tear up fundamental laws. A few courageous barristers 
turned up to protest outside courts in Suva and Lautoka when they reopened 
First published in New Zealand Herald, 18 April 2009.
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after the Easter break, but this was nothing like the reaction in Pakistan, 
when furious lawyers took to the streets in their black gowns to demand the 
reinstatement of  their chief  justice.
In contrast, Fiji’s Chief  Justice, Daniel Fatiaki, who was ousted shortly after 
the December 2006 coup and accused of  corruption, reached a F$275,000 
(NZ$216,000) out-of-court settlement with the interim government in 
December 2008, which allowed him to settle quietly into retirement with 
full pension and other benefits.
That an uprising was possible in the wake of  last week’s crisis is suggested 
by the reaction of  interim Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama, who had 
himself  reappointed as ‘caretaker’ prime minister.
In press conferences, Bainimarama chose to be flanked by his fellow white-
uniformed naval officers Viliame Naupoto and Esala Teleni, notably not the 
top-ranking army officers, who are known to be harbouring grievances at 
being passed over for promotions or lucrative civil service appointments. 
That was an indication of  which loyalties can be most counted upon at a 
time of  crisis.
To present an image of  normalcy and continuity, ministers were all sworn 
into their same portfolios in the wake of  the abrogation of  the constitution. 
Military minders were sent into the newsrooms of  the local media 
organisations, foreign journalists were expelled and the signals from Radio 
Australia were jammed in an effort to avoid ‘negative publicity’. That need 
to control the news was a sign of  the regime’s weakness, not its strength or 
popularity.
The military command has been careful to avoid any potential flashpoints. 
When deposed Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase departed for his home 
island of  Mavana straight after the December 2006 takeover, it came as 
some relief  to the military authorities. For months, the local airlines and 
shipping companies were forbidden from carrying him back to the capital, 
for fear his return might serve as the focal point for popular mobilisation. 
When the courts intervened and allowed Qarase to return in September 
2007, the political temperature suddenly rose and Bainimarama responded 
by reintroducing emergency regulations. But nothing happened.
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Ethnic Fijians sit around the yaqona bowls and curse the military 
commander, wishing upon him a grisly end. They talk of  his heart 
condition, and the demons that allegedly haunt him at night. But they do 
not act. Indigenous Fijians have a tradition of  subservience in the face of  
violent and oppressive overlords. Chiefs who rule badly are rarely dislodged. 
Instead, rivals wait patiently for such leaders to die and then conspire to 
ensure their sons do not inherit their titles.
Lack of  popular resistance in the face of  coups is not new in Fiji. In 
previous coups in 1987 and 2000, the victims were predominantly politicians 
representing the country’s Fiji Indian population. An indigenous Fijian, Dr 
Timoci Bavadra led the short-lived 1987 coalition government, but its voter 
base was mainly amongst the Indians. Mahendra Chaudhry’s 1999–2000 
government had some Fijian allies, but most had drifted away by the time 
of  the coup on 19 May 2000. Few ethnic Fijians mourned the ousting of  
either government. Lack of  open defiance to those coups by Fiji Indians 
was frequently—if  rather feebly—explained by small physical stature, as 
compared to the burly rugby-playing indigenous Fijians. More sensibly, 
outward migration seemed to provide a safety-valve for aggrieved Fiji 
Indians, more than a hundred thousand of  whom departed between the 
1987 and 2006 coups.
What is now obvious is that ethnic temperament had little to do with 
quiescence in the face of  coups. It has been the military’s monopoly on 
armed force that discourages the country’s citizens from taking to the streets, 
and fear of  this afflicts the indigenous Fijians as much as it does the Fiji 
Indian minority. In all Fiji’s coups, it has been the stance of  the military that 
has been decisive—which is why Sitiveni Rabuka’s coup in 1987 succeeded, 
why George Speight’s coup in 2000 failed, and why Frank Bainimarama is 
now able to contemptuously toss aside Fiji’s constitution.
What distinguishes the 2006 coup, however, is its lack of  a firm social 
base outside the military, which gives the political situation a brittle and, 
indeed, dangerous character. When the military seized power in 1987, many 
ethnic Fijians rejoiced. The former Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, 
was soon back and, under a new constitution, coup leader Rabuka was able 
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to get himself  elected in 1992 and again in 1994. The 2000 coup was also 
popular amongst indigenous Fijians, even if  there was some disdain amongst 
the mainstream for George Speight and his lunatic fringe.
Most, like Bainimarama and the military, initially, accepted former banker 
Laisenia Qarase as the moderate alternative to Speight. As a result, Mr 
Qarase’s Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party was able to grow 
his support from 50 per cent amongst indigenous Fijians at the 2001 polls 
to over 80 per cent at the May 2006 polls. By contrast, when Bainimarama 
seized control in 2006, those who rallied behind him were mainly from the 
country’s Fiji Indian population. Mahendra Chaudhry, whose Fiji Labour 
Party obtained over 80 per cent of  the Indian vote at the elections of  May 
2006, joined the cabinet as finance minister as well as assuming the national 
planning, public enterprise and sugar portfolios.
Chaudhry was pushed out of  the cabinet in August last year, and Fiji 
Indian reaction to the coup has become more ambivalent. Fiji Indians, who 
for the most part lack the safety net of  owning land in rural villages, have 
been hit hard by last year’s fuel and food price rises. This year, they face 
the triple whammy of  long-term decline in the sugar industry due to the 
ending of  European Union price subsidies, Bainimarama’s coup-generated 
domestic decline and the impending arrival of  an overseas-originated slump 
in tourist arrivals, remittances and commodity prices. On Wednesday, the 
Fiji dollar had to be devalued by 20 per cent.
In the president’s abrogation speech last weekend, it was claimed that 64 
per cent of  the population support Bainimarama’s People’s Charter, which 
contains proposals for radical electoral reform. In fact, that figure is wildly 
overinflated, and the consultation exercises that generated it were deeply 
flawed. The decision to put off  elections until 2014 is a better indication of  
the regime’s own perception of  its likely electoral fortunes.
Is it possible that military might, and popular passivity, might endure 
for years, giving Bainimarama time to discredit his adversaries, train up 
the supporters of  his new order and so reshape the political order? That is 
unlikely because—like many other soldiers entering politics—he has shown 
himself  to be poor at cultivating allies or handling opponents, and still worse 
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at managing the economy. More likely, Bainimarama’s coup will go the way 
of  its predecessors, in 1987 and 2000, none of  which have succeeded in 





Not just India’s problem any more
The US State Department has consistently listed India as the country with 
the second-highest number of  terrorism casualties after Iraq. However, 
Western media have given scant regard to the problem and this is sometimes 
resented in India. All that is likely to change with yesterday’s attacks in 
Mumbai. Mumbai has been at the epicentre of  India’s terrorist problem, but 
there have been many attacks in other key cities.
Terrorism in India is perpetrated by a number of  groups, including 
Maoists in eastern India and separatists in the northeast and Kashmir. But 
one of  the most persistent and costly problems has been so-called ‘violent 
jihadi’ terrorism in India’s major commercial and administrative centres.
Indian authorities and commentators point to Pakistan and especially the 
secretive Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as having a hand in the Indian 
attacks. After an attack on the parliament in December 2001, India mobilised 
First published in Sydney Morning Herald, 28 November 2008.
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against Pakistan and the two very nearly slipped into war—a frightening 
prospect for nuclear-armed powers.
It is clear that arms and training have been provided by Pakistani groups, 
such as Lashkar-e-Toiba; that the ISI has been heavily engaged in helping 
insurgents and terrorists in Indian Kashmir; and that Pakistan has refused to 
extradite accused terrorists to India. But there is no ‘smoking gun’ indicating 
direct involvement of  Pakistani authorities in terrorist attacks outside 
Kashmir. On the contrary, most of  those involved appear to be ‘home-
grown’ terrorists intent on revenge against the activities of  Hindu zealots, 
incensed by the poor socioeconomic status of  India’s Muslims or inspired 
by the so-called ‘global jihad’.
Frequently members of  the banned Students’ Islamic Movement of  
India, or SIMI, have been involved. Recently SIMI seems to have morphed 
into the Indian Mujahideen or at least acted with its members. The group 
claiming responsibility for yesterday’s attacks, Deccan Mujahideen, may be 
another example of  such morphing.
The stakes in this ‘game’ of  terrorism in India are extremely high. 
Exponents of  violent jihad and political Islam would like to see an end to 
the India-Pakistan rapprochement over Kashmir, which has resulted in a 
diminution of  Pakistani support for the Kashmiri separatists. If  they could 
mount an attack of  sufficient seriousness, the rapprochement could quickly 
unravel, especially in the highly charged climate of  impending state and 
national elections.
Moreover, increased India-Pakistan tension would be highly damaging to 
the broader ‘war on terrorism’. It would draw Pakistan’s security efforts away 
from the western frontier and give virtual free rein to the militants in the 
tribal belt to operate in Afghanistan.
The attacks also target commercial and IT hubs, such as Mumbai, 
Bangalore and Hyderabad, apparently with the purpose of  undermining 
India’s economic renaissance. They also target communal hotbeds, such as 
Malegaon, and important religious centres, such as Varanasi. The apparent 
purpose is to fan communal unrest (Hindu-Muslim rioting) and thus drive 
Muslims to support militancy.
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It is this strategic targeting, among other things, that has prompted 
accusations by Indian commentators of  official Pakistani involvement. But, 
given that many of  those terrorist leaders are well educated, especially in 
technology and science, it is possible that they, themselves, are capable of  
picking strategic targets.
Moreover, there is also an evident motive of  revenge apparent in some of  
the targeting. Several attacks in Mumbai, including the rail bombings of  2006, 
have apparently targeted lines, business places and suburbs frequented by 
the Gujarati Hindu business community, evidently in revenge for the terrible 
rioting against Muslims that occurred in Gujarat in 2002. In those riots, the 
authorities—under a Hindu-leaning government—turned a blind eye to the 
horrors and failed subsequently to prosecute their alleged perpetrators.
A successful counter-terrorism campaign requires that two things be done 
well: investigation and intelligence to catch those involved and pre-empt 
attacks, and alleviation of  the conditions that give rise to terrorism. India’s 
record in the first of  these has been patchy. Investigatory and forensic skills 
have not, on the whole, been well honed. Where the authorities have done 
very well is to keep the lid on the difficult communal situation after terrorist 
attacks. With the exception of  Gujarat, there has not been widespread 
communal unrest after what are frightful terrorist attacks.
Long-term alleviation of  the situation of  Muslims is more problematic. 
Here the Congress-led coalition is caught between the rock of  needing to act 
affirmatively to assist the community and the hard place of  reaction to such 
action fanned up by the so-called ‘Hindu right’, led by the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP). Should a BJP-led coalition win next May’s national election, 
the outlook for Muslim regeneration would probably be bleak. The BJP is 
making considerable political play of  the Congress government being ‘soft’ 
on terrorism. Consequently the government is contemplating toughening 
the counter-terrorism laws.
Moreover, there has recently emerged a violent Hindu reaction to the 
growing problem of  jihadi-inspired terrorism. What India is experiencing 
is well short of  the kind of  violence and counter-violence in Lebanon and 
Iraq. Given that 140 million of  India’s 1.1 billion are Muslim, that would be 
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a development not to be contemplated. After each such attack, India seems 





In the late 1960s a small girl and her family set out from a Delhi shanty 
town to visit her grandparents in one of  the many thousands of  villages 
dotted across India. It was a long journey and her parents began to chat 
with their fellow passengers on the bus. All was well until someone asked 
where they would be staying in the village. When her parents revealed that 
their destination was the Chamar mohalla—the area usually found on the 
outskirts of  a village populated by people on the lowest rung of  the caste 
hierarchy—the other passengers stopped speaking and the girl recalls them 
physically shrinking away from her family. Her mother explained to her that 
the caste to which her family belonged was considered by other Indians 
to be low and unclean. Her response, she said later, was to ‘hate the caste 
system with all my might’.
More than forty years later this little girl, known simply as Mayawati, has 
become the unchallenged hero of  lower castes across much of  north India. 
Increasingly, she is also gathering support among other oppressed (and not 
so oppressed) groups across India. Last year Forbes magazine named her as 
one of  the world’s one hundred most powerful women.
In May 2007 Mayawati became chief  minister of  India’s largest state, Uttar 
First published in Canberra Times, 14 February 2009; revised version of  ‘Nobody can stop 
me’, Inside Story, http://inside.org.au/nobody-can-stop-me/, 14 January 2009.
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Pradesh, for the fourth time. With Uttar Pradesh’s population numbering 
around 170 million people, this makes her responsible for more people’s 
lives than the leaders of  Pakistan, Bangladesh, Russia or Japan. On taking 
the oath of  office she declared that ‘Nobody can stop me from becoming 
prime minister.’
If  you haven’t heard of  the 53-year old, it’s no surprise. State politics in 
India rarely makes international news, and so far Mayawati’s direct influence 
has been limited to Uttar Pradesh. But after her outstanding win in 2007 
and with her party steadily gaining seats in other states, her ultimate goal is 
no impossibility. If  she does become prime minister, she will be unlike any 
other Indian leader we have seen.
If  she fulfils her dream, some are even suggesting that she should be seen 
as India’s counterpart to Barack Obama, a representative of  a historically 
oppressed segment of  society reaching the pinnacle of  political power. That’s 
not because she’s a woman but because she is a Dalit, the caste historically 
known as ‘untouchables’ and referred to under the Indian constitution as 
‘Scheduled Castes’. How she became so politically powerful in a society 
which, despite what many urban middle-class Indians may like to think, is 
still riddled with caste discrimination, is a compelling story.
The Dalits in Uttar Pradesh love her, coming in their thousands from far-
flung villages to hear their Behenji (respected sister) speak at political rallies. 
She tells them that she is proud to have been born into a Dalit family. Caste 
continues to be the primary reason for their experience of  discrimination, 
oppression, violence, poverty and general exclusion from wider society. 
Hearing Mayawati take pride in her caste and refuse to accept its traditionally 
negative value is an empowering experience for those who attend these 
rallies. In Uttar Pradesh in particular, Dalits claim that her leadership and 
political success has provided them with dignity and the courage to speak 
up against their oppressors.
In the big cities of  Delhi and Mumbai, meanwhile, the urban middle 
classes feel alienated from her culture and idiom and fear her influence. 
Mayawati as a chief  minister is one thing but an India with her as prime 
minister points to a disturbing new world in which they may not find a 
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place. As a Hindi-speaking Dalit, she shares neither their culture nor their 
language.
Mayawati was born on 15 January 1956, the second of  nine children from 
a family who originally hailed from the village of  Badalpur in Uttar Pradesh. 
Unlike most of  India’s Dalits, she grew up in the city, in the lower-middle-
class Delhi suburb, Inderpuri, after her father was transferred there by the 
posts and telegraphs department. Her father, a low-level clerk, had access to 
a regular, if  modest, salary, but with nine children the family’s living space 
was cramped and life was difficult financially.
But Mayawati’s family was able to send her to a government school and 
understood the importance of  education as a means to a better life. Her 
father encouraged her to study to become a district collector, a government 
post which would give her both financial security and a significant amount of  
power. The family wasn’t overly political but—like a lot of  Dalit families—
each year they would attend festivals celebrating the life of  Ambedkar, a 
Dalit who had become a government minister and who wrote extensively 
about the condition of  the lower castes and how the oppression could be 
overcome. This early access to a radically different way of  thinking about 
society coupled with her own life experience had an enormous influence on 
the young Mayawati.
Although she doesn’t appear to have been a brilliant student, Mayawati 
was a hard worker. She went on to university and gained a bachelor of  
arts and a teaching qualification. While working in Delhi as a teacher and 
studying for a law degree she became interested in Dalit politics; she was first 
noticed by the founder of  the Bahujan Samaj Party, Kanshi Ram, when she 
spoke out passionately at a public meeting against an upper-caste politician 
who referred to Dalits as harijan, a term coined by Mahatma Gandhi that 
is considered patronising by Dalits. She condemned Gandhi, got people to 
chant slogans and brought Dalits in the hall to their feet.
The driving force behind Mayawati’s passionate brand of  politics is her 
desire to end caste discrimination and usher in a society that pays more 
than lip service to the ideals of  equality and fairness. Officially, the practice 
of  untouchability and caste discrimination was outlawed in the Indian 
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constitution in 1950. Unofficially, this did nothing to change the daily lives of  
millions of  Dalits across the country, even after the Prevention of  Atrocities 
Act was introduced to enforce the constitution and bring perpetrators of  
caste violence to justice.
Discovering the role caste plays in contemporary India is not 
straightforward. Some urban-educated Indians argue that caste hasn’t 
existed as a social institution since independence and so it no longer has 
any bearing on people’s lives. But a closer look at the lives of  Dalits, and 
in particular those who live in the rural areas (along with about 75 per cent 
of  the population), reveals a disturbingly different story. Caste does matter. 
Sometimes it merely operates in ways that cause annoyance—a social slight 
from someone in a higher-caste family, or an upper-caste parent discouraging 
their children from playing with Dalit children. At other times caste has a 
profound impact on physical, emotional and economic wellbeing.
A recent Action Aid study of  more than 500 villages across 11 states found 
significant discrimination in the provision of  public services, including the 
denial of  barber services (in almost half  of  surveyed villages), separate seating 
in restaurants (a third of  villages) and separate utensils in restaurants (a third 
of  villages). It takes only a little imagination to consider the psychological 
impact of  being part of  a group forced to use separate cups and forks in 
your local restaurant so that you don’t ‘pollute’ other customers.
Of  even greater concern is the fact that physical violence against Dalits 
is not a thing of  the past. The National Crime Records Bureau reports that 
each day two Dalits are killed and three Dalit women are raped; a Dalit is 
assaulted every 18 minutes. Newspaper reports and activist web sites are 
awash with examples of  violence and discrimination occurring across the 
country—primarily in rural areas.
Under existing Indian law everything from segregated seating in a 
restaurant to assaults and murder is illegal. The problem lies not with the 
law but with the state’s ability and will to implement the law. With neither 
political nor economic clout, Dalits find it hard to get local police to register 
complaints against influential landowners or those with money and power.
The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) entered the Uttar Pradesh political arena 
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in 1984 with the goal of  fighting for the rights of  oppressed segments of  
Indian society. While mainly focusing on Dalits, the party’s rhetoric always 
included non-Dalit groups such as Muslims and other oppressed castes. At 
the time, the party was keenly aware that winning electoral power required 
Dalits to adopt a more confident approach. Using symbols, language and 
idioms which were familiar to her audience, Mayawati spoke at length at 
rallies; with her fire and passion she motivated people to cast votes for the 
party rather than supporting whoever the local landlord told them to vote 
for. She built statues of  Dalit heroes (including herself  and Kanshi Ram) in 
towns and villages, asserting the right of  Dalit identity to be celebrated in the 
public sphere. A well-trained and committed BSP cadre travelled extensively 
by foot, bicycle and train to spread the message and enlist support.
Upper-caste/class journalists have mocked Mayawati’s approach, calling 
her a crude ‘casteist’ politician and even accusing her of  murdering language 
(the ultimate insult from the cultural elite but not one that she particularly 
cared about). They accuse her of  corruption and point to the wealth she has 
accumulated while in politics.
But the BSP went from strength to strength, culminating in its majority 
win in 2007. Mayawati had been chief  minister three times between 1995 and 
2004, but always in unstable coalitions for short periods. Knowing her time in 
power was likely to be short lived, she aggressively pursued the transfer and 
promotion of  Dalits and loyal party workers into key government positions. 
The efficacy of  this approach supports Mayawati’s long-held belief  that the 
emancipation of  oppressed groups requires a one-point plan—win power.
Mayawati’s early success was largely due to her ability to forge a political 
identity from the cultural and social identities of  Dalits and their common 
experience of  oppression. But the numerical strength of  Dalits in India (a 
little more than 15 per cent) was never going to be sufficient to win power 
outright.
The 2007 state election demonstrated Mayawati’s ability to build cross-
caste alliances and appeal to a wider section of  the electorate on the basis 
of  economic and social issues facing people across the state. As far back as 
2002, she shrewdly began to build support for the BSP among Brahmins, 
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who are traditionally at the top of  the caste structure. Her appeal to Brahmin 
fears of  middle-caste assertion was supported by a series of  Brahmin rallies 
where she showed herself  to be just as capable of  tapping into upper-
caste symbols. In villages across Uttar Pradesh the BSP also set up Dalit-
Brahmin Brotherhood Committees to work together on social issues and 
election strategy. Her approach paid off, with the party increasing its share 
of  Brahmin votes in the state election from 6 per cent in 2003 to 17 per cent 
in 2007.
Mayawati campaigned on a platform of  law and order, and on a promise 
of  development for all people in need, irrespective of  their caste. Coupled 
with some careful handing out of  party tickets to ensure castes from across 
the board were well represented, this was enough to win her power.
In a country plagued with such a significant disparity in wealth between 
the top and the bottom—135 million out of  the 188 million households are 
considered deprived—and with 59 per cent of  Dalits in Uttar Pradesh living 
below the poverty line, it is significant that the BSP fights for the rights of  
the oppressed via the ballot box. At times this focus has attracted criticism 
from Dalit activists, but the leadership obviously believes that a violent quest 
for social change is usually paid for disproportionately by the poor.
Since the decline of  Congress Party dominance, it’s a brave person 
who tries to predict the outcome of  an Indian election. This doesn’t stop 
Indian psephologists—but they frequently get it wrong and never more 
spectacularly than in the last general election when the vast majority of  
them assumed that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with its ‘India Shining’ 
campaign and emphasis on the trappings of  a middle-class existence, was a 
certainty to win. Few thought to consider the relevance of  a successful call-
centre industry to a drought-stricken farmer or what a bullish stock market 
might mean to a rag-picker.
The most likely result of  this year’s national election is a hung parliament, 
not an unusual outcome for India. If  Mayawati manages to win around fifty 
seats she may find herself  the leader of  the third-largest party in the Lok 
Sabha and both major parties will have to negotiate with her if  they hope to 
form government.
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Mayawati’s temperament is the unpredictable element in this scenario. She 
cares nought for what other politicians and the elite think of  her and doesn’t 
hesitate to let them know. It isn’t clear whether she will give her support to 
one of  the major parties in order for them to form government. If  she does 
she is likely to extract weighty concessions. One possibility is that she will 
offer support to either Congress or the BJP in return for the position of  
deputy prime minister.
Of  course, there is another possibility—a long shot but a possibility 
nonetheless. In this scenario, the BSP, the left, and various regional 
parties would come together to form a non-Congress, non-BJP coalition 
government, with Mayawati as prime minister. If  a third-front alliance did 
come to power, this Dalit ki beti (daughter of  a Dalit) will have come a 
long way from that bus ride to her grandparent’s village, and the hopes and 





There probably aren’t too many 81-year olds who have an iPhone and their 
own blog. Lal Krishna Advani does. He can also put his name to a number 
of  websites, a Facebook group and over 250 YouTube clips. But Advani’s 
subscription to cyberspace shouldn’t come as a surprise. As prime ministerial 
candidate for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in India’s upcoming national 
elections, he is one of  scores of  political candidates who are using blogs, 
A longer version was posted on Inside Story, http://inside.org.au/looking-for-youngistaan/, 
14 April 2009.
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text messaging, video platforms and social networking sites to reach out 
to Indian voters. Welcome to e-campaigning in these, the largest and most 
plugged-in elections in democratic history. And meet the target constituency: 
India’s colossal youth electorate.
In a nation where a quarter of  eligible voters are now between the ages of  
18 and 25, the 2009 elections will see a potential 100 million young Indians 
heading to the polls for the first time between 16 April and 13 May. This isn’t 
any old India, as PepsiCo’s recent series of  TV commercials suggests, this is 
‘Youngistaan’, the Land of  the Young. And just as the demographic reality 
of  India’s youth bulge hasn’t passed soft drinks corporations by, neither has 
it escaped the attention of  India’s political hopefuls. In the run-up to the 
elections, national and regional parties alike have been anxiously reworking 
their campaign strategies to appeal to Young India.
At the heart of  this drive is Obama-inspired online campaigning. Stirred 
by the Democrats’ success in the United States, India’s major parties have 
been eagerly integrating the internet into their election drives. The BJP, 
leading party of  the National Democratic Alliance, one of  two coalitions 
competing for power, commands the biggest political web presence in the 
country. It has also seen fit to advertise on more than 3000 websites and 
target some half  million subscribers with a daily email dispatch.
Equally keen to make waves on the web has been the BJP’s major rival, 
the Congress Party, which heads the ruling coalition, the United Progressive 
Alliance. Its party website offers a downloadable ringtone of  ‘Jai ho’, the 
signature tune to the award-winning film Slumdog Millionaire. Quick to cash 
in on the film’s popularity with young voters, Congress acquired rights to the 
song and rejigged the lyrics to harmonise with its campaign.
One of  the biggest challenges facing Indian parties is the very real task 
of  getting these new voters out to the polls. While turnout in the 18–24 
age group was higher than 50 per cent at the last four national elections, 
it was persistently lower than that of  older voters. There were also stark 
differences in turnout patterns across the rural-urban divide. According to 
Sangeeta Talwar, only 10 per cent of  urban youth voted in the last elections. 
Her company, Tata Tea, has backed a young team from the Bangalore-based 
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NGO, Janaagraha, in their ‘Jaago Re!’ (Hey, wake up!) campaign, a non-
partisan ‘enabling platform’ aimed at demystifying the political process and 
encouraging voter registration. The Jaago Re! web interface is chatty and 
user-friendly, urging visitors to get themselves onto the electoral roll. Yet for 
all its inclusiveness, the website’s entire content—except its Hindi slogan—is 
in English, a language which remains the preserve of  a minority in India and 
has limited hope of  reaching out to a broad group of  young people. As the 
Delhi-based online research company JuxtConsult revealed recently, only 13 
per cent of  internet users in India prefer to read online content in English.
Language issues aside, it’s difficult to get a sense of  just how many Indians 
use the internet. The BJP’s IT cell puts the number at a staggering 250 million, 
which may explain the party’s enthusiasm for web-based campaigning. But 
more conservative estimates, like the one from JuxtConsult, of  47 million in 
January 2009, paint a less optimistic picture of  the effectiveness of  cyber-
shortcuts. Estimates see the influence of  the internet on election results 
as limited to about 50 seats out of  an available 543. The reality is that 
most of  India’s voters live in rural areas where internet access is limited or 
nonexistent.
Reaching out to the electorate with Advani’s iPhone might be a better 
bet. In the state of  Gujarat, the BJP has created a database of  25,000 mobile 
numbers which it targets with bulk messaging. Mobile phone technology is 
more widely used in rural India than the internet: at the start of  2009, the 
total number of  wireless telephone connections stood at over 360 million, 
according to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of  India. Tagged the ‘next 
accelerator’ for mobile growth, the rural market is the new target of  telecoms 
companies, who are working together to bring infrastructure to remote areas 
quickly and cheaply.
Wooing the plugged-in generation might seem like a very contemporary 
way of  tapping into Young India, but strategies for appealing to youth 
are not entirely new and nor are they limited to websites, YouTube or the 
blogosphere. Making brands out of  politicians has been a common and 
enduring theme of  the Indian election scene. Cricket icons and film stars 
are revered by young Indians: either as political sidekicks, or as candidates 
India 151
themselves, many of  them have stolen the show at election rallies. Other 
methods of  attracting India’s youth vote centre on a more personal touch. 
Rahul Gandhi, the young face of  the Congress Party, and fourth generation 
member of  the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty that has monopolised Congress 
leadership since Indian independence, has engaged in campus rallies and 
visits to villages and slums. In the midst of  a frenzied campaign he still 
finds time, and an internet connection, to maintain contact with supporters 
through Facebook and email. His tactics exemplify the mix of  old and new 
which characterises the Congress approach to politics. The traditional bent 
of  the century-old party is reflected in its recognition that the majority of  
voters live in rural areas and can still only be reached through conventional 
means. Despite Congress’s reluctance to buy completely into e-democracy, 
what this year’s campaigning shows is a paradigm shift, with the words ‘young’ 
and ‘politics’ linking hands in the media and skipping through a number of  
election manifestos. Yet the Young India obsession is not entirely new.
The celebration of  the nation’s youth has bubbled up, in part, from among 
India’s elite. In 2002, former Indian President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam published 
his slim book Ignited Minds, which called for the awakening of  young Indians 
to ‘unleash the power within India’. Another national luminary, the co-
founder of  Infosys, Nandan Nilekani, also made conspicuous reference to 
the latent potential of  India’s youth in his recent book Imagining India. He 
presents India as ‘a young, fresh-faced nation in a greying world’ and its vast, 
young human capital as a ‘demographic dividend’ that is the key to future 
productivity and growth.
Politicians have been quick to seize on this rhetoric of  progress and join 
in the heralding of  India’s dazzling, young future. Yet while the growing 
recognition of  India’s youth as major stakeholders in the country’s progress 
has led to their political acknowledgement, it has not translated into a greater 
role for young Indians in the nation’s political life. In fact, the number of  
MPs under the age of  40 accounted for only 11 per cent of  seats at the 
midpoint of  the most recent parliamentary term.
This might not be a top-down conspiracy, however. In a nationwide 
study conducted in 2008, the New Delhi-based company Marketing and 
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Development Research Associates found that two-thirds of  voters prefer 
experienced political candidates to their younger counterparts. This helps 
explain why the 38-year-old Rahul Gandhi projects the fresher side of  
the Congress party, yet 76-year-old Manmohan Singh remains its prime 
ministerial candidate.
While the hype surrounding Young India may be paying homage to the 
country’s greatest resource, the image of  youth as a commodity rather than 
an active political force persists. Patterns of  consumption in other parts of  
the world point to young people as a distinct ‘market segment’. But does the 
logic of  the generation divide translate so easily into India? Tellingly, Rukmini 
Bhaya Nair, a professor of  English at the Indian Institute of  Technology in 
Delhi, points out that youth ‘is perhaps less foregrounded as a conceptual 
category in the Indian subcontinent than in many other societies’. According 
to Nair, ‘Traditionally, the transitional years between childhood and full-
fledged adulthood appear to be marked by a representational absence in 
literature and art.’ This social invisibility of  youth in the Indian context sits 
uncomfortably with the political rhetoric that proclaims its significance.
Yogendra Yadav, senior fellow at the Delhi-based Centre for the Study of  
Developing Societies, believes that young people in India do not ‘constitute 
a distinct political constituency nor are they a section of  population with 
distinct political preferences, attitudes and voting patterns’. According to 
the results of  the National Election Study 2004, age impacts far less on 
voting choice than class, caste, locality or gender. This contrasts with the 
European experience, where younger voters are seen as drivers of  recent 
political trends such as the emergence of  Green parties. Yadav concludes 
that ‘in their political opinions, the youth are not very different from the rest 
of  the population’.
The main issue facing India’s youth in the 2009 elections is the same one 
that confronts the population as a whole: there are no clear ideological poles 
to cluster around and no all-India issues to contest. While the Indian youth 
is numerically important, even if  it could be accessed via the internet it is 
not a monolithic entity. New campaign methods certainly highlight India’s 
new tech-savvy edge, but they speak the idiom of  the middle classes and of  
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a more affluent and educated urban India, rather than that of  youth. Some 
of  the most avid users of  the internet, India’s journalists, have helped feed 
the media myth of  Pepsi-swigging IT-literate, English-speaking youngsters 
who care about politics and are ripe for the picking.
So why the attachment to the iPhone, Advani? India’s ageing political 
elites may be out of  touch with the reality of  India’s young electorate but 
this hasn’t stopped them envisioning a bright, young and shining India of  
the future. Embracing the value of  forward-looking technology is one way 
of  living on the cutting edge of  that dream.
A glance at Advani’s BJP manifesto reveals twin pledges to serve Young 
India’s aspirations and bring broadband to its villages. It seems these 
elections and their victors will decide just how ‘connected’ the country’s 
young demographic will feel to the political process of  the future. For the 
moment, though, India’s largest political website has little hope of  reaching 




India’s elections: a bed of nails and roses
As an explanation for the results of  India’s 15th general elections, one 
particular picture perhaps is worth a thousand words—or 10 or 20 million 
votes. It shows an old man with spectacles, a white beard and a pale blue 
turban. His raised right hand acknowledges cheers, and his beard masks 
Posted as ‘A bed of  nails and roses’, Inside Story, http://inside.org.au/a-bed-of-nails-and-
roses/, 28 May 2009; published as ‘The wise elder and the young brave’, Canberra Times, 30 
May 2009.
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what may be just a hint of  a smile. Next to him, slightly sturdier, is a good-
looking, clean-shaven, clear-eyed young man. His hand also acknowledges 
cheers, and there is no question: he is smiling. He has a right to.
The duo is Manmohan Singh, 75, Prime Minister of  India, and Rahul 
Gandhi, 38, grandson of  Indira Gandhi, great-grandson of  Jawaharlal 
Nehru and red-hot hope of  his Congress Party. The picture appeared on 17 
May, the day after election results showed that the Congress had surpassed 
every prediction. In India’s first-past-the-post elections, it won 206 seats in 
the 545-member lower house—60 more than it had held in the previous 
parliament.
Having governed for the previous five years through an unwieldy coalition, 
the Congress last week found it relatively easy to line up the necessary allies 
to form a new government.
As analysts ponder reasons for the Congress success, the picture of  the 
clever, honest older man and the pedigreed, untried (but also untainted) 
younger one looms large. It is particularly potent when placed against the 
images of  the Congress Party’s various rivals. L. K. Advani, the 81-year-
old leader of  the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led an uninspired 
campaign that was unable to make poverty or national security vote-
grabbing issues. The BJP’s other leaders lacked glamour, fire and ideas. The 
party’s attempt to rev up Hindu-nationalist enthusiasm by defending an 
anti-Muslim speech made by Rahul Gandhi’s clodhopping cousin, Varun, 
flopped. Indeed, the episode may have drawn Muslim voters back to a 
Congress Party from which they had drifted. (Varun, however, won the seat 
he contested for the BJP).
If  you had gone to the polling booth uncertain of  whom to vote for but 
with images of  Advani and of  the Manmohan-Rahul combination in your 
head, your finger on the button of  the electronic voting machine (EVM) 
might well have twitched in the direction that would support the wise elder 
and the young brave. (You would not, however, have had the chance to 
vote for Manmohan Singh. Not much of  a stump politician, he sits in the 
indirectly elected upper house of  the parliament.)
Of  course there was much more to it than that. Attempts to divine the 
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‘mind of  the Indian voter’ are notably unrewarding. That’s not surprising, 
given that there are more than 700 million eligible voters and more than 
400 million of  them voted—and that India has 22 official languages and 
350 million mobile phones. And major newspaper industries operating in 
10 different scripts. And more than 50 television news channels feeding into 
110 million television households and working in all the big languages. If  
there were a ‘mind of  the Indian voter’, it would be a delirious place.
What this election does suggest, however, is that the communications 
revolution that is transforming India creates possibilities for ‘nation-wide’ 
movements and verdicts. This contradicts the assumption that as more and 
more local groups have organised to take part in politics, India’s electoral 
system would fragment and that India’s destiny lay in a succession of  shaky 
coalition governments based on constantly changing alliances of  regionally 
based parties.
To be sure, the Congress Party is a long way from its days of  dominance 
when it commanded comfortable majorities in its own right. But in 2009 
it has won seats in every major state and, to most observers’ surprise, it is 
back in business in north India where it won 70 out of  191 seats across six 
states.
The Congress got just over 27 per cent of  the votes cast, which delivered 
38 per cent of  the seats in the Lok Sabha (house of  the people—the lower 
house of  the parliament). The BJP, which led a coalition government from 
1999 to 2004, won 18 per cent of  the vote and 116 seats (21 per cent of  the 
seats).
The next largest vote-share went to the Communist Party of  India 
(Marxist) (CPI(M)) with just over 7 per cent. But the CPI(M) was rolled 
back to 16 seats from the influence-wielding 45 it held in the previous 
parliament.
This may be the end for India’s two old Communist parties, the CPI(M) 
and the even weaker CPI (down to 2 seats from 10). In its citadel of  West 
Bengal state, where it has governed for 32 years, the CPI(M) was overrun by 
the party of  fiery 53-year-old Mamata Banerjee. Her Trinamool Congress 
won 19 of  West Bengal’s 42 seats; the CPI(M)’s total fell from 26 to 9. 
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Banerjee, who will be railways minister in the new government, is already 
calling for the dismissal of  the West Bengal state government and new state 
elections. Such elections are due only in 2011. In Kerala, another CPI(M) 
stronghold, the party also faces state elections in 2011—and was also 
thrashed (down from 12 seats to 4).
The CPI(M)’s leaders are urbane and highly educated, but they are locked 
in a world view formed during the Cold War. Their party machines in West 
Bengal and Kerala too often look like stand-over rackets that alienate more 
citizens than they benefit. And the parties’ concerns often seem remote 
from those of  the toiling masses they seek to represent.
It is not as if  toiling masses were in short supply. A 2007 government 
report estimated that more than 75 per cent of  the Indian population spent 
less than Rs20 a day on food (50 cents Australian). The report termed such 
people ‘poor and vulnerable’.
In Indian elections, poor people vote in larger proportions than the upper 
classes. So where did the votes of  the poor go? They did not significantly 
favour the communists. Nor did they go as strongly as expected to the party 
of  Mayawati, 53, the fierce chief  minister of  Uttar Pradesh (UP), India’s 
largest state (population 190 million).
Mayawati is a Dalit (the favoured term today for ‘untouchable’) who built 
the Bahujan Samaj Party, which governs UP. Her party won only 20 seats, 
not the 30 or so predicted, though it took nearly 6 per cent of  the vote 
nationally.
About 15 per cent of  Indians—close to 180 million people—are Dalits, 
most of  them heartrendingly poor. Another 7 per cent of  the population 
(80 million people) are tribals, marginalised people living in hill country that 
is increasingly valued for the minerals that lie under it.
Three political possibilities confront India’s poor and stigmatised. The 
first is electoral politics—the Mayawati option. But Mayawati, though 
flamboyantly symbolic, is yet to deliver material improvements. The second 
possibility is revolt. A ‘Maoist’ movement operates in about 180 of  the 
remotest of  India’s 600 districts. Maoists tried to disrupt the first phase 
of  the elections, though without much success. However, with South Asia 
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awash with weapons that overflow from Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, Maoist 
movements will continue to confront governments that try to displace 
traditional occupants of  land to dig mines and dam rivers.
The third option for the poor is religious and social revival. Some of  the 
tumultuous consequences of  such movements were seen in the past week 
in Vienna where a preacher associated with a Dalit-improvement movement 
among Sikhs was murdered. The reason apparently was that the low-status 
preacher was held by higher-status people to be committing sacrilege. When 
news of  the murder reached India, rioting followed across Punjab state, and 
the army had to be called out.
In this election, poor voters seem to have come to the Congress in 
significant numbers. Post-election interviews indicate that two programs of  
the previous government have had an impact in rural India where 75 per cent 
of  the population still lives (though less than 20 per cent of  GDP now comes 
from agriculture). The National Rural Employment Guarantee Program 
aims to provide, as a right, 100 days’ work at a basic wage for anyone in the 
countryside who asks for it. A related program has absolved small farmers 
from repayment of  bank loans. For all their flaws, these programs touch 
millions of  people and have bolstered support for the Congress Party.
So does the new government lie on a bed of  nails or roses? It’s not totally 
nails. India has been relatively cushioned from the global recession. The 
stock market liked the election results, and growth is estimated to be about 
4 per cent for the current year and 6 per cent in 2009–10. The new ministry 
will be largely free of  the shackles that hobbled its predecessor, which 
depended on a dozen minor parties, plus the left. The new government will 
have the opportunity to renovate the education system, continue economic 
reform and improve infrastructure.
There are two views about whether this will happen. Some argue that, 
having seen the electoral benefits of  expenditure on the poor, the government 
will concentrate on such activity and that the pace of  other change will be 
slow. Others argue that the old prime minister is now a man with a mandate 
and an urgent mission. He is not expected to serve the full five-year term, 
and the betting is that efforts will be made to install Rahul Gandhi as prime 
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minister at some midway point. According to this line, Manmohan Singh will 
press hard for accelerated economic change—increased foreign investment 
and sell-offs of  public-sector enterprises, for example—and that external 
pressures will help him to achieve this. He is, after all, an economist whose 
first book was called India’s Export Trends and Prospects for Self-Sustained Growth, 
published in 1964 when India’s economic nostrum was ‘import substitution’, 
not ‘export-led growth’.
There will be pressure to strengthen India’s global diplomacy. Its foreign 
affairs bureaucracy has brilliant people at the top, but it does not have 
enough of  them, and it lacks the capacity to talk to the world in sustained, 
sophisticated ways. China outnumbers, outspends and outshines it, as senior 
Indian diplomats have pointed out.
One hint that this may change is the presence in the outer ministry of  
newly elected Shashi Tharoor, 53, novelist, diplomat and a former under-
secretary general at the United Nations. The new Minister of  External 
Affairs will be an old Congress politician, S. M. Krishna, 77, US-trained in 
the 1960s, and a former chief  minister and governor.
Other key cabinet posts have also gone to Congress veterans: Pranab 
Mukherjee, 73, from West Bengal, a long-time devotee of  Indira Gandhi 
and her family, moves from External Affairs to Finance; P. Chidambaram, 
63, from Tamil Nadu retains Home and A. K. Antony, 68, from Kerala, 
stays at Defence. Kapil Sibal, 60, well known to Australians for his work as 
Minister of  Science in the previous government, is likely to get the Human 
Resources ministry, crucial for the reform of  education.
Rahul Gandhi, the other half  of  the youth-and-experience image that 
served the Congress Party well in these elections, is not to enter the cabinet—
yet. He remains general secretary of  the party and oversees the Youth 
Congress. His mother, Italian-born Sonia Gandhi, is party president. They 
and the prime minister can take credit for the surprisingly successful election 
strategy. Against much advice, they eschewed alliances and contested every 
seat in Uttar Pradesh. They were told Congress would get badly beaten; 
instead, it re-established itself  in the heart of  India.
One of  the heroes of  this election has again been the EVM—the 
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electronic voting machine, used extensively since 1999. About 1.1 million 
of  these robust, self-contained little boxes were deployed in 800,000 polling 
booths. Though the elections took five weeks and five phases of  polling to 
complete, the results were known within a few hours once the computerised 
count began on 16 May. Coupled with a photo identification card and photo 
electoral roll, which now includes 85 per cent of  voters, the system makes 
malpractice difficult and labour-intensive. A mark of  the system’s success was 
the result in West Bengal, where the CPI(M), reputed to have the country’s 
best-organised electoral muscle, suffered its first big setback in decades and 
voter turnout exceeded 80 per cent.
In India, however, diversity prevails in all things, and a squeal of  complaint 
against the EVMs has come from the southern state of  Tamil Nadu. The 
party of  former chief  minister and film star, the mystique-laden Jayalalitha, 
claims the EVMs were rigged. Her AIADMK party won a disappointing 
eight seats.
India’s electoral system is now so embedded in daily life that it can cope 
with such complaints. Back in 1971, defeated candidates took a case to the 
Supreme Court claiming that they had lost because the government of  the 







Indonesia’s year of  living electorally
Election fever is warming up in Indonesia. The change from the ‘orderly’ 
election arrangements during the Soeharto period is astonishing. The 
Indonesian election system has been dramatically transformed in recent 
years from a monopolistic structure during the Soeharto era to today’s highly 
competitive (some would say ‘excessively competitive’) system.
Two key dates loom large on the Indonesian election calendar in the first 
half  of  2009. First, parliamentary elections are due on Thursday 9 April. 
And second, the presidential election will be held three months later on 
Wednesday 8 July.
To understand the system it is important to appreciate that the formal 
Posted on The Interpreter (Lowy Institute for International Policy), http://www.
lowyinterpreter.org/, as ‘Indonesia’s year of  living electorally’, 24 February 2009; ‘Indonesia 
stronger after parliamentary elections’, 14 April 2009; ‘A president for Indonesia’, 2 July 
2009; and ‘A victory for Indonesia’, 9 July 2009.
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structure of  the Indonesian political system is now similar to that in America. 
These days, Indonesian legislatures (parliaments) at both the national and 
regional level are noisy and influential. Previously, during the Soeharto era 
until the late 1990s, parliaments were toothless and moribund. No more. 
Now they exercise real power.
Just as in America, the president is powerful as well. And just as in 
America, Indonesians cast separate votes for the legislatures and the 
president (although, as noted, in Indonesia the voting is on separate days, 
three months apart). The result, like the situation in America, is that the 
political contests for the legislatures on one hand, and for the position of  
president on the other, are largely separate.
To add to the complications, this set of  contests is unlikely to end with 
the presidential election on 8 July. Unless one presidential candidate emerges 
as clear winner with 50 per cent of  the vote (which doesn’t look likely), a 
second round run-off  must be held in September. This, in turn, means that 
a new government is unlikely to be formed in Indonesia until late October 
2009.
What does this mean for Australia? The implications are that, first, senior 
Indonesian decision-makers will be preoccupied with domestic political 
matters for most of  2009. Nearly all main decisions in Indonesia during 
2009 are likely to be taken in the context of  a highly charged political 
environment. Second, it will be hard to get senior decision-makers to 
focus on international issues such as the Copenhagen conference on the 
environment. As one leading US political figure famously put it, ‘All politics 
is local.’ This will certainly be the case in Indonesia during 2009.
Indonesian stronger after the parliamentary elections  
last week*
How times change. Just a few years ago, the talk around Southeast Asia 
was that the influence of  Indonesia—long seen as the natural leader within 
ASEAN—was on the wane, and that Thailand looked like emerging as the 
* Posted on The Interpreter, 14 April 2009.
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new leader in ASEAN. But domestic politics in these countries have led the 
two nations in very different directions in the past few years. In Thailand, 
the domestic political system is in an awful mess, and Thailand is in no 
position to provide leadership to anybody. In Indonesia, President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has steadily strengthened his position since his 
election in 2004. The election results from the key parliamentary elections 
last week appear to have strengthened him even more.
Perhaps the single most important outcome from the election results 
in Indonesia is the strengthening of  the processes of  orderly, healthy 
competition within the Indonesian political system. During the previous 
Soeharto era, Soeharto’s Golkar political party maintained an effective 
monopoly of  the Indonesian political industry. Golkar’s monopoly collapsed 
when President Soeharto was forced to resign in the midst of  the 1997–98 
economic crisis in Southeast Asia.
For a while after 1998 the Indonesian political industry passed through 
a fairly chaotic period. A number of  presidents (Habibie, Abdurrahman 
Wahid (‘Gus Dur’), and Megawati) came and went in quick succession and 
the parliament sometimes behaved in a fairly erratic and unhelpful way. 
The inside joke amongst Indonesian political observers in Jakarta was that 
Indonesia had acquired ‘democrazy’ rather than ‘democracy’.
The Indonesian political scene settled down a bit after Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono won the presidency from Megawati in 2004. However, Megawati 
Soekarnoputri never really accepted her defeat. She has spent much time 
since then planning a comeback in 2009. Various other presidential hopefuls 
are also hovering around in the wings. It remained to be seen how all of  this 
manoeuvring would work out and whether the political processes would 
work effectively. In the event, the elections last week went surprisingly 
smoothly. There were some well-publicised hiccups but little occurred which 
would be unfamiliar in the backrooms of  the Labor Party in Sydney or the 
Democratic Party in Chicago.
It is too early to say much about the longer-term outcomes but on the face 
of  it, things are encouraging. One outcome flagged by Kuskhrido Ambardi, 
a director in the Indonesian Survey Institute, will probably be a welcome 
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consolidation of  parties. There was chaotic competition in the Indonesian 
political market before the elections because an excessive number of  38 
parties joined in the contest. However, only a few have emerged from the fray 
with their feathers intact. The Indonesian political system would probably 
operate more effectively if  most of  the smaller parties disappeared.
The other major outcome is that the line-up for the president elections 
to be held in July immediately looks clearer. The main contenders emerging 
from the pack are SBY himself  and Megawati. This is not unexpected, 
and doubtless surprises could yet occur, but with three months to go, the 
parliamentary elections last week worked well in helping sort out the choices 
which Indonesian voters will face in the coming presidential election.
A president for Indonesia*
You would hardly know it from the Australian media, but 2009 is the ‘year 
of  politics’ in Indonesia. Hotly contested elections were held in April for 
the national parliament and for dozens of  regional parliaments. And on 
Wednesday of  next week, a vital election will be held for the biggest prize 
of  all—the presidency of  the Republic of  Indonesia.
The parliamentary elections two months ago set the scene. The incumbent 
president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), stole the show. He was not 
up for election himself, but his Democrat Party was.
Support for the Democrat Party jumped remarkably—from around 
7 per cent in the last elections five years ago (in 2004) to nearly 22 per 
cent. Support for the other two main parties, Golkar (formerly associated 
with President Soeharto) and the Indonesian Nationalist Party of  Struggle 
(currently associated with former President Megawati), slumped sharply. 
The parliamentary elections two months ago were a triumph for SBY.
However, there’s many a slip twixt the cup and the lip in political life. It 
was not clear whether SBY’s triumph in early April would translate into a win 
in the second big race for the presidency in early July. The last two months 
have therefore been a period of  hot political manoeuvring in Indonesia.
* Posted on The Interpreter, 2 July 2009.
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Three candidates are in the running for the presidency: SBY with the 
backing of  his Democrat Party, former president Megawati Soekarnoputri 
(Indonesian Democratic Party of  Struggle), and current Vice-President Jusuf  
Kalla (Golkar). On the face of  it, SBY will be a shoo-in. He has received an 
unexpected boost from the marked success in his anticorruption campaign. 
But polls showing a strong lead for SBY might be unreliable.
Why would it be good news if  SBY wins? His critics argue that he is 
too cautious and that he fails to show strong leadership. His supporters 
point out that caution is not necessarily a bad thing and that his record on 
economic management and corruption is strong.
Megawati and Jusuf  Kalla have been trying hard to chip away at SBY’s 
poll lead. The signs are that they have cut SBY’s lead back a little, but not 
much. And an important part of  the reason is that neither of  them has 
shown much leadership themselves.
Both have talked vaguely about relying less on ‘market forces’ to run 
the Indonesian economy (the implication has been that SBY, and his vice-
presidential running mate Dr Boediono, are too reliant on advice from 
international agencies such as the IMF and World Bank) and providing more 
support for ‘ordinary people’. Quite what this latter promise means has been 
quite unclear.
Further—and just as important—both Megawati and Jusuf  Kalla are 
being judged on their own records in office. Megawati was unimpressive 
in her presidential term, which ended in 2004, and Jusuf  Kalla has proved 
somewhat erratic as vice-president in recent years.
What the SBY-Boediono team offers Indonesia for the next five years is 
stability. It is true that both are cautious. Neither has offered the Indonesian 
people any populist ‘castles in the air’ during the short election campaign.
But cautious policies are probably what Indonesia needs. Largely because 
of  the well-judged economic policies designed by SBY and Boediono (latterly 
as governor of  Bank Indonesia) during the last few years, Indonesia is coping 
with the global financial crisis surprisingly well. If  these policies are continued, 
the outlook for Southeast Asia during the next few years is promising. And 
this, surely, is good news both for the region and for Australia.
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A victory for Indonesia*
An astonishing thing has just happened in Indonesia. Early informal results 
point to a sweeping victory for the incumbent President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY) in yesterday’s election. And what is astonishing is not only 
that the presidential election has gone so smoothly but that the Indonesian 
electorate has voted so decisively in favour of  sound government.
Exit polls indicate that SBY and his vice-presidential running mate 
Boediono gathered in a stunning 60 per cent of  the vote. Some pre-election 
surveys had suggested that the SBY-Boediono team might win by a large 
margin, but few observers expected it would be as large as this.
The strongest challenge to SBY came from the Megawati-Prabowo team, 
which managed to win only 25 per cent of  the vote. The Jusuf  Kalla-Wiranto 
team came a distant third with around 15 per cent of  the total. President 
SBY has therefore gathered in half  as much again as the total votes won by 
his two challengers combined.
Whatever organisational problems there may have been during the 
election campaign—and there were quite a few reports of  administrative 
hiccups—there can be no doubt at all that the Indonesian electorate wants 
SBY in charge for another five years.
Now that we have the result, we can draw three main conclusions. They 
are all very encouraging.
First, the result is an enormous step forward in strengthening the 
institutions of  good governance in Indonesia. It is over 60 years since 
independence was declared in Indonesia in 1945. For the whole of  that 
long period, political leaders in Indonesia have been searching for ways 
to establish the strong institutions needed to ensure the legitimacy of  the 
presidency. Yesterday’s election was the first time in Indonesian history that 
a sitting president has stood and been re-elected in a fair and convincing 
way.
Second, the result gives SBY a very strong mandate to press on with 
programs of  sensible reform. During his first five years in office, SBY has 
* Posted on The Interpreter, 9 July 2009.
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had mixed success in promoting social and economic reform. On balance 
the record has certainly been good, but he has often been criticised for 
being too cautious. Now that the Indonesian electorate has given him such 
clear support, he is in a much stronger position to promote further reform. 
We will have to see if  he does so. Certainly Boediono, who is a highly 
skilled economist with many years of  experience in the top echelons of  
government, can be relied upon to give him total support in implementing 
reform programs.
Finally, SBY and Boediono may be characterised as ‘extreme moderates’ 
in international affairs. The chances of  Indonesia embarking on adventurist 
policies in Southeast Asia while SBY and Boediono are in charge are 
approximately zero. The election results in Indonesia yesterday therefore 





Indonesia’s choices facing the global financial crisis
A favourite saying among Indonesia scholars at The Australian National 
University is ‘This is a very interesting time to be in Indonesia.’ The statement 
is never inappropriate: it is always an interesting time to be in Indonesia. 
And with the global financial crisis now beginning to bite, it is even more 
interesting than usual for policymakers in the central bank (Bank Indonesia, 
BI) and ministry of  finance. The list of  monetary and banking issues with 
First published in APEC economies newsletter, March 2009.
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which they need to deal is long, and the appropriate policy solutions are in 
no case obvious.
Indonesia’s inflation was twice as rapid as targeted in 2008, and still needs 
to come down quite a bit more if  the 2009 target is to be met. Rapidly 
falling commodity prices in the second half  of  2008 helped slow inflation. 
This process is unlikely to go on for long, however, so monetary policy will 
yet have an important role to play. The exchange rate became quite volatile 
toward the end of  2008 and, although it is less so now, there has been 
ongoing depreciation over the last couple of  months. This is a problem for 
domestically oriented firms that have borrowed in foreign currencies, while 
on the other hand it is a boon for producers of  tradable goods and services 
facing declining demand.
While economic growth was around 6 per cent last year—a wonderful 
result in comparison with many other countries—there was a sudden 
turnaround in the fourth quarter. Growth turned negative, although this was 
mainly due to seasonal factors affecting the agriculture, livestock, forestry 
and fisheries sector. Excluding this, growth was a little below zero. A large 
fiscal stimulus package is now being introduced in an attempt to prevent job 
losses. But this raises the question of  whether monetary policy should also 
be focusing on growth, in addition to inflation and the exchange rate.
At the very least the authorities want to be sure there is no banking 
system collapse that would result in a reduction in lending. The size of  bank 
deposits covered by the government’s guarantee has recently been increased 
by a factor of  20, yet the guarantee still covers only about 50 per cent of  the 
total value of  deposits. If  conditions deteriorate, there is every possibility of  
a run on the banks by large depositors. Should the guarantee be extended 
to include all deposits? This would imply a huge contingent liability for the 
government of  around US$150 billion, which cannot be taken lightly. The 
last time a blanket guarantee was provided, 11 years ago, all the big banks did 
become insolvent, and the ultimate cost to the government—and therefore 
the Indonesian public—was about US$50 billion.
If  the deposit guarantee is not extended further, and if  there is a bank run, 
this would be accompanied by a run on the currency as well, because it is only 
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overseas that relatively safe assets can be found in large quantities. Should 
Bank Indonesia respond to large-scale capital outflow by selling down its 
international reserves in order to keep the exchange rate from depreciating? 
Supporters of  this approach argue that any depreciation of  the currency 
signals weakness and thus generates more capital outflow. Recall, however, 
that it was precisely this strategy that led the Bank of  Thailand to sell off  all 
its international reserves back in 1996–97, after which it was forced to float 
the baht—which, in turn, precipitated the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, 
a fire cannot burn without fuel. If  sudden capital outflow is driven by the 
fear of  depreciation, then allowing that depreciation to occur quickly will 
put an end to the outflow, because the opportunity to avoid a loss or secure 
a windfall gain will no longer exist.
Bank Indonesia is responsible not only for monetary policy but also for 
supervision of  the banking system. Given this second role, it now needs 
to think about the current stance of  prudential regulations relating to the 
banks. In particular, it needs to consider whether the regulations on capital 
adequacy are strong enough. Some of  the most reputable banks in the world 
suddenly have been found to have insufficient capital relative to the risks 
they were carrying. Only a supreme optimist would imagine that this is not 
a plausible threat in Indonesia.
As it happens, the average reported capital adequacy ratio is twice as high 
as the regulatory minimum of  8 per cent, so a doubling (say) of  this minimum 
would not be a problem for the average bank. But banks with relatively less 
capital would be obliged either to inject new equity or to cut back their 
lending. Would this be inappropriate in current circumstances? The counter-
argument is that continuing to encourage relatively weak banks to expand 
their portfolios is a risk not worth taking at the time when world famous 
banks are having to be taken over and recapitalised by their governments.
Already one small bank has failed and been taken over by the authorities. 
If  it is decided not to provide a blanket guarantee of  all deposits, the 
authorities need to be ready with a plan of  action if  they happen to be 
confronted with a run on the banks. One possibility would be immediately 
to freeze the operations of  any bank facing a run and to appoint an 
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independent, temporary management team. The first task of  this team of  
financial administrators would be to undertake a very quick, conservative 
estimate of  the value of  the bank’s assets. If  this was judged to be less than 
the value of  its liabilities, the shareholders would be required to inject new 
equity without delay. Failure to do so would result in the issue of  new shares 
to depositors and other creditors in return for a ‘haircut’ sufficiently large 
to restore capital adequacy to an acceptable level. This would allow banks’ 
solvency to be restored within a matter of  days, thus removing the cause of  
the run. Accumulated losses up to that time would be borne by shareholders 
and creditors of  the banks, rather than ‘innocent bystanders’—the general 
public.




Islamic lens the wrong way to see Indonesia
Western leaders have recently been emphasising the ‘Islamic’ nature 
of  Indonesian society and political life. When US Secretary of  State, 
Hillary Clinton visited Jakarta in February she commended Indonesia for 
demonstrating ‘so clearly that Islam, democracy and modernity not only 
can exist but also thrive together’. She also hoped that Indonesia would 
help Washington ‘to reach out the Muslim world’ as part of  the Obama 
administration’s new ‘smart diplomacy’ strategy. The media and some 
commentators picked up this theme speculating that Obama may choose 
First published in Jakarta Post, 14 March 2009.
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Jakarta to make his promised ‘speech to the Muslim world’.
Similarly, the Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, praised Indonesia 
as a ‘dynamic Muslim democracy’ and ‘its extraordinary role…in the wider 
councils of  the world’. He said religious commitment was a common 
element in the bilateral relationship and spoke glowingly of  the international 
interfaith dialogue that he and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
would co-convene later this year. In this context, Indonesia was seen as a 
representative of  the Islamic world.
In one way, it is understandable that Western leaders might see Indonesia 
through an Islamic prism. Some 200 million Indonesians profess Islam as 
their religion, by far the largest Muslim population of  any country. ‘Islamic’ 
issues have also dominated Western perceptions of  Indonesia since the 1998 
downfall of  Soeharto. These include the rise of  jihadist paramilitary and 
terrorist groups, the spread of  Sharia law in some provinces and districts, 
and the putative expansion of  political Islam.
But viewed another way, this focus on Islam is misplaced and quite 
possibly harmful. To begin with, it is problematic to characterise Indonesia 
as a ‘Muslim democracy’, as if  religion is a defining element in the country’s 
democratisation. Of  course, Muslims played a major role in the post-Soeharto 
transition to democracy, but we cannot assume that Islamic motivations 
were paramount. Indonesia’s history shows that many Muslims have drawn 
a distinction between their religious identity and political behaviour. Of  the 
nine general elections held since 1955, for example, Islamic parties have 
never gained more than 44 per cent of  the vote—that is, less than half  of  
the ‘Muslim vote’. At the two post-1998 elections, Islamic parties gained 
only about 38 per cent of  the vote.
Indonesians do not normally describe their democracy as ‘Muslim’ or 
‘Islamic’, and most of  its citizens probably see the nation’s constitution 
as ensuring religious neutrality and pluralism. When Western leaders cast 
Indonesia’s democratic achievements in Islamic terms, they risk overlooking 
or discounting the role of  non-Muslims in developing the current political 
system. One might also ask how Americans and Australians would respond 
if  their countries were described as ‘Christian democracies’. Although both 
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countries have large Christian majorities, their democracies are not normally 
linked to a religion.
Second, the notion of  Indonesia being a ‘bridge’ between the Muslim 
and Western worlds is questionable. It assumes that Indonesia is influential 
in the broader Islamic world. Regrettably, the reality is that Indonesia is seen 
by much of  the Muslim world as geographically, intellectually and politically 
peripheral. As many Indonesian Islamic leaders who visit the Middle East 
or South Asia can attest, few of  their co-religionists in those regions have 
much knowledge of  or interest in Indonesia. Numerous attempts to ‘export’ 
Indonesian Islamic thinking to other parts of  the Islamic world or to have 
Indonesia act as a broker between rival Islamic groupings have ended in 
failure.
I would argue that Western leaders such as Hillary Clinton and Kevin 
Rudd are in danger of  projecting their governments’ preoccupations and 
anxieties about Islam on to their relations with Indonesia. This might best be 
described as Huntington’s syndrome. In 1993, the famous American political 
scientist, Samuel Huntington, wrote a seminal article about the ‘clash of  
civilisations’ which, among other things, warned of  post-Cold War conflict 
between the Muslim East and the Christian West. The article was immensely 
influential in policy circles, particularly in the Bush administration, but was 
widely criticised by scholars of  Islam as reductionist and divisive. Ironically, 
in the post-9/11 world, Western leaders have been at pains to claim that 
there is no gulf  between Islam and the West and have eagerly embraced 
nations such as Indonesia as ‘proof ’ of  this.
But by continuing to define the world in dichotomous Muslim and non-
Muslim terms we risk falling into the same error as Huntington; that is, 
magnifying religion into a primary factor when it is at most secondary or 
tertiary. Islam explains very little about Indonesia’s democracy or diplomacy. 
If  Western leaders persist in placing Indonesia into an Islamic ‘box’ they will 
betray their own misunderstanding of  the country and its politics.




A surprise choice? Dr Boediono is selected as SBY’s 
running mate
It’s official and a surprise. Economic analyst, manager and academic, Dr 
Boediono, the current central bank governor, has been named as President 
Yudhoyono’s choice of  running mate for the first round of  presidential 
elections in July. Some nine political parties have been jostling for influence 
in Indonesia’s emerging political make-up for 2009–14. Many, especially in 
the main Muslim parties, would dearly have liked their leader to be selected 
by the popular president as the ‘ca(wa)pres’, SBY’s vice-presidential running 
mate. In return, they would surely pledge their political support.
So why select a technocrat? Is SBY hankering for the bad old Soeharto 
days, when technocrats proposed and the president decided on policy 
seemingly oblivious to social forces around him?
The announcement has come after several weeks of  intense speculation 
as to who would be chosen by SBY. Although the Democrats are expected 
to be the largest party in the new parliament, they will hold only around one-
quarter of  all seats. SBY will need the support of  several minor parties to 
govern effectively. Why then select a seeming rank outsider to the political 
game, who might seem to offer little in terms of  bolstering the stocks of  the 
president in the parliament?
An obvious answer might be that it’s the economy, stupid. SBY expects 
the Indonesian people to find comfort in the selection of  a highly regarded 
and experienced manager as their vice-president, in the context of  the global 
economic crisis. Boediono could thus be expected to bolster SBY’s popularity 
Posted on Indonesia Project, 14 May 2009, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/blogs/indonesiaproject/; 
posted on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 15 May 2009.
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in the presidential race at a time of  uncertainty, even if  he contributed little 
to shoring up political support in the parliament. Such an interpretation 
would suggest that SBY is thinking more about the short-term advantage, 
rather than winning the longer-term battle of  pushing reform through the 
legislature.
But there is a catch. The Indonesian economy has been doing remarkably 
well, amidst the tumbling fortunes of  its neighbours. Prices have actually 
fallen, including those of  important staples, for several months in 2009. 
SBY’s popularity is high precisely because of  the seeming economic success 
of  government policies (and a little bit of  luck). One can also point to the 
impact that Boediono’s calm and steady leadership of  Bank Indonesia has 
had on confidence in financial markets during a difficult time.
So why change a winning formula? Perhaps the answer to the puzzle lies 
in two other key areas, rather than in the economic credentials that Boediono 
brings to the presidential ticket. The first relates to the role that the current 
Vice-President, Jusuf  Kalla, has had in policymaking, and his relationship 
with SBY in the past five years. While Kalla was often seen to be given a free 
reign in pushing key economic policy decisions (such as the oil price hike 
in 2005), his impetuous, can-do style, fashioned from years of  experience 
as a businessman, is said to have grated with the president. Further, not 
infrequently SBY was forced to share the limelight with his vice-president. 
And there was always a sense that the vice-president was ready to cut corners 
to get the job done, sometimes undermining the carefully crafted image of  
rules-based government projected by SBY.
Boediono could be expected to offer equally valuable advice on the 
economy. But he is likely to do so in a more measured fashion and away 
from the cameras, as he did for several years as the economics coordinating 
minister. As many have been quick to point out, he has shown no sign of  
political ambition, which cannot be said of  many other potential contenders 
for the vice-presidency. And he is pronounced by all to be squeaky clean. 
It is also worth pointing out that although Boediono is not a politician, he 
certainly does not appear politically naïve. He has laboured hard in selling 
the government’s economic policies to cocky and often self  interested 
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parliamentarians, since his elevation to finance minister in the Megawati 
government in 2001.
Second, selection of  a vice-presidential candidate from any one of  the 
Muslim parties risked alienating the others. Representatives of  all the Muslim 
parties (and especially those of  the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS) and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)) have mouthed their 
disapproval of  Boediono’s selection rather than a choice of  one of  their own 
candidates. Nonetheless, if  another Muslim party candidate had been chosen 
by SBY, one senses the disenchantment of  the others would have been much 
deeper and politically harmful to the president’s would-be coalition with the 
Muslim parties. The case is different for a politically neutral candidate. It is 
less likely that any of  the parties will risk being sidelined simply because their 
leader was passed over by SBY in his choice of  a running mate.
Time will tell, in politics as well as in policy, whether the president has 
made the right choice. Selecting a reliable lieutenant with a similar cautious 
bent, another Javanese, might seem to go against the grain in Indonesian 
politics. But if  he is elected for a final term, perhaps having a soul mate in 
the palace will give SBY more leeway and greater confidence to take stronger 
stands on big policy issues, both nationally and internationally, in his second 
and last term in office.
Of  course, he still has to be elected. But at the time of  writing few political 






It is almost certain that the incumbent, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(universally known as SBY), will be re-elected in this week’s presidential 
elections, together with his Australian-educated running mate Boediono, if  
not in this round then in the September run-off.
There has been little international commentary on the campaign in this, 
the world’s third-most populous democracy. This partly reflects the lack 
of  fireworks and low-key, scripted debates centred mainly on personalities 
rather than policies.
But it also reflects the country’s remarkably swift transition from 
authoritarian to democratic rule. Few outsiders appreciate that, 
notwithstanding the global financial crisis, these are comparatively good 
times for Indonesia. A little over a decade ago, the country experienced 
a catastrophic economic crisis, which in turn triggered the collapse of  the 
Soeharto regime and ushered in a period of  deep uncertainty. East Timor 
voted to secede, there were secessionist challenges elsewhere and serious 
ethnic/religious conflict in several regions. At a crucial period in this crisis, 
the international donor community was largely unhelpful. Then there was a 
series of  terrorist attacks earlier this decade, prompting some to ask whether 
Indonesia was in danger of  becoming a failed state.
Three factors underpin the return of  optimism. First, the national 
elections have proceeded smoothly, as they did in 2004. Second, the economy 
has been doing quite well this decade. The government has also adroitly 
managed the global crisis. The economy is likely to grow at about 3.5 per 
cent this year, slower than China and India, but faster than its immediate 
Published as ‘Changes for the better go unnoticed’, Australian Financial Review, 7 July 2009.
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neighbours and the OECD block. Third, the peace settlement in Aceh looks 
secure, thus ending decades of  rebellion, and the nasty violence elsewhere 
has for the most part been contained. What can we expect from another 
five years of  SBY? The answer, reflecting both the man himself  and the 
country’s institutions, is essentially more of  the same. SBY is a highly 
cautious leader, sometimes agonisingly so for the ambitious reformers 
around him. Moreover, although his Democrat Party emerged as the front 
runner from the April parliamentary elections—quite an achievement for 
a six-year-old party—he will continue to lead a minority party in the lower 
house of  parliament. This means he will have to assemble another ‘rainbow 
coalition’ in cabinet, this time with a more overtly Islamic flavour owing to 
his choice of  coalition partners. As at present, we can therefore expect a 
cabinet comprising a handful of  competent, non-political technocrats, like 
Dr Boediono, running key economics ministries (and possibly also defence 
and foreign affairs), alongside a group of  political appointees of  various 
persuasions and calibre.
Indonesia is not an easy country to govern. It is institutionally unlikely 
that the country can ever match the spectacular growth rates of  China and, 
earlier, the East Asian ‘miracle’ economies, where ruthless and powerful 
leaders implemented a ‘growth first’ strategy. This is so for at least three 
reasons.
First, the power of  the central government has been deliberately 
weakened since the sweeping 2001 decentralisation, which handed over 
much administrative and financial authority to more than 500 subnational 
governments. Each now has directly elected leaders and parliaments, and 
hence local legitimacy. From Soeharto’s highly centralised regime, centre-
region relations are now a work in progress. Every significant investment 
decision—highways, factories, mines, reforestation programs—involves 
three tiers of  sometimes inexperienced governments, thus often entailing 
protracted negotiations.
Second, community opinion is sceptical of  the virtues of  globalisation. 
One of  the most hotly debated issues during the presidential election 
campaign was the accusation that Boediono was a ‘neo-lib’, with the 
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pejorative connotation that he is too close to the international financial 
institutions (particularly the IMF) and foreign investors. Ironically, the 
populist, nationalist campaign run by one of  the vice-presidential candidates, 
Prabowo, resonated (ironical because his father was the widely respected 
founder of  the Indonesian economics profession). Consequently, Indonesian 
reformers have a constant struggle on their hands: to align domestic petrol 
prices with the world price, to sell the case for foreign investment, to rebut 
notions of  food self-sufficiency, to repeal the country’s restrictive labour 
laws, and much else.
Third, Indonesia is engaged in the long-term, complex process of  
building institutions. At any one time, there is a host of  scandals in the press, 
from minor provincial officials to national government ministers. These 
cases periodically paralyse the operations of  government. Civil servants, for 
example, are genuinely fearful of  signing off  on major projects, including 
for badly needed infrastructure. Judicial cases, both civil and commercial, 
can be drawn out and the results uncertain.
More than any other developed economy, Australia has a vital stake in these 
developments. A confident and prosperous Indonesia is the best defence 
policy for Australia and our neighbourhood. The Indonesian economy will 
probably not grow as fast as China. There will be periodic hiccups in the 
bilateral relationship. The government will from time to time do things that 
puzzle us. But we need to take a long-term view, one that transcends narrow 
strategic and commercial interests, and to realise how fortunate we are with 
the current course of  developments in our giant neighbour.




Indonesia’s new leadership: the Australian 
connection
One of  the most durable and important elements in the Australia-Indonesia 
relationship is the large number of  Indonesians who have studied in our 
universities. In Indonesia, Australia offers the largest number of  graduate-
level scholarships for study abroad, and it also hosts the largest number of  
private Indonesian university students studying abroad.
More so than almost any other country in Southeast Asia, these graduates 
now increasingly occupy senior positions in government, business, universities 
and civil society. It is no exaggeration to say that it is probably the single most 
important dynamic in the bilateral relationship. At elite levels in Indonesia, 
we are probably now better understood than any other Western nation. And 
there is momentum in that many of  the earlier Australian graduates send 
their children here to study.
In the outgoing Yudhoyono administration there were three cabinet 
ministers who graduated from Australian universities, while in the recently 
elected administration, which technically does not assume power until 
October, the Vice-President-elect, Dr Boediono, has close Australian 
connections. For more than a decade, Boediono has been the most important 
economic policymaker in Southeast Asia’s dominant power. It is therefore 
important that we better understand this leader, who spent several years in 
our midst.
Published as ‘The year of  living amicably’, Canberra Times, 25 July 2009; posted on Inside 
Story, http://inside.org.au/indonesia-new-leadership/, 29 July 2009.
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Education and career
Boediono (who like many Javanese has only one name) has had a stellar 
academic, ministerial and now political career. Born in 1943, he spent 
extended periods at three Australian universities, initially courtesy of  a 
Colombo Plan scholarship. He graduated with an economics degree from 
the University of  Western Australia in 1967, followed by a Masters degree 
from Monash in 1972. He also spent two years in the early 1970s as a junior 
researcher at The Australian National University, the university with which 
he has continued to have a close intellectual association (and from which 
his daughter also subsequently graduated). He later earned a PhD from the 
Wharton School, University of  Pennsylvania.
Most of  Boediono’s academic career has been at Gadjah Mada University, 
Yogyakarta. Even as a minister, he has maintained Yogyakarta as his principal 
place of  residence and has often continued to conduct Saturday classes at 
the university.
From the mid 1980s, he was increasingly pulled into the Jakarta policy 
world. Appointed to the senior staff  of  the national planning agency, 
Bappenas, he rose quickly through the ranks, becoming a deputy (i.e., 
subminister) in the late 1980s. He was then appointed as one of  the directors 
of  the Bank Indonesia, the central bank, for the period 1993–98. Boediono’s 
ministerial career formally commenced in May 1998, when the incoming 
president, B. J. Habibie, appointed him minister for planning (and head of  
Bappenas), a position he held throughout the 17-month administration. He 
was technically out of  government during the controversial Wahid presidency 
but returned as finance minister in the Megawati presidency from August 
2001 to November 2004. After another short break, he returned to cabinet 
as President Yudhoyono’s coordinating economics minister in December 
2005, a position he held until June 2008. At the behest of  the president, he 
was then appointed to the position of  governor of  Bank Indonesia in May 
2008, overcoming an impasse that had arisen from the parliament’s refusal 
to agree to any of  the other candidates nominated by the administration.
This short summary of  his ministerial career highlights two key 
achievements. One is that over the past decade, Boediono has held every 
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major economic policymaking position in the Indonesian government. 
It is difficult to think of  a policymaker in any other major country with 
comparable experience. The other is that he has been at the centre of  decision-
making when Indonesia faced momentous challenges. At least three deserve 
mention. The first was the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98. The Indonesian 
economy contracted severely then, both the currency and the banking system 
collapsed, and relations with the international donor community soured. 
Second, as finance minister in the early years of  this decade, he presided 
over a remarkable recovery in state finances, rapidly bringing down public 
debt and managing to control the spending propensities of  a divided cabinet 
not known for its economic literacy. He also adroitly navigated the country’s 
exit from the detested IMF program. Third, he was in charge of  the nation’s 
central bank as the current global financial crisis hit, and thus far the country 
has navigated its way through the crisis competently.
One other feature of  Boediono’s ministerial career deserves comment: at 
a time of  unprecedented political turmoil and intrigue, he has managed to 
remain above the fray. At one stage, Indonesia had had five presidents in six 
years, and Boediono was a senior figure in four of  them. The governorship 
of  the central bank in particular has been a political minefield. In spite of  
its independence, a condition of  the IMF rescue package, all occupants of  
that position, except for Boediono, have subsequently faced extended legal 
action, house arrest or imprisonment. The closest Boediono came to political 
controversy was as a result of  the so-called BLBI scandal at the height of  
the financial crisis in 1997–98, when billions of  dollars were spent by the 
central bank in an effort to rescue the ailing banking system. This led to the 
dismissal of  the then bank governor and his subsequent long-running trial. 
For a period, it appeared that Boediono might also be charged. However, he 
has since been officially cleared.
An unlikely politician emerges: Boediono turned 65 last year. It was 
widely expected then that he would complete his distinguished career of  
government service by serving out the five-year term as head of  the central 
bank and then return to academe.
But following this year’s April parliamentary elections, at which 
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Yudhoyono’s party was the clear, but minority, victor, attention turned to 
his choice of  running mate for the 8 July presidential elections. The initial 
assumption was that Yudhoyono (SBY) would choose a leader from one of  
the other political parties. However, quite suddenly, rumours surfaced that 
Boediono might become his vice-presidential candidate, and in mid-May 
this became official.
There appear to have been two reasons for his selection. One was SBY’s 
greatly enhanced power following success at the parliamentary elections, 
and hence his freedom to appoint a vice-president of  his choosing. As a 
corollary, since this is his final term, vice-presidential loyalty was considered 
to be essential, and a ‘non politician’ was therefore preferred. An occasional 
irritation during SBY’s current term has been the sometimes erratic behaviour 
of  his outgoing deputy, Jusuf  Kalla. The second factor was the difficulty of  
choosing an acceptable candidate from among the four Muslim parties with 
which SBY had teamed up.
In passing, the parallels with Indonesia’s earlier pre-eminent economic 
policymaker, Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, are striking, even though the 
authoritarian and democratic eras are so very different. Both Boediono and 
Widjojo were hand-picked by two Javanese presidents, SBY and Soeharto, 
military men by career and both with an instinctive recognition of  the 
importance of  good economic management. Both presidents developed a 
very close rapport and personal chemistry with their principal economic 
advisors, both also Javanese, quintessential technocrats of  great intellect and 
integrity, and with an evident capacity to read their leader’s mind and mood. 
Soeharto in fact wanted Widjojo as his vice-president in 1983, but personal 
circumstances got in the way.
It is not clear how Boediono’s candidature affected the outcome of  
the presidential elections. The campaign was mainly personality based. It 
lacked fire, controversy and grand policy or ideological debates. The three 
presidential candidates dominated the media. The other two vice-presidents 
were controversial and divisive military figures who still remain subject to 
US travel restrictions.
Boediono is not a natural politician, but he adapted to political life more 
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quickly than expected and ran an effective campaign. As expected, he 
was especially comfortable in dealing with economic policy issues, which 
according to poll surveys were the dominant concerns of  the electorate. 
This plus his impeccable personal credentials were undoubtedly an asset for 
SBY. It also did not go unnoticed that his personal wealth was the lowest of  
the six presidential and vice-presidential candidates.
Perhaps the most contentious poll issue was the pejorative ‘neo-lib’ label 
that a desperate and populist opposition tried to pin on Boediono. This was 
a scurrilous attack on his record in government, alleging that he was too 
close to the IMF and foreign investors and that he neglected issues of  social 
justice. These strident, so-called ‘nationalist’ assertions are, of  course, wildly 
misleading.
Writings and philosophy
Apart from a series of  widely used textbooks, Boediono’s publications are not 
extensive. His major international outlet has been ANU’s Bulletin of  Indonesian 
Economic Studies (BIES), with which he has been closely associated as a board 
member since 1984. He has continued to write when out of  government. 
By far the most important recent paper is his ‘Managing the Indonesian 
economy: some lessons from the past’, BIES, December 2005, presented at 
ANU’s annual ‘Indonesia Update’ conference that year. This essay provides 
the best English-language summary of  his views on economic policymaking 
in Indonesia. His survey of  postindependence economic policymaking 
emphasises the need for economic policy cohesion (present under Soeharto, 
absent for much of  the next few years), the need for a coherent and credible 
economic strategy and macroeconomic stability. He regards the central 
challenges as building institutions to underpin a fragile democracy. These 
include crucially the judiciary and law enforcement, on which he notes slow 
progress to date, and civil service reform, which was neglected in the early 
post-Soeharto era. He warns of  the possible ‘disharmony between politics 
and economics’, and argues that some economic policymaking should be 
insulated from the pressures of  vested interests. Examples include central 
bank independence and legislated fiscal policy constraints, both achieved in 
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Indonesia in recent years, and with Boediono playing a central role in the 
process.
Implications for Indonesia and Australia
Boediono is a technocrat and, although he is popularly elected, he does 
not have an independent political base. Nor does he have further political 
aspirations; in fact, he did not seek this high office. He is therefore likely to 
be more of  a prime minister, a cabinet coordinator, especially on economic 
policy, and a manager of  the often unpredictable and assertive parliament. 
He will therefore free SBY for broader national and international issues.
Boediono is a courteous, understated, cautious, reserved individual. He is 
not a crusading, charismatic figure, quite different in style and substance from 
the current vice-president, Jusuf  Kalla, a controversial, can-do politician. But 
Boediono can be tough and resolute, as he has shown in handling several 
demanding portfolios and policy challenges way beyond the magnitude his 
Australian counterparts ever have to contemplate.
The most important consideration for Australia is that for the next 
five years Boediono will be a central player in the major power of  our 
neighbourhood. Nothing matters more to Australian foreign policy than a 
stable and prosperous Indonesia at peace with itself  and its neighbourhood. 
This will be an administration whose cabinet is far more ‘Australia-literate’ 
than can be said of  the converse. (Regrettably, we have never had an Australian 
minister deeply immersed in Indonesia.) That means an administration well 
disposed towards us.
In the case of  Boediono, in particular, it also means we have a natural 
partner for a range of  international initiatives including, importantly, G20-
based reforms of  the international economic and financial architecture and 
further institution-building in the Asia-Pacific region. His elevation will also 
enhance the effectiveness of  our development assistance program to the 
country, which, approaching A$500 million annually, is our largest country 
program and the second largest bilateral program to Indonesia.
Conversely, it is important not to have unrealistic expectations. Inevitably, 
there will be differences in a bilateral relationship between two neighbours 
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who are so different in so many respects. Particular individuals can do 
only so much. In the final analysis, it is the broad layers of  social, cultural, 
commercial and personal relations that are the arbiters of  whether there is a 
close and durable friendship between two nations.
International reporting on Indonesia, including that from Australia, has 
tended to oscillate excessively, from the euphoric to the gloomy. Let there be 
no mistake. The recent Jakarta bombings, the first in almost four years, are a 
terrible tragedy. But the country is in good hands, and its economy is doing 
better than most at the moment. The election of  Boediono as vice-president 





It’s important to know how Japan will affect us*
The recent spate of  bad economic news about Japan has raised many 
questions about the global crisis, Japan’s response and what it will mean for 
Australia. Do we understand Japan well enough to be able to answer the 
fundamental questions?
In the middle of  last year it looked as if  Japan was set to weather the 
world’s financial storms. By November its own government was talking 
of  recession and by this month the economic data proclaimed a virtual 
meltdown of  the industrial sector. The numbers are alarming not only for 
their size but for their speed. Japan will probably be the worst performing 
OECD economy in 2009, shrinking by an estimated 2.6 per cent. Industrial 
production in the last quarter has fallen to the level of  1983.
How has this happened in an economy that was, up to the end of  2007, 
First published in Australian Financial Review, 2 March 2009; posted as ‘What do we know 
about Japan?’ East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 17 March 2009.
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experiencing its longest post-war recovery?
Recovery from the decade of  the 1990s followed stringent reform of  
the financial sector and structural reform programs in many other areas, 
plus expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. None of  these policies was 
applied consistently, much backtracking and political bickering took place, 
and external criticism was harsh. But it looked like the medicine had worked. 
What we now see is that new vulnerabilities have been revealed.
What ails the Japanese economy now is different from what ailed it in 
the 1990s. Then, lax monetary policy created an asset bubble; lax regulation 
allowed banks to lend excessively and encouraged (some) investors to borrow 
unwisely and squander resources on unproductive projects, and eventually 
resulted in appalling and frightening fragility in the financial system. Very 
similar to what has happened in the United States and Europe today.
But that is not what is happening in Japan now.
What has happened this time is a large external shock, transmitted through 
collapsing export markets and combined with a rising yen. This has revealed 
that Japan’s economy has grown more dependent on exports to support 
growth than it was during the ‘high growth era’. Its industrial and export 
structures have become more concentrated on a few industries and a few 
trade partners (though new ones such as China have replaced some of  the 
old ones).
At the same time, the international financial system still does not adjust 
very quickly to changing trade balances and sudden shifts in domestic 
consumption and savings. Exchange rate systems are increasingly driven, 
in the short run at least, by considerations such as domestic liquidity needs 
and perceptions of  risk. They cannot carry the burden of  adjusting trade 
balances alone. So, whereas the yen might be expected to depreciate under 
the present circumstances, it continued to strengthen until this week. Without 
some yen depreciation Japan’s exports cannot gain the ground they have lost 
from collapsing demand abroad. But Japan cannot quickly alter the value of  
the yen without international support. Depreciation would at least require 
the tacit agreement of  the US and the EU not to complain too loudly before 
any intervention would be possible.
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The world has looked to Japan’s experience in the 1990s for pointers on 
how to respond to the global financial crisis and has come to admire some 
of  what it once criticised as either insufficient or excessive government 
involvement in the economy. There is still a lot of  misunderstanding of  
what Japan actually did, but that discussion needs deeper analysis at another 
time. The urgent question for Japan is what it should do now that it has 
swallowed its bitter medicine (wiping huge amounts off  inflated asset values 
over the 1990s, writing off  trillions in non-performing loans, and living with 
unemployment levels twice their historic rates for ten years) and still faces 
more pain.
This crisis should be amenable to more conventional policy responses 
than the last one. Replacing lost external demand by temporarily increasing 
domestic demand through fiscal policy; stimulating government and private 
consumption while loosening monetary policy to keep interest rates from 
rising and to avoid upward pressure on the currency; and embracing any 
slight upward pressure on prices; would all be good responses, but these 
responses become difficult when politics are in disarray so budgets cannot be 
passed, when the legacy of  past fiscal policies has created large government 
debt, when interest rates are close to zero, and when international hostility 
would greet any softening of  the value of  the currency.
Japan still needs to enact all these policies but will also have to wait for 
the rest of  the world to recover. It must hope fervently that the world avoids 
protectionism and in the meantime it will have to go on improving the 
flexibility of  its own economy via (now unpopular) structural reform. It will 
face continuing high (for it) unemployment and will have to improve safety 
nets and soften its social and economic impact by a variety of  means.
These are tall orders and if  Japan is not able to manage them it matters to 
the region and to Australia. Japan is still our largest export market and is at 
the hub of  production networks in the Asian region. Japan’s growth not only 
depends on the region but impacts on it, and we must all hope that it is able 
to recover sooner rather than later. Thankfully Japan is not, at the moment, 
withdrawing from the region. Indeed it has recently contributed in significant 
ways to global and regional efforts to respond to the crisis—supporting an 
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expanded Chiang Mai initiative at the recent ASEAN+3 summit, increasing 
its contribution to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and supporting 
capital increases for the Asian Development Bank (ADB). But what the 
shock over the data shows is that we understand Japan’s economy no better, 
or even less well, now than we did in the roaring 80s.
In Australia there are no regular macroeconomic analyses of  Japan and 
few, if  any, macroeconomic models in use that say anything about the 
impact of  Japan on Australia. So, when asked how big the effect of  Japan’s 
collapse on Australia might be, well-informed observers can do little better 
than ‘wait and see’. Is this really good enough or is it time we began to pay 
more attention to the health and functioning of  the economy of  our largest 




Australia, and managing Japan’s insecurity*
When Kevin Rudd was elected prime minister in November 2007, many in 
Japan (and Australia) worried about the prospect of  Australia shifting its 
diplomatic focus from Japan to China. Rudd’s fluency in Mandarin and his 
long-time links to China brought out the insecurity in those who thought 
Australia’s increasing political engagement with China would come at the 
expense of  its relationship with Japan, as if  this were a zero-sum game. 
Many of  those critics see Japan’s relationships with the United States and 
Australia as a counterbalance to China.
Posted on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 13 July 2009.
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This, of  course, got worse when Rudd did not visit Japan on his first 
official tour abroad as the newly minted prime minister, whereas China 
featured prominently on his itinerary. The fury was bordering on panic 
and the oversight was widely reported as a diplomatic snub. Was this panic 
justified? Right after the election, key cabinet ministers such as Trade 
Minister Simon Crean and Foreign Minister Stephen Smith visited Japan in 
January 2008. Since then Kevin Rudd has made a couple of  trips, including 
an important and significant trip to Hiroshima.
In addition to Rudd’s trips, nine ministers in the Rudd government have 
visited Japan, for a total of  13 trips. Compare this rather busy schedule to the 
number of  trips Japanese ministers, including the prime minister, have taken 
Down Under. Foreign Minister Nakasone visited Perth and Melbourne in 
May this year, but this was a rare exception. In fact, he’s the only minister to 
visit since Rudd was elected. Australia 13, Japan 1.
Japan’s last three prime ministers hardly set a foot on Australian soil. Abe 
Shinzo attended APEC in Sydney but hastened straight back home to resign. 
Former Prime Minister Fukuda and current Prime Minister Aso have not 
visited Australia. The last bilateral visit to Australia by a Japanese prime 
minister was way back in 2002 by Koizumi. The only minister to have visited 
between Koizumi in 2002 and Nakasone this year was Aso when he was the 
foreign minister in 2006.
Japan is worried that it is being pushed off  the global map by China’s 
rise, or at least that the attention being paid to China is happening at its 
own expense. This is a crisis of  self-confidence. Complaining about others 
giving attention to, and engaging with, China is hardly the solution. Few 
countries are so hung up on how their US ambassador ranks alongside the 
US ambassador to another country.
The Japanese press jumped the gun and prematurely announced star 
Harvard academic Joseph Nye as the ambassador designate before Obama 
loyalist John Roos was finally given the nod. The comparisons between Roos 
and Jon Huntsman, the next US ambassador to China and a long-time China 
expert, started with complaints that the Obama administration was sending 
a fundraiser to Japan and a ‘real player’ to China. Roos is an insider in the 
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Obama camp (unlike Huntsman who was introduced to Obama by Jeffrey 
Bader) and has the invaluable ability of  being able to pick up the phone and 
reach the president himself  at any time.
Whether Japan is getting the attention it thinks it deserves from its allies 
or not (and no objective analysis would suggest that it isn’t), making it a 
diplomatic issue with a Democratic administration in the US or a Labor 
government in Australia hardly helps Japan’s diplomatic credit. There are 
more substantive things in diplomacy than form and status measured by 
irrelevant yardsticks.
Japan is preoccupied by domestic political and leadership problems. 
Brushing up on its diplomacy might also be given some attention.
There will be a new government in Japan soon and the first thing the 
Australian government should (naturally) do is invite the new prime minister 




The end game for Japanese politics? The significance 
of the collapse of the LDP*
In the aftermath of  six successive defeats in regional elections, the dominant 
force in Japanese politics—the Liberal Democratic Party—is staring down 
electoral defeat in the national elections scheduled for 30 August. The nature 
of  the electoral tsunami that confronts the LDP indicates that more is at 
Published as ‘It’s sayonara to the LDP as Japan embraces political change’, Canberra Times, 
22 July 2009.
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stake than just the decline of  a political party. Japanese politics itself  is being 
reinvented, and the destruction of  the LDP is an important component of  
that ground-shaking transformation.
In sifting through the rubble of  the LDP’s disastrous campaign in the 
Tokyo Metropolitan election on 12 July, it is easy to see why the LDP 
frontline has panicked. In every demographic, the LDP was trounced by 
the opposition Democratic Party of  Japan (DPJ). In the over-60s category, 
which has been deeply dismayed by the mismanagement of  millions of  
pension fund records by the government and by LDP-designed cutbacks on 
aged care services, the LDP vote imploded from a 43 per cent support rate 
in the previous election, to a miserable 27 per cent support rate on 12 July. 
The DPJ on the other hand rose from an 11 per cent support rate to a 42 per 
cent rate last weekend. In this rapidly ageing society, the grey vote matters.
The news gets bleaker when we examine the behaviour of  the voting 
public in general. Voter turnouts reached historic highs in the recent regional 
campaigns, indicating the determination of  voters to make a statement in 
advance of  the national poll. Moreover, voters of  all hues have turned their 
backs on the dominant party in power. Not only did the overwhelming 
majority of  unaffiliated voters rush to support the DPJ, but even the LDP’s 
own declared affiliated supporters betrayed them. A full 20 per cent of  the 
LDP’s faithful ticked the box for the DPJ on 12 July. This is not an electorate 
that is thinking only of  the pending summer holidays. Instead, they have 
revolutionary political change on their minds.
As the extent of  the humiliation confronting the LDP became obvious 
on election night, several party heavyweights began muttering about 
Prime Minister Aso’s responsibility for the disaster. Although Aso’s prime 
ministership has been marred by gaffes and indecisiveness, and his personal 
support rate has sunk to lows that usually foreshadow political death, 
blaming Aso simply does not wash.
Aso was quarantined by his own party from the Tokyo campaign. Amongst 
party leaders, his was the only face missing from election campaign posters 
around the capital. Aso’s departure for the G8 summit in L’Aquila during the 
campaign was greeted by LDP party leaders and candidates with relief, as he 
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could not spoil their appeal to their support base. Aso cannot be blamed as 
the principal architect of  this rout.
Instead of  mobilising the prime minister, LDP officials paraded the front 
line of  cabinet ministers and party executives to the electorate. One dominant 
pattern that emerged in voter decision-making was that voters shunned 
not only LDP candidates, but especially those who had been repeatedly 
returned over many elections. It was precisely the LDP old guard that the 
voters turned on, preferring instead raw, young and politically inexperienced 
candidates fielded by the DPJ.
It is still possible that elements of  the LDP will underpin pending electoral 
suicide by removing Aso before the August election, but they should not 
deceive themselves that this will somehow alter the view of  the electorate. 
This electorate is rejecting the LDP way of  politics, not merely the person 
who happens to be leading the party at this moment.
Exit polls on 12 July reveal some of  the reasons why negative energy is 
flowing from voters to the LDP. In the week before the election, Aso was 
repeatedly humiliated by his own party in the media. Aso would announce 
his intention to shuffle the party executive, and then a stream of  factional 
and party office holders would parade across TV screens stating that they 
disagreed with this plan. Aso was forced to pretend he had never intended 
anything like a major reshuffle. When Aso started discussing the date of  the 
pending national election, party heavies weighed in on the evening news, 
openly contesting Aso’s statements. Given that in Japan it is the prime 
minister who makes the call on when an election is held, the public could 
only see this as cannibalisation of  the leader by his own party. The electorate 
noted Aso’s weakness, but blamed the party elders for behaving badly.
As astonishing as it may seem, the party that has ruled Japanese politics 
since 1955 seems to have lost its electoral compass and is hurtling full tilt 
towards the cliff  of  electoral defeat. In the midst of  a serious economic and 
financial crisis, a collapse in the terms of  trade and rising unemployment, the 
LDP collective leadership seems more concerned with its own survival—or 
more precisely, with each politician’s personal survival—than with the fate 
of  the country.
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It was the former LDP hero of  electoral success and prime minister 
between 2001 and 2006, the maverick Koizumi Junichiro, who famously 
declared his intention to ‘destroy the LDP’. What Koizumi meant by this 
was a two-pronged assault on the LDP: on its factions and on the locus of  
policymaking in the party. Koizumi managed to clip the wings of  faction 
leaders by depriving them of  their power base, utilising political funds 
laws, electoral reforms and altering the voting system for the LDP party 
presidency, to achieve one of  his goals.
The second goal, of  wrenching policymaking power from the inner 
sanctum of  party committees, was partly achieved by concentrating resources 
into the prime minister’s own office. Aided by the international emergency 
heralded by the 9/11 attacks and by increasingly belligerent behaviour by 
North Korea, Koizumi was able to make notable strides in the area of  security 
policy. Japan has contributed to the coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, albeit 
with constraints, without revising the famous ‘peace constitution’. Prime 
minister-centred policymaking was central to these developments.
As Koizumi heads into retirement at the forthcoming election, it is perhaps 
fitting that his ‘revolution’ is more likely to be achieved by the opposition 
Democratic Party of  Japan than by his own LDP. The irony is that Koizumi’s 
huge victory margin in the last election is the only thing preventing the DPJ 
from doing so without the burden of  having to compromise with a coalition 
partner in government.
LDP politics is now playing out its end game, and the new politics of  
Japan are being forged in the cauldron of  political desperation and spite that 





South Korea’s ‘bulldozer’ seeks a partner in Rudd
South Korea’s President Lee Myung-bak arrives in Australia today as part 
of  a seven-day visit to New Zealand, Australia and Indonesia. Lee’s visit at 
this particular time, in the midst of  the global financial meltdown and North 
Korea’s threat to test-launch a ballistic missile capable of  reaching the west 
of  the US mainland, gives a heightened significance to his summit meetings, 
especially the one with Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.
Indeed, the South Korean economy, especially hurt by the current 
economic downturn spirals, is in crisis. Its currency has fallen more than 40 
per cent against the US dollar. South Korea’s GDP grew only 2.5 per cent 
in 2008, the lowest level of  growth since 1998, and it is now predicted that 
Asia’s fourth largest economy will actually shrink in 2009.
In terms of  inter-Korean relations between the South and North, 
Pyongyang has openly warned the Lee government against pushing relations 
First published in Canberra Times, 4 March 2009.
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to the ‘brink of  war’. A decade-long ‘sunshine’ engagement between North 
and South Korea abruptly ended after Lee declared his own conservative 
‘Vision 3000’ policy which promised North Korea ‘conditional aid’ only 
when it had completely abandoned its nuclear weapons program.
The North’s dismissal of  Vision 3000 was immediate: it cut off  virtually 
all dialogue with the South. Lee’s visit is taking place amid these crises which 
demand unusually strong collaborative and complementary outcomes from 
his ‘summit diplomacy’ with Rudd.
According to the Korea Times, the summit between Rudd and Lee will 
discuss ‘joint responses to climate change and the global financial crisis’. The 
summit will also include discussion on ‘ways to promote Korean studies in 
Australia’ and increase bilateral exchanges in culture and human resources, as 
well as free trade agreement issues. President Lee is apparently keen to boost 
cooperation in green energy development, particularly through promoting 
his government’s policy of  ‘Low carbon, green growth’ and his recently 
announced ‘Green New Deal’ which aims to ‘promote eco-friendly growth 
in order to ensure sustainable development’.
This apparently coinciding national interest of  Australia and South 
Korea arouses public curiosity about the South Korean leader. Who is he? 
Having promoted himself  as an ‘economic president’, Lee—former CEO 
of  Hyundai Engineering and former mayor of  Seoul—is known for his 
bulldozer-like approach and ‘creative pragmatism’, a man who gets things 
done fast.
After electing him with high expectations in a December 2007 landslide 
following 10 years of  pro-left liberal leadership, South Koreans looked to 
President Lee to bring his corporate drive and success to a sagging economy. 
He, in fact, captured many South Koreans’ imagination with what he called 
his ‘7–4–7’ vision, promising to achieve annual growth of  7 per cent, double 
per capita income to US$40,000 within a decade, and become one of  the 
world’s top seven economies.
After a year in office, however, Lee is struggling to revive an economy hit 
harder than most by the global financial meltdown, and faces an increasingly 
negative North Korea, angered by his hardline stance towards the regime. 
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Domestic opposition to his policy initiatives and pro-US stance has also 
blown out into mass demonstrations. The latest polls show that only a third 
of  South Koreans think he’s doing his job well. The public believes that, 
by insisting on his so-called ‘MB-nomics’, the government Lee leads has 
amplified the vulnerability of  South Korea to external shocks.
Lee’s first major domestic setback occurred when he allowed beef  imports 
from the US, which had been banned previously over fears about mad cow 
disease. Three months of  citizens’ ‘candlelight protests’ ensued, which 
ultimately led Lee to change his senior presidential staff  as well as revise 
his reform agenda. In his defence, he tried to overcome the economic crisis 
and at the same time pursue a revised national agenda through his typical 
‘bulldozer’ approach. But the two just did not fit together, as overcoming 
the economic crisis is a precondition for his national agenda and must thus 
come first. Lee’s biggest problem is the loss of  public confidence in his 
governance of  state affairs.
Lee is seen as lacking political skills, especially the ability not only to bring 
about social unity but also to work with those who disagree with him. Even 
the leading conservative papers point out that Lee tends to trust none but 
those he personally knows. His failure in effective governance is viewed by 
many as derived from his dislike of  the inefficiency of  politics.
But with his persistence he is focused on the future and quoted as saying 
to his advisers that ‘We must not dwell on what happened during the past 
year because we’ll be judged by how we do throughout our five-year term.’ 
In this sense, his summit with Rudd may provide a new starting point for 
the two leaders to expand and strengthen bilateral cooperation in tackling 





North Korea’s bluff should be taken seriously
When I was in North Korea earlier this month, there was one thing that 
caught my attention: what was happening (or, to be more precise, what was 
not happening) on the highway between Pyongyang and Kaesong. The road 
between Pyongyang and Kaesong is North Korea’s only decent highway, 
and for a good reason—it is along this route that most troops would have 
to move to reach the 38th parallel which separates North from South. I had 
travelled along the highway before, in 2005. On that occasion, it was full of  
all the normal traffic of  a North Korean main road: people on bicycles, in 
ox-drawn carts, walking very long distances, or chatting and reading books 
by the road as they waited for a passing truck to give them a lift.
But this month, the highway was eerily empty of  everything except the 
occasional motor vehicle. The only people in sight were teams of  villagers 
and schoolchildren, who were energetically pruning every weed and bush 
on the side of  the road. Despite their country’s reputation for inscrutability, 
school kids in North Korea are much like school kids anywhere: most of  
the girls were assiduously digging up weeds as per instructions; half  the boys 
had skived off  to sit on top of  the embankment and wave at every passing 
car.
I could think of  only two possible explanations for the uncanny emptiness 
of  the Pyongyang–Kaesong highway: either some very significant bigwig 
was about to pass this way; or otherwise the road was being cleared in case 
it was suddenly needed for moving a mass of  troops to the border with the 
South. Three weeks ago I thought the latter explanation seemed improbably 
grim. Now I’m not so sure.
First published in The Age, 2 June 2009.
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When the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea’s (DPRK) leaders make 
dramatic statements about acts of  war and tearing up armistices, the worst 
mistake anyone could make is to think they are bluffing and to try to call 
their bluff. North Korean politicians do not make jokes. Even if  some of  
their statements start out as bluster, the bluster has a nasty way of  becoming 
fact. To back down would be humiliating, and the thing that North Korean 
politicians most dread is humiliation in the eyes of  the world.
Several factors make the current crisis in relations with the DPRK 
particularly explosive. The outside world is weary of  the decades-long process 
of  on-again, off-again engagement with North Korea. After repeated failed 
agreements, it is all too tempting to abandon negotiation and take a tough 
stance. But impatience with negotiations is dangerous, doubly so because 
it is shared by the North Korean side. While the US and others focus on 
North Korea’s broken promises, the North Koreans see only the promises 
broken by South Korea and its US ally.
To give just one much-resented example, in October 2007 North 
Korea and South Korea (under the administration of  the late Roh Moo-
hyun) agreed to a range of  steps to promote bilateral peace-building and 
economic cooperation, including the creation of  a joint fishing area and a 
special ‘peace zone’ on their west coast. But the conservative Lee Myung-
bak administration, elected at the end of  2007, took a dim view of  these 
agreements and allowed them to languish.
Lee Myung-bak’s hardline North Korean policy, indeed, came as a surprise 
to some South Koreans and probably to some North Korean bureaucrats, 
who initially expected the new regime to make few changes to existing 
engagement with the North. If  you are a North Korean, making mistakes 
about such things can have very unpleasant consequences. Choe Song-
chol, a North Korean bureaucrat who had been playing a leading role in 
engagement with the South within the North Korean regime, is believed to 
have been executed last year for inaccurately making optimistic predictions 
on political developments in South Korea.
Since the middle of  last year, hardline forces have increasingly been in 
the ascendancy in North Korea, and it is now clear that they are prepared to 
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take drastic steps. Everyone (including, surely, most of  North Korea’s own 
leaders) knows that if  it came to military conflict, North Korea would lose. 
North Korea’s bombs are suicide bombs. But by now the world should be 
only too well aware that desperate people are often willing to become suicide 
bombers, and that the devastation they cause can be horrible.
In 1994, at the height of  a similar crisis, the commander-in-chief  of  US 
forces in South Korea estimated that an all-out war with North Korea would 
probably leave one million people, including 80,000–100,000 Americans, 
dead. As far as I am aware, that estimate has never been revised. If  it came 
to war, the inevitable military defeat of  North Korea would not end with 
the citizens of  Pyongyang welcoming American and South Korean troops 
as liberators and tearing down the statues of  Kim Il-sung. It would end in a 
massive humanitarian disaster and an unholy political, social and economic 
mess, which the rest of  the world (but most particularly South Korea) would 
spend decades trying to sort out.
And how might China react? It is hard to imagine China either joining a 
coalition of  the willing against the North Korean regime or sitting idly by as 
US, South Korean and allied forces (in a replay of  1950) advanced towards 
the Yalu. Violence on the Korean Peninsula would profoundly destabilise 
the relationship between China and the US, and between China and its other 
Asian neighbours at the very moment when good relations are most essential 
to global political and economic stability.
The emerging crisis in Korea is one of  the most serious challenges faced 
by the Obama administration to date. The United States, whose actions will 
be the key to addressing this crisis, urgently needs a clear, coherent and 
imaginative North Korea policy. This policy must include positive measures 
to create channels of  communication and spell out a long-term path away 
from conflict, rather than simply entering into a vicious cycle of  hostile 
response and counter-response.




Is Pyongyang reacting to or shaping events?
In a fit of  calculated fury, North Korea has undone the work of  several years 
of  negotiations, declared the armistice agreement that ended the Korean 
War in 1953 to be null and void, and promised ‘merciless’ retaliation against 
anyone that violates its unilateral definition of  sovereign rights.
Subtlety and imagination are among the many things in short supply in 
Pyongyang. Policy setbacks lead the regime to press the only button on the 
console: belligerence. Even so, the latest phase of  ill humour is strikingly 
fierce.
Why? Has one or more of  the other five participants in the Six-Party talks 
done something so aggressive or insulting that Pyongyang was left without 
a choice? If  not, then perhaps Pyongyang wants to be where it currently is 
and has inflated lesser policy setbacks to the point where it believes they can 
serve the constructed appearance that the Democratic People’s Republic of  
Korea (DPRK) has responded to extreme provocation.
Back in October 2008, the Bush administration removed the DPRK from 
its list of  state sponsors of  terror and from the provisions of  the Trading 
with the Enemy Act. This was done in response to Pyongyang having begun 
the process of  disabling its Yongbyon reactor and reprocessing facility, and 
providing its comprehensive declaration on all its nuclear facilities (although 
the declaration had some significant shortcomings).
A popular line of  speculation is that since that time Pyongyang has felt 
increasingly sidelined and resentful of  Washington’s preoccupation with 
changing administrations, the global financial crisis, relations with Russia, 
China and Cuba and so on. The DPRK, it is suggested, is simply demanding 
Posted on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 6 June 2009.
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to be reinstated as the first priority. I don’t find this persuasive.
We also have a new government in Seoul that has dropped the ‘sunshine’ 
policy of  unconditional engagement in favour of  linking aid and economic 
cooperation to developments in the political relationship and, specifically, 
progress on denuclearisation in the Six-Party talks.
Pyongyang has reacted adversely to this development, not least by putting 
in jeopardy the joint venture in Kaesong. Again, this is hardly an adequate 
explanation for scrapping the Six-Party talks, conducting a second nuclear 
test and threatening war.
An explanation begins to emerge when one recalls that in February/
March this year, Pyongyang announced that it intended to launch a satellite. 
Pyongyang would have been aware of  how provocative this would appear to 
the US and Japan in particular and how close it was to being a violation of  
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1718, passed after its 
first nuclear test in October 2006.
It is certain that Beijing used its connections to stress the same points. 
Not only did Pyongyang proceed with the launch, it threatened beforehand 
that even a hint of  protest from the UNSC would elicit strong retaliation.
This introduces the possibility that Pyongyang was seeking to create 
the circumstances in which it could present the second test and its other 
actions as a response to provocation, that is, the fault of  the hostile attitudes 
amongst its negotiating partners. The UNSC statement condemning the 
satellite launch-cum-ballistic missile test was precisely what Pyongyang 
expected, and sought.
The final piece of  the jigsaw puzzle is Kim Jung-il’s stroke and, presumably, 
diminished confidence in his longevity. Many have speculated about a 
leadership struggle and portrayed the latest developments as part of  shoring 
up support among factions of  the elite, especially, one imagines, the military. 
An equally plausible explanation is that Kim’s ill health has already produced 
a new configuration of  power at the top of  the DPRK government.
Further, it may be that the consensus among this new group that the Six-
Party process would deliver too little to the DPRK, and thus needed to be 
derailed. It is even possible that the new consensus is that it was a mistake to 
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agree that the Bomb could be negotiated away, that there was no imaginable 
deal that would leave the regime in Pyongyang better off  than retaining the 
Bomb.
This line of  speculation is reinforced by the thought that Pyongyang has 
a very limited stock of  plutonium, perhaps 30–50 kilograms and that the 
two tests have probably consumed 10–15 kilograms. The military may have 
agreed to the second test on the condition that the reprocessing facility be 
reopened to replenish the stockpile.
The task now is to discover whether Pyongyang still wants to negotiate 
and, if  so, whether those negotiations will be about denuclearisation or some 
lesser objectives linked to coexisting with a nuclear-armed DPRK.
An approach that is probably among the options being considered is 
that the UNSC will endorse a regime of  targeted sanctions with real teeth, 
that is, sanctions that signal an intent to unseat the present leadership. 
Implementation of  the sanctions could be deferred pending a visit to 
Pyongyang by a high-profile emissary (Bill Clinton and Colin Powell have 
been mentioned) to ascertain the scope for new negotiations.
While Beijing, in particular, will be loath to contemplate such a course, 
Pyongyang has now twice aggressively rejected its counsel: as recently as 
January this year, a senior Chinese envoy met with Kim Jong-il and secured 
a reaffirmation of  the DPRK’s interest in denuclearisation. In addition, 
Beijing has been a trenchant critic of  unipolarity and championed the 
‘democratisation of  global leadership’. It would not relish yet another 
example of  the UNSC being exposed as impotent when it comes to the 
hard issues of  protecting international peace and security.
This reading of  the tea leaves suggests that Pyongyang wants any re-
engagement to be premised on its status as a state with nuclear weapons. US 
Secretary of  Defense Gates signalled in Singapore last week that the US was 
not prepared to proceed on this basis.
Seoul has not backed away from its insistence that economic aid and 
investment in the North will be made conditional on progress in the Six-
Party talks, and underscored this posture by confirming its intention to join 
the Proliferation Security Initiative.
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Tokyo has for some time been an advocate of  a harder response to 
Pyongyang’s provocations and made no secret of  its disappointment in 
Washington’s decision last year to drop the DPRK from the list of  states 
that sponsor terrorism.
That leaves Russia and, especially, China. China has consistently declined 
to give denuclearisation priority over regime stability. Abrupt change of  any 
kind in Pyongyang could not only become violent and result in a heavy 
influx of  refugees from the DPRK, it would also make it more difficult for 
China to steer longer-term outcomes to its advantage.
Will Beijing now conclude that the DPRK is set on a course too likely 
to result in China’s worst-case scenario and that supporting harsh, targeted 
sanctions is the best of  the unattractive options still open? The answer, if  
there is to be one, should be discernible in the response being worked up in 
the UN Security Council. What is clear is that Pyongyang has crossed the 






Sex, race and religion still political weapons in 
Malaysian politics
The Malaysian national and state elections on 8 March 2008 surprised all 
observers. Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s ruling coalition, Barisan 
Nasional, lost its two-thirds majority in the federal parliament, and a coalition 
of  secular and Islamist opposition parties, Pakatan Rakyat, won five state 
governments. The election saw Malaysia’s ethnic voting patterns break down 
to an unprecedented extent.
Pakatan leader, Anwar Ibrahim, heralded the result as a ‘new dawn’ for 
Malaysian politics. Pakatan’s rise seemed to finally enable the creation of  a new 
politics that could somehow unite both Islamists and liberal cosmopolitans 
against ethnic and religious political manipulation.
Very quickly, however, the possibility of  a genuine political challenge 
A slightly edited version was posted on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 26 
February 2009.
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to Barisan began to fade. Instead of  articulating a post-racial narrative for 
Malaysia, Anwar’s major strategy since the election has consisted of  seeking 
defectors from the ruling coalition. He even suggested 16 September as the 
date Pakatan would gain the numbers to form a new federal government. 
Instead, almost one year on, Pakatan’s state government in Perak has 
collapsed. Pakatan representatives have crossed over to become Barisan 
allies instead, reportedly in return for millions of  ringgit in payment. 
Media speculation over the viability of  the Selangor and Kedah Pakatan 
governments is intense.
Malaysia’s ‘new dawn’ has been reduced to a sheer numbers game. 
The grim calculus of  attaining numerical dominance in state and federal 
legislatures, in turn, has seen important players launch cynical and calculated 
attacks based on sex, race and religion against Pakatan parliamentarians.
Two recent events have revealed that sex, race and religion are still major 
political weapons in Malaysian public life.
A Pakatan member of  the Selangor state assembly, Elizabeth Wong, 
offered her resignation on 18 February 2009, after photographs of  her 
sleeping semi-naked were leaked to the Malay Mail, a government-linked 
tabloid. The photographs appear to have been taken without Wong’s consent 
by a former partner and political ally.
On top of  the cruelty of  the public betrayal, and despite Wong having 
broken no laws, the photographs were immediately used to slur her character. 
Former Barisan Chief  Minister for Selangor, Mohamad Khir Toyo, quickly 
declared that ‘This is about morality.’ It was not necessary to elaborate, but 
Khir persisted, ‘She is a single person. How can she allow a man into her 
room when they are not married?’
The Pakatan leadership has hesitated over accepting Wong’s resignation, 
but for now she has effectively been shamed off  the political stage. She has 
been one of  Pakatan’s brightest stars, one of  the most capable of  articulating 
the new politics that was promised last year.
Months earlier, in September 2008, another high-profile, ethnic Chinese 
Pakatan member for Selangor, Teresa Kok, found her parents’ home had 
been firebombed. Some weeks beforehand, the same Khir Toyo had used 
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his blog to allege that Kok had asked a mosque in her constituency to cease 
amplifying the azan (Muslim call to prayer). The accusation was repeated in 
another newspaper, Utusan Malaysia. Mosque officials quickly revealed that 
the amplifier was actually faulty, but Kok was arrested and detained under 
the Internal Security Act, which allows for indefinite detention. Several 
Muslim NGOs, widely regarded as government fronts, quickly declared 
Kok an enemy of  Islam. Fortunately for Kok, other prominent Muslim 
organisations denounced her detention and she was released a week later. 
Regardless, the insinuations continued, and Kok was accused of  wearing a 
short skirt to a Ramadan meal to break the fast. Attached to the Molotov 
cocktails thrown at her parents’ house was a note which mocked her racially, 
called her a pig, and threatened that she would burn next.
These two women’s public humiliation has been driven by two 
developments following the election. First, Kok was detained on 12 
September, days before Anwar’s federal government crossover deadline. 
The political defectors, however, did not exist. Second, Barisan’s reduced 
majority has created much bitterness within its main constituent party, the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). Abdullah was immediately 
blamed for the poor election result. A political succession deal was brokered 
and Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak will apparently become prime 
minister next month.
Khir, too, is involved in a major power struggle. Vying for the position 
of  UMNO Youth chief, Khir is hoping to undermine the Pakatan state 
governments with appeals to racial and religious majoritarianism. He is also 
playing to widespread community acceptance of  the moral surveillance of  
Malay-Muslim women by the family, the public and the state.
The moral insinuations which result, along with frequent racial and 
religious slurs against unsurveilled others, are key features of  Malaysian 
political life. Non-Malay, non-Muslim, unsurveilled and immoral: two 
prominent, unmarried and politically capable ethnic Chinese women hit all 
the important political triggers at once.
Pakatan component parties have condemned the attack on Wong’s 
character. However, Islamists in the coalition—like Barisan—have an interest 
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in the didactic public discussion of  women’s bodily choices. Their interest 
in public morality competes with their liberal coalition partners’ interest in 
individual liberty and equality of  opportunity.
Other power brokers are focused on keeping the coalition together, and 
the arithmetic of  winning two upcoming by-elections in Perak and Kedah 
states. Without a coherent, unifying political vision to bind the coalition, 





Najib’s and UMNO’s survival
Najib Tun Razak was sworn in as Malaysia’s sixth prime minister on 3 April 
2009. He takes over the prime ministership of  Malaysia at a critical juncture 
in the history of  his political party and Malaysia. On the global front, Malaysia 
is battered by the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression. 
Domestically, Najib’s ruling party, the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO) and the coalition that it leads, the Barisan Nasional (BN), are at 
their lowest ebb, suffering a backlash from citizens fed up with the blatant 
abuse of  power from a regime that has ruled Malaysia since independence 
in 1957.
Najib realises that reform of  UMNO is critical for his and UMNO’s 
survival. He watched how Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s fortunes turned him 
from ‘party hero’, leading UMNO and BN to the resounding victory in 
Posted on New Mandala, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/, 27 April 2009; posted 
on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 2 May 2009.
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the 11th general election in 2004 when Malaysians gave him the biggest 
mandate for an incoming administration ever, to ‘a failed leader’ in the 
12th general election, where the electorate punished him, UMNO and BN 
for squandering the mandate given and betraying the people’s trust by not 
instituting the reforms that were promised. Badawi has since been removed 
as UMNO needed a scapegoat. Najib knows that he will face the same 
consequence if  he does not deliver victory for UMNO. For all the promises 
of  loyalty and the feudal mentality that pervades it, UMNO nonetheless is 
ultimately driven by money and power.
Najib, who headed BN’s operations during the election campaign in 
the 12th general election in 2008, is aware of  the following facts. BN lost 
four states on the more prosperous west coast of  the peninsular—Kedah, 
Penang, Perak and Selangor—while failing to retake poverty-ridden Kelantan 
on the east coast, which has been in opposition control since 1990. BN only 
obtained 49 per cent of  popular votes on the peninsular. Sabah and Sarawak 
saved BN. Although BN won 140 of  the 222 parliamentary seats, 54 of  
them came from these two states on the island of  Borneo, confirming that 
Borneo island politics are not linked to the peninsular. Most importantly, the 
popular vote obtained by UMNO in the peninsular was 35.5 per cent which 
was matched closely by the combined votes of  Anwar’s Justice Party (Parti 
Keadilan Rakyat) and the Islamist party (PAS).
This trend is also evident in that BN has lost all four by-elections in 
peninsular Malaysia with a face-saving win in Sarawak, the only by-election 
to date on the Borneo island. The three most recent by-elections were 
held simultaneously in an attempt to weaken the opposition’s campaign 
organisation (two in the peninsular, one in Sarawak). It was held on 7 April 
2009, four days after Najib was sworn in as prime minister. BN lost two with 
a face-saving win through one of  its component parties on the island. BN 
and UMNO campaigned on the platform of  giving the new prime minister 
and his policy of  ‘One Malaysia, People First, Performance Now’ a chance; 
it did not resonate with the electorate, however. Even more worrying is that 
in all these by-elections, the opposition’s winning margin increased over that 
in the general election despite BN training all its and the state’s resources 
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and machinery against the opposition.
Najib also understands that Malaysia’s economic fortunes—BN’s claim 
to legitimacy—are trending downwards. Economic growth over the past 
18 years has averaged just a little over 6 per cent while the average growth 
rate since the East Asian financial crisis of  1997–98 has been only 4 per 
cent. This is worrying as the performance has undershot all BN government 
targets. In the Vision 2020 Policy, economic growth was targeted at 7 per 
cent per annum from 1991 to 2020; in the Industrial Master Plan III, the 
target was 6.3 per cent for the plan period from 2006 to 2020; and the 9th 
Malaysia Plan (2006–10) sets the target for 6 per cent. While the reasons 
for Malaysia’s lacklustre economic performance are varied, the opposition 
has successfully laid the blame squarely on BN’s incompetency and corrupt 
practices; an electorate hard hit by the current global economic crisis and 
experiencing long-term deterioration in government delivery of  services 
have heartily accepted this proposition. This, of  course, has raised serious 
questions about the credibility of  the BN government’s ability to deliver 
on economic growth—BN’s final claim to legitimacy. The slowdown in the 
global economy has also made Najib’s task more difficult, as Malaysia, the 
third most open economy in Asia, relies heavily on international trade.
Najib also faces a weakening domestic fiscal position. Ever since 
affirmative action was introduced in a big way through the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) in 1970, the government has never had a balanced budget or 
surplus except for the period 1992–97, interestingly when Anwar was finance 
minister. Budget deficits have been the norm despite economic cycles and, 
since 1999, budget deficits have consistently exceeded forecast outcomes. 
While federal government debt for the period 2000–08 averaged at 42.6 per 
cent of  GDP is manageable, it is steadily increasing as revenues progressively 
fall due to limited sources of  new growth areas, higher thresholds before 
individuals are taxed, increased exemptions from taxable incomes, depleting 
natural resources, and mismanagement and wastage of  public funds.
Najib also realises that he comes with heavy baggage. He is the ultimate 
UMNO insider. He was ushered into politics at the age of  23 in 1976 upon 
the death of  his father, taking over his father’s parliamentary seat. Being 
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the son of  the highly respected second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, 
and the nephew of  the third Prime Minister, Tun Hussein Onn, meant that 
his path up the ladder in UMNO was secured. His tenure as chief  minister 
of  the state of  Pahang and deputy minister or minister of  various other 
ministries was lacklustre. Most telling was his tenure as defence minister, 
which was scandal-ridden with allegations of  various shady defence deals; 
a high number of  deaths of  Malaysian armed forces personnel while flying 
obsolete and poorly maintained fighter planes and helicopters (almost 
90 military personnel and civilians are reported to have died flying Nuri 
helicopters); a national service program which has resulted in the deaths of  
17 young Malaysians; and, finally, with the allegation of  being complicit in a 
murder of  a Mongolian national.
With all these setbacks, Najib realises that he must convince UMNO 
and BN that the critical challenge to his and their survival is to deliver on 
economic growth and improve race relations by ending, or at least tempering, 
patronage politics and improving government efficiency, which had been 
the hallmark of  the successful BN machinery of  past years. Najib’s policy 
slogan of  ‘One Malaysia, People First, Performance Now’ may demonstrate 
that he (and UMNO) is beginning to understand that although Malaysia 
remains a country with deep-rooted racism, Malaysians of  all races, creeds 
and colours are increasingly doubtful about BN’s continuing rule. The BN/
UMNO’s strategy of  dividing the races has not worked in the same way as 
in years gone by. Voting patterns, especially among the younger generation 
(below 35), reveal the willingness of  voters, irrespective of  race and social 
class, to vote for the opposition.
Najib may also realise that only substantive reforms will give him and 
UMNO a serious shot at redemption. Immediately after becoming the prime 
minister, he released 13 individuals (including three Hindu Rights Action 
Force (HINRAF) leaders—a people’s movement advocating fair treatment 
for the minority Malaysians of  Indian heritage) held under the Internal 
Securities Act (ISA)—an act that provides for detention without trial for 
unlimited period. Najib also revoked the suspension of  the biweekly internal 
newspapers of  Parti Islam Semalaysia (PAS) and Parti Keadilan Rakyat 
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(PKR) hoping to influence the by-election. It, however, had no effect. Najib 
correctly pointed out after the by-elections that BN had to ‘shape up or ship 
out’.
As 80 per cent of  Najib’s cabinet comprises ministers from the previous 
Badawi administration, many having dubious records, it is unclear how his 
administration will proceed in addressing the work that is needed, given all 
the challenges UMNO, BN and Malaysia is facing. Najib, following previous 
trends, has indicated that there is a need for reforms and has implemented 
some symbolic changes. Whether it is sufficient—only time will tell. But one 





PNG and the Solomon Islands: splendid isolation
Port Moresby
We touch down at Jackson International Airport and drive out amidst 
aircraft hangers and signalling towers. The Air Niugini planes here used 
to be painted in dazzling bright crimsons, oranges, yellows and greens to 
depict the plumage of  the bird of  paradise, the national symbol. ‘Land of  
the Unexpected’ was emblazoned on the fuselage in a sales message that 
emphasised the unpredictability of  Papua New Guinea. Passengers got 
worried. So PNG Airlines instead adopted more demure and conventional 
aircraft markings. On a hill overlooking the runway, the Airways Hotel, where 
I am staying, is a bolt-hole for arriving expatriates; a citadel surrounded by 
barbed wire where even internal access doors and lifts need to be operated 
Published as ‘Splendid isolation: dispatches from the most diverse region on earth’, in The 
Economist (online edition), http://www.economist.com/, 22 May 2009. © The Economist 
Newspaper Limited, London (2009).
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by card keys. The Cypriot owner of  the hotel was killed earlier this year by 
Port Moresby’s rascals, after he tried to run a road block. His mistake, so I 
am told, was not to follow the standard advice of  surrendering car, money 
and all other property to save his skin. The chief  of  police demanded that 
the people living in the nearby settlement surrender the culprits. When they 
did not, mobile forces razed their houses to the ground.
It is for this kind of  incident that Port Moresby has acquired a reputation 
as ‘the most unliveable city in the world’. Foreigners and wealthy Papua New 
Guineans inhabit fortified apartments on the top of  the hills open to the 
cooler sea breezes, hidden behind high fences bristling with razor wire and 
spy cameras. Private security guards are everywhere, and police armed with 
machine guns man key intersections around town. But is the threat to life 
and limb any greater than in Lagos, Baghdad or Caracas? I doubt it. And 
are global tastes so uniform as to allow the world’s capitals to be effortlessly 
scaled by their liveability? Port Moresby may be an eccentric choice, but it has 
its charms. It is an urban island in a sea of  rural villages. It is a headquarters 
of  government in a land where the state matters little. It is a magnet for the 
ambitious, the footloose and the renegade. It brings together peoples from 
across a country of  six million people that is so diverse as to be home to 12 
per cent of  the world’s living languages.
For those expatriates who speed in big four-wheel drives between their 
wire-encircled apartments and ‘fortress shit-scared’ (as the super-secure 
Australian High Commission compound is called), life outside the safety 
zones seems tough. For those of  a more adventurous disposition, Port 
Moresby has more to offer. And so do the remote hinterlands beyond and 
the scattered islands that lie northeastward of  the mainland into the Pacific 
Ocean. Besides, things are getting better in Port Moresby, so I am told. The 
streets are safer than they used to be, a minibus driver assures me, because 
the police now shoot to kill. And former student radical, Powes Parkop, 
has become governor of  the National Capital District. His ‘Yumi Lukautim 
Mosbi’ (We look after Port Moresby) campaign has helped to clean up the 
city streets and to restore some sense of  civic pride.
We are at the University of  Papua New Guinea. Deputy Prime Minister 
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Dr Puka Temu is speaking, articulately and sensibly. He says Papua New 
Guinea is subsidising the carbon emissions of  the rich countries, and that if  
they paid for this at today’s prices of  US$30 per tonne of  carbon dioxide, 
earnings would exceed the country’s receipts of  development aid. He is 
referring to the REDD scheme (reducing emissions from deforestation and 
degradation) under which industrialised nations that cannot meet carbon-
reduction targets can buy carbon credits from countries like PNG, which 
has the world’s third-largest intact tropical rainforest.
PNG is a leading member of  the ‘Coalition of  Rainforest Nations’, of  
which Dr Temu’s boss, Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare, is co-chair. At 
last year’s climate conference in Bali, coordinator of  the coalition, PNG’s 
Kevin Conrad, advanced the REDD plan for paying villagers to leave natural 
rainforests untouched, gaining global notoriety for challenging the USA to 
‘lead, follow or get out of  the way’. To preserve forests, Prime Minister 
Somare has set up the Office of  Climate Change and Environmental 
Sustainability (OCCES) which hopes to make intending traders register 
officially, so as to avoid the carbon cowboys striking lucrative deals with 
unsuspecting landowners. Oddly, other parts of  government are marketing 
rival carbon trading schemes, and the East Highlands Governor Malcolm 
Kela-Smith challenges the rights of  the OCCES to appropriate any earnings 
from land under customary tenure. Although keen to embrace potential 
carbon earnings from leaving forests untouched, many of  the ministers in 
Somare’s government have links with logging companies.
Alotau
It always rains in Milne Bay. Clouds hang over the high mountains on each 
side of  the 12-mile-long inlet, and the heavy rain seems to get pulled down 
into the bay upon which sits the provincial capital, Alotau. People from 
colder climates imagine day after day of  sunshine in the tropics, but anyone 
who has lived long in such parts knows that it rains often, long and hard. 
Two hundred inches a year in Milne Bay. What look like house plants in 
the frosty sitting rooms of  England soar upwards here as giant creepers 
climbing dank black tropical tree trunks. The grass squelches under foot as 
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if  the earth were a porous sponge. When sunshine comes, it thumps down 
on the moist ground, but the air still hangs heavy and humid as if  a reminder 
that the respite is only temporary. Rain also brings cool breezes, a relief  
from the thumping of  the sun. It drums down on the rooftops, drowning 
out the sound of  speech. It drenches all who dare step out to meet it.
It rained on the day the Japanese landed in Milne Bay. Twelve hundred 
troops from the 5th Sabeto and 5th Kure Special Naval Landing Forces 
came ashore on 25 August 1942 and within days their numbers had swelled 
to twice that size. They came to support the simultaneous overland Japanese 
assault through the interior across the Kokoda trail aimed at taking Port 
Moresby. Milne Bay sits on the southeasternmost tip of  mainland New 
Guinea, from where an airstrip might have allowed command of  the 
shipping lanes between Australia and America and enabled the bombing of  
Australia’s coastal cities. Japanese forces wanted to seize the Gili Gili airstrip 
but were met by fierce resistance from the Australian 61st battalion and 
punishing raids by Royal Australian Air Force Kittyhawk aircraft. Aircraft 
had to land on the inland runway in pools of  water, and the force of  rain 
and mud hit and damaged the flaps. Nevertheless, they managed to destroy 
the Daihatsu landing barges, ensuring slow Japanese movement by foot 
across the boggy terrain. The battle lasted 10 days, before the Japanese navy 
ordered a withdrawal. It was the first allied land victory in the Pacific War, 
and a triumph for Australia. The story is well told in Peter Brune’s A Bastard 
of  a Place—including accounts of  savage atrocities against innocent Papuans. 
Tours still escort Australian war veterans to revisit war sites and recall the 
action-packed moments of  their youth. A rusty anti-aircraft gun outside the 
airport terminal reminds you of  a time when landing here was not so safe.
Alotau is a port town from which vessels come and go to remote, scattered 
tropical islands stretching eastwards towards the Solomon Sea. What made 
it become the provincial capital in 1969 was the airstrip left behind by the 
Pacific War. Across the Pacific Islands, no subsequent generation has been 
able to match the airstrip construction activity stimulated by war. Nearly 
all the region’s airstrips were built back then. A flight from Alotau to 
Port Moresby takes around 45 minutes. But few want to see a road built 
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stretching the 370 kilometres westwards to the nation’s capital. It is not that 
people prefer isolation; there is frustration that the Irish company Digicel 
has not fulfilled on its promise to bring mobile telephone links to these parts 
and anger that the government will not let them have direct international 
flight links with Cairns, the northern Australian city less than a thousand 
kilometres to the south. It is because a road would facilitate easier linkages 
eastwards and encourage the spread of  Port Moresby’s rascals to relatively 
tranquil Milne Bay.
Goroka
Children throw pairs of  worn-out shoes up into the power cables here, 
which dangle aloft while the weather rots them away. The prank is to cause 
power outages so that when repairers come they can be bribed to lay illegal 
lines to houses. Trapping footwear in the overhead lines became a sport, 
with champions able to hurl trainers so that they spin by their laces around 
the lines and stick fast. Wires laden with mouldy shoes now stretch from 
post to post down the town streets. It looks like an elongated centipede 
wearing boots.
We are 1,600 metres above sea level, and you need a jumper. Water crashes 
down streams, giving the place an alpine feel. I’ve never been anywhere both 
alpine and tropical before, but it doesn’t seem a mismatch. Off  the edges 
of  the Papua New Guinea’s high, central mountain ranges, rivers loop down 
through virgin rain forests towards the coasts. From the air they look like 
children’s wiggly doodles, until they straighten and disgorge their loads of  
brown water out into the blue sea. Heavy rainfall in the interior gives the 
river water its earthy colour, but inland logging eases its removal of  the 
topsoil. Also inland, copper and gold mines jettison their tailings into the 
river systems poisoning the fish, for which a little compensation is paid to 
the cash-poor communities who inhabit the river banks. Maybe one day, the 
scruffy centipede will jump off  the highlands and paddle down river to call 
a halt to mining and logging.
People lived in splendid isolation in the highlands until missionaries, 
miners and kiaps (colonial officials) arrived in the 1920s and 1930s. The 
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whites found a million inhabitants, and the highlanders discovered iron 
tools to replace their stone implements. Although iron never travelled up 
the hidden and forgotten paths that connected hill dwellers to the coastal 
peoples, the sweet potato must have done so. No one knows how exactly 
it got here, only that it came from South America. It thrives at altitudes 
where the usual Pacific Island lowland staples like taro and cassava will not 
grow. Using surpluses of  sweet potatoes, highlanders could rear pigs, which 
were prized as symbols of  wealth and prestige. With these, they built a ‘big 
man’ culture of  accumulation, and pigs were also given as payments to allies 
in wartime. Tribal fighting continues up here, often entailing communal 
mobilisation around revenge killing. Electoral defeats also spark violence, 
and battles stemming from the last general election, in July 2007, are still 
raging here and there.
Today’s front page of  The National, one of  PNG’s daily newspapers, 
headlines ‘US$10 million lawsuit: tribesman sues New Yorker magazine’ 
and shows a picture of  Pulitzer prize-winning geographer Jared Diamond, 
author of  bestsellers like Guns, Germs, and Steel and Collapse. In an article for 
The New Yorker entitled ‘Vengeance is ours’, Mr Diamond reported PNG 
highlander Daniel Wemp’s tale of  avenging his uncle’s death by paralysing a 
man and of  six years of  tribal fighting which left 47 people dead. The events 
took place in the Southern Highlands, near Lake Kutubu. Mr Jared’s story is 
well told, a familiar type of  tale in the highlands. The war allegedly started 
because of  a foraging pig ruining a garden and mushroomed into communal 
warfare, entailing alliances between neighbouring villages and revenge killing 
on a scale outdoing anything in Aeschylus’s Orestia. The end of  the Handa 
vs. Ombal War, says Diamond believably, stemmed from the need to build 
common electoral alliances in the face of  an even greater threat from the 
neighbouring Huli peoples. The trouble is that Mr Wemp now says the 
story was untrue and that he has never stolen a pig, raped a woman or 
killed anyone. The revelations feature on the Stinkyjournalism.org website, 
run by the Art Science Research Laboratory’s Media Ethics Project, which 
dispatched researchers to the PNG highlands to check on Jared Diamond’s 
findings. They found the allegedly paralysed man to be fit and strong. If  Mr 
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Wemp and his lawyers get the US$10 million compensation, perhaps they 
will have found a sweeter than fictional revenge.
Madang
The first shades of  light appear in the night sky. It is ANZAC day in Madang, 
a day of  commemoration of  the Australia and New Zealand landing at 
Gallipoli on 25 April 1915. I am at the dawn ceremony. I can just make out 
what appears to be a huge, white bombshell with a flickering light at the top 
with its nose sticking into the ground. We are in a grassy field. It is literally 
spitting with rain, not drizzling. The emerging dawn light reveals a blotchy 
mix of  greys and whites in the cloud-covered sky, but you can feel confident 
that it will not pour—thank heavens, for I have no umbrella. It seems as if  
the clouds had already been squeezed nearly dry by a giant pair of  hands, so 
that all that is left is an irregular dripping. Flying foxes cartwheel above the 
nearby trees as if  spinning around on an invisible Ferris wheel. These giant 
fruit-eating bats give the town’s football team its name: the Madang Foxes. 
What were formerly the dark shapes of  assembling people are becoming 
faintly visible as they take their plastic seats. As the light brightens, so does 
the recognition: people turn to greet each other. The huge, white bombshell 
turns out to be the Australian Coastwatchers War Memorial, which doubles 
as a lighthouse.
Faintly visible shapes are sharpening in form. Brother Andrew, the vice-
principal at Madang’s Divine Word University, is instantly recognisable. He 
is the town’s most substantial figure, at least around the waist. He greets 
and walks with the smaller but better known Governor, Sir Arnold Amet, 
formerly Papua New Guinea Chief  Justice but since 2007 serving member 
of  parliament for Madang. Brother Andrew then turns to greet the Australian 
Defence Force’s Captain Gerard Kearns, who has flown in for the occasion. 
I wonder from where Australia gets all its captains? Canberra sends out 
military officers to every sizeable town in the southern hemisphere for 
ANZAC day. Perhaps there is a factory that churns them out by the dozen. 
Perhaps there is a mail order agency that delivers one to each distant Pacific 
Island once a year and then packs them away like Christmas decorations for 
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the next year’s celebrations. Brother Andrew introduces the captain to Sir 
Arnold. The captain permits a half-hearted and brisk handshake and then 
abruptly turns away, as if  following some routine program inserted in the 
factory. Sir Arnold justifiably looks a little offended.
The ceremonies start. There are prayers and readings, and the United 
Church Gospel Band strikes up a tune. Captain Kearns makes some 
perfunctory remarks, following the program on his computer chip. He talks 
of  wartime alliances and unbreakable bonds between Australia and PNG, 
and anticipates that these will continue into the future. Sir Arnold speaks 
more thoughtfully, for his people are present. Most are not sitting on the 
neatly ordered plastic chairs, where I can now see that the dignitaries have 
shirts and ties. (My own shorts and T-shirt having been exposed by the 
emerging light of  day.) More and more townsfolk have awoken and come 
out to stand and watch respectfully from around the perimeters of  the 
field. Sir Arnold talks about the war relics that were visible in his youth and 
conveys the moral closeness of  PNG’s learned elite to Australia. Over the 
years, Madang has become a more peaceful alternative to Port Moresby for 
foreign-financed civil society organisations, businesses and even some of  
the supranational organisations, but Sir Arnold indicates concern about the 
growth of  crime and the coming of  the rascals. He appeals to the community 
to take better care of  its youth. The captain, the governor and the priest lay 
wreaths, as does a naval officer from the Papua New Guinea Defence Forces 
with a brisk salute matching that of  Captain Kearns. Another Catholic priest, 
Brother Hugo Andrey takes a polished silver trumpet from a well-kept but 
aged and musty, black case and plays the mournful notes of  the last post. 
After a minute’s silence, he lifts the instrument again to sound the reveille. 
He returns awkwardly to his seat but with a smile of  relief, clearly happy at 
having again achieved an accomplishment that has been his for many years.
As we depart from the celebrations, a young man spins around with 
his middle finger pointed offensively upwards and shouts profanely for 
Australians to go home. It makes me wonder whether the captain factory, or 
more likely the Catholic priesthood, will be able to keep alliances between 
Australia and PNG alive in the future.
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Honiara
Our taxi skirts the potholes on the road into town from Henderson Airfield, 
the international gateway to the Solomon Islands. The driver is from the 
Lau Lagoon, on the neighbouring island of  Malaita, as is recognisable by 
his distinctive facial markings. We strike up a conversation. He once used 
all his savings to buy his own taxi, he says, but this was seized by heavily 
armed Malaitan militiamen who manned roadblocks and controlled the 
town during ‘the tensions’. Now he has to drive someone else’s car. The 
‘tensions’ he refers to occurred in 2000–03 after indigenous people from 
the island of  Guadalcanal threw out all the Malaitan settlers working in rural 
parts of  their island and sent them crowding back into the capital, Honiara. 
In response, Malaitan militants overthrew the government and blockaded 
the town, generating an exodus of  non-Malaitans out of  Honiara. The town 
severed itself  from the countryside. My taxi driver thought, as a Malaitan, he 
might earn protection under the post-coup order, but the militiamen soon 
started squabbling amongst themselves, and turned to internecine pillaging, 
plunder and killing. That’s when they seized his taxi. He yanks the steering 
wheel left to avoid a pothole, generating a loud, groaning sound from the 
vehicle’s knackered suspension. We drive on regardless.
On a clear day in eastern Honiara, you can gaze out across the sea and just 
pick out the dark mountains of  Malaita on the horizon. The militants who 
stole my taxi driver’s car were from the Kwara’ae region in the central part 
of  that island. His home is in the northeastern part, where people inhabit 
tiny artificial islands off  the mainland. He was brought up in Honiara and 
seldom visits Malaita. Things are better here in Honiara since the Australians 
arrived in 2003, he explains, you can now drive out safely again to the rural 
parts of  Guadalcanal. During the ‘tensions’, Alligator Creek—just beyond 
the eastern end of  Henderson Airfield—was a front line separating the 
Malaitan and Guadalcanal militants, who took pot-shots at each other with 
home-made guns that rarely hit their targets. Few Malaitans dared cross that 
line. 
Near the airport is the Guadalcanal Beach Resort, which has been turned 
into the main base for Australian soldiers and police. It is a sprawling and 
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heavily secured mass of  air-conditioned porto-cabins, an artificial island of  
a quite different sort to those in the Lau Lagoon. Owing to the Australian 
presence, the earlier exodus has been reversed and Honiara’s population has 
doubled in size, encouraging the town’s taxi drivers to put their vehicles back 
into service. We veer rightwards to avoid another giant cavity in the road. 
Somewhere hidden in the car’s interior, ball-bearings send out a shudder 
of  clicks as if  in protest at the harsh sunshine having melted away all their 
grease. We drive on regardless.
We cross the Lungga River, which marks the official boundary of  the 
Honiara Town Council area (as distinct from the wartime boundary out 
at Alligator Creek). Below the bridge, you can see cars with doors flung 
ajar being washed in the river, while their cushions dry in the sun on the 
stony riverbanks. Over recent years, saltwater crocodiles have grown in 
number along Guadalcanal’s coasts and, in the wet season, they swim up 
the rivers to places like this, occasionally catching people unawares. Before 
the tensions, they would have been shot by villagers, but with the coming of  
the Australians the guns have been confiscated. Wild boars have for similar 
reasons proliferated in the mountainous interior. Due to the absence of  
locally held weapons, Australian soldiers have assumed responsibility for 
culling the occasional killer croc, in one of  the many signs of  a mission creep 
that has seen the white man take charge of  many bits of  the government. 
At least there aren’t any Australian taxi drivers yet, we joke. My driver slams 
on the taxi’s ancient brakes to avoid a truck that suddenly veers leftwards 
straight in front of  us, provoking another spasm of  clunking from the taxi’s 
interior. We drive on regardless.
The truck is festooned with campaign posters and adorned with foliage. 
Young men hang off  its top, shrieking and yelping at passers-by. They 
are coming into Honiara after a day campaigning in the North-Eastern 
Guadalcanal by-election, where the sitting member Peter Shanel is trying 
to regain his seat. The counting of  ballots will take place at the Rove Police 
Club in town, with assistance from the Australian-funded ‘Machinery of  
Government’ program. Mr Shanel lost his seat after being imprisoned for 
nine months for stabbing a man who kicked his wife during a drunken brawl. 
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Whatever the verdict in the foreign-influenced courts of  law, people in rural 
Guadalcanal consider the stabbing justified by family honour. The next day 
we learn that Mr Shanel has been returned with an increased majority. Such 
incidents in the indigenous interior disturb the operation of  the Australian-




Vanuatu’s recent economic success: lessons for the 
Pacific
The Pacific Islands Forum meets in Cairns this week. If  the leaders of  
the Pacific’s island economies want to know what needs to be done to lift 
the traditionally low levels of  economic growth seen in the region, they 
would do well to ponder the recent growth record of  one the forum’s own 
members, Vanuatu.
Prior to 2004, Vanuatu, like many other Pacific island countries, had 
a long-term rate of  economic growth little different from its population 
growth, about 2.5 per cent. But economic growth in Vanuatu took off  in 
2004, and growth for the 2004–08 period has averaged 6.6 per cent.
Due to the global recession, short-term growth prospects are uncertain. 
But so far this year, tourism growth has accelerated, not declined.
Vanuatu’s growth acceleration is important for the Pacific. It dispels the 
myth that the Pacific island economies cannot grow, and it confirms the 
This article draws on the findings of  a Pacific Institute of  Public Policy brief  on Vanuatu 
written jointly with Nikunj Soni, which can be found at http://www.pacificpolicy.org. 
Posted on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 4 August 2009.
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range of  factors which are important for growth in the Pacific—a dynamic 
private sector, active land markets, deregulation, and macroeconomic and 
social stability.
Vanuatu’s recent growth has been led by the private sector, not by foreign 
aid. Foreign aid is no higher this decade than last.
Tourism and construction have been the two main growth areas for 
Vanuatu’s private sector. The average annual growth in visitor arrivals by air 
into Vanuatu was 12.5 per cent in the period 2004 to 2008, compared to only 
1.8 per cent in the period 1995 to 2003. Cruise-ship visitors to Vanuatu have 
doubled since 2003. The private sector is reported to be investing heavily in 
expanding hotel capacity.
Construction growth increased from 7 per cent in 2004 to 25 per cent in 
2008. Vanuatu’s construction boom has been driven by tourism growth and 
by expatriates and nationals building houses.
Vanuatu’s upsurge in tourism and construction would not have been 
possible without an active land market. Customary land in Vanuatu can be 
leased for periods of  up to 75 years. Most of  Vanuatu’s main island, Efate, 
has been marketed under 75-year leases, and the land markets in the outer 
islands are now becoming active as well. Vanuatu’s land market is not well 
regulated and disputes over ownership are common. There is also discontent 
that landowners are not benefiting from subsequent subdivisions and 
development. These issues need to be addressed since they raise important 
questions of  equity and may lead to a social backlash, but they are very 
different issues to those which arise in many other Pacific island countries 
where the land market is dormant.
Vanuatu has also benefited from deregulation. Its opening up of  the 
telecom sector in 2008 led to an increase in mobile subscribers from 23,000 
to 100,000 in the space of  just 6 months. Air travel between Australia and 
Vanuatu grew by 19 per cent the year after Pacific Blue started flying to 
Vanuatu in 2004 from Brisbane, thereby breaking Air Vanuatu’s monopoly. 
A further boost to tourism came in October 2008 when Pacific Blue started 
to provide competition on the Sydney–Port Vila route. Flights from Sydney 
to Port Vila cost little more than flights from Sydney to Cairns. Vanuatu is 
224 Capturing the Year — 2009
now also served by Air New Zealand, Air Pacific and Solomon Airlines.
Vanuatu has enjoyed macroeconomic stability in recent years, with 
relatively low inflation and a slight fiscal surplus in recent years. As many 
Pacific economies have discovered, however, this is a necessary rather than 
sufficient condition for growth.
Finally, social stability underlies Vanuatu’s recent success. Vanuatu suffered 
from a fiscal crisis in the late 1990s, two years of  negative economic growth 
in 2001 and 2002, and intense political instability mixed with diplomatic 
tensions in 2004. Throughout this difficult period, violence was limited. 
Vanuatu has a tradition of  political instability—with nine prime ministers 
between 1995 and 2004. Perhaps the relative political stability enjoyed since 
then—with a single prime minister from the end of  2004 to the end of  
2008—has helped promote growth.
More fundamentally, Vanuatu’s social stability, and its ability to make 
transitions of  power peacefully—national elections in 2008 resulted in 
another change of  government—have provided a supportive environment 
for economic activity, including by enhancing the country’s reputation 
among potential tourists.
Social stability is a key factor behind Vanuatu’s ability to attract and retain 
expatriates, who bring investment and specialist skills to the economy. Its 
lack of  an income tax is also an attraction for expatriates, though its role 
as an offshore financial centre seems to have played little role in its recent 
growth.
Vanuatu, like other Melanesian countries, has traditionally lacked access 
to foreign labour markets. However, Vanuatu was included in, and in fact 
is the biggest beneficiary of, the Recognized Seasonal Employer program, 
which provides temporary farm employment in New Zealand. Over 1,700 
ni-Vanuatu participated in the scheme in its first year in 2008. Vanuatu has 
also been included in Australia’s Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme, 
which commenced this year.
Vanuatu’s future is by no means assured. All small island economies are 
easily destabilised and Vanuatu faces a range of  challenges. But it is time to 
recognise that Vanuatu has good prospects for sustained, rapid growth. For 
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five years, Vanuatu has enjoyed broad-based, private-sector-led and relatively 
rapid growth in excess of  5.5 per cent. Tourism, construction and seasonal 
migration will continue to offer opportunities for new employment, not 
only for Port Vila but also for the Outer Islands.






‘If  they don’t rise to this challenge, they are finished,’ stated the Pakistani 
defence analyst Talat Masood of  the country’s political elites, in response to 
the horrific bombing of  the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on 20 September 
2008 as guests were celebrating the end of  a day of  fasting for the holy month 
of  Ramadan. Never have the effects of  terrorism been so directly felt in the 
heartland of  the Pakistan establishment, and never have the challenges for 
the government of  Pakistan in crafting a response been so difficult. The 
Marriott bombing came at a time when Pakistan’s own position as a frontline 
state in the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ appeared increasingly shaky, 
both because of  mounting anti-Americanism in Pakistan and because of  
Pakistan’s own perverse involvement in hosting terrorist groups, which had 
led to a number of  US military strikes against targets in Pakistan’s Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas.
First published in The Diplomat, November/December 2008, pp. 34–6.
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Unfortunately, the situation is already so dire that the available options 
are all beset with significant problems of  their own. The global economic 
crisis has also engulfed Pakistan, pushing its economy to the precipice of  
bankruptcy.
Furthermore, the crisis in Pakistan, with all its implications for the 
wider region, comes at a time when the NATO mission in neighbouring 
Afghanistan seems increasingly under stress, when major powers are 
entangled in managing the effects of  a daunting economic crisis, and when 
the United States is in the process of  putting in place a new president, who 
will not, however, take up office until January 2009.
The roots of  Pakistan’s problems can be traced to the 1970s. The loss of  
East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971 set off  a chain of  events that culminated 
in the seizure of  power by General Zia ul-Haq in 1977. In contrast to many 
of  his peers in the Pakistan military establishment, Zia was a devoutly 
religious figure and took the fateful step of  permitting two religious groups, 
the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat, to proselytise within the ranks 
of  the military.
While Zia was briefly an international pariah following the 1979 execution 
of  the former leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Soviet invasion of  Afghanistan 
in December 1979 brought him back to international respectability: 
Pakistan became the frontline state through which international assistance, 
principally from the United States, was channelled to the Afghan resistance 
known as the Mujahideen. However, there was a lethal twist to this as well. 
Pakistan had long had poor relations with Afghanistan as a result of  an 1893 
boundary demarcation between Afghanistan and British India, which had 
split the Pashtun ethnic group. Zia was resolute that this dispute should not 
be revived.
As a result, Pakistan was determined that aid for the Mujahideen supplied 
through its own Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) should go less 
to nationalist groups or to Mujahideen commanders with strong bases of  
support, such as Ahmad Shah Massoud in northern Afghanistan, and more 
to radical religious parties, like the Hezb-e Islami of  Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, 
that were very much the clients of  Pakistani patrons and therefore unlikely to 
228 Capturing the Year — 2009
deal amicably with Pakistan’s arch-enemy, India. This philosophy ultimately 
led Pakistan to promote the Taliban as successor-client to Hekmatyar’s Hezb 
once it became clear after 1992 that Hekmatyar was incapable of  seizing and 
occupying significant territory and could only act as a ‘spoiler’.
The Taliban, capitalising on their support from Pakistan and the exhaustion 
of  other Afghan forces, succeeded in occupying Kabul in September 1996, 
but .remained international outcasts, largely because of  their ultraconservative 
approach to gender issues. Their ‘support’ substantially collapsed after 
September 2001, as soon as it became clear to ordinary Afghans, who had 
suffered under Taliban rule, that the Taliban could be overthrown.
However, while the Taliban regime was obliterated by Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the Taliban themselves managed to make their escape. 
As Ahmed Rashid has brilliantly documented in his recent book Descent into 
Chaos, the top leadership headed for the Pakistani city of  Quetta, and many 
foot-soldiers followed; some were even evacuated in a Pakistani airlift from 
the besieged pocket of  Kunduz in northern Afghanistan, which the Bush 
administration naively allowed to proceed.
This set the scene for a revival of  the Taliban in the future, and from 
2003 Taliban activities began to increase, although it was only in 2007 and 
2008 that the seriousness of  the problem of  Taliban resurgence began to 
register in Western capitals given the huge distraction created by the 2003 
US invasion of  Iraq. Even President Musharraf  admitted Pakistan’s role: in 
a speech in Kabul in August 2007, he candidly stated, ‘There is no doubt 
Afghan militants are supported from Pakistani soil. The problem that you 
have in your region is because support is provided from our side.’
But in the meantime, trouble was brewing in Pakistan as well. The risks 
of  promoting a group such as the Taliban were always high. In 1999, not 
long before the coup in Pakistan that brought General Pervez Musharraf  
to power, a senior Western official spoke bluntly to then Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif, saying, ‘You are sending these young men into Afghanistan 
telling them that Ahmad Shah Massoud is not a good Muslim. What makes 
you think that they will not come back here saying that you are not a good 
Muslim?’ Massoud was assassinated by al-Qaeda agents on 9 September 
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2001. Benazir Bhutto, whose administration had backed the Taliban in 1994, 
met a similar fate in the Liaqat Bagh in Rawalpindi in December 2007. The 
prime suspects in her murder were the Pakistani offshoots of  the Taliban.
The slaying of  Benazir Bhutto was one of  the most dramatic events in a 
slide which began with the move by Musharraf  on 9 March 2007 to remove 
the highly respected Chief  Justice of  Pakistan and culminated in Musharraf ’s 
own resignation on 18 August 2008, followed by the installation of  Benazir’s 
widower, Asif  Ali Zardari, as president.
The intervening months saw a popular middle-class movement of  
lawyers and intellectuals take to the streets to challenge the assault on a 
judiciary that was finally moving to give meaning to the rule of  law. They 
also saw a crisis in July 2007 as force was used to evict militants from the 
so-called ‘Red Mosque’ (Lal Masjid) in downtown Islamabad; and a rolling 
crisis as militant Pakistanis and sundry other extremists associated with the 
Pakistani Tehreek-e-Taliban hit targets in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA) and, increasingly, in settled parts of  the Northwest Frontier 
Province, driving many thousands from their homes. Finally, elections on 
18 February 2008 delivered a crushing defeat to Musharraf ’s supporters, 
setting the scene for the slow death of  his regime. But through this period, 
one other phenomenon of  note occurred: a steady climb in popular anti-
Americanism, as the Bush administration sought to stand by Musharraf  as 
Pakistanis increasingly abandoned him in disgust. This has left the United 
States in the post-Musharraf  era with a significant burden of  past failure to 
overcome.
Radicalism is not deeply grounded in the general population in Pakistan, 
as the February 2008 election clearly showed. It is nonetheless a very serious 
threat to stability, since Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state and a number of  
key institutions such as the ISI have been deeply penetrated, something 
which the recent appointment of  the reputedly moderate Major-General 
Shuja Pasha as ISI director-general can only begin to correct. The terrorist 
attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul on 7 July 2008, in which US agencies 
reportedly concluded the ISI was implicated, highlights the seriousness of  
this problem.
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With its key intelligence agencies compromised, Pakistan is not only a 
questionable partner in the struggle against the Afghan Taliban, but poorly 
placed to deal with its own Taliban problem. In Washington, this has 
spawned an important but as yet unresolved debate on how both Pakistan 
and Afghanistan should be handled. Increasingly, policymakers see the 
situations in the two countries as inextricably intertwined, but where that 
leads in policy terms remains contested.
How, then, might Pakistan proceed? The sharp rise in anti-Americanism in 
the recent past has somewhat changed the context in which outside powers 
must deal with Pakistan. The risk it creates is that public pressure on the new 
authorities under President Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf  Raza Gilani 
to move promptly against the terrorists and their sanctuaries in the FATA 
may prove counterproductive, simply weakening the new rulers’ positions.
However, the story does not end there, because across the border in 
Afghanistan, ordinary people are increasingly frustrated that they run the 
risk of  being killed as collateral damage in attacks on the Taliban, while 
Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan are left largely untouched. There is therefore 
a limit to the freedom that the US and its allies can safely leave to Pakistan 
to sort out its problems—for ‘its’ problems are grave problems for the wider 
world as well.
The best way to proceed is in the form of  discreet but intense pressure on 
Pakistan, perhaps through a process of  engagement that seeks to mobilise 
the support of  Pakistan’s long-standing friend China to arrest the Afghan 
Taliban leaders and their supporters in Quetta. This would not end the 
insurgency in Afghanistan, but it would send a strong signal that the winds 
of  change were beginning to blow through the region, and it would also 
position Pakistan’s authorities to address their own Taliban problem from a 
position of  greater perceived strength.
In the longer run, there is much to be said for the pursuit of  an integrated 
approach to the interlocking security dilemmas in South and West Asia that 
have so long been overlooked by key actors in the wider world. But most 
of  all, it is necessary to appreciate the seriousness of  the challenge that the 
deteriorating situation in Pakistan poses. It is the first nuclear-armed state 
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that is also a threshold failed state, and in a profoundly stressed region. 
Given its parlous condition, merely hoping that things will improve is not 




Inside Pakistan’s Jalozai refugee camp
Jalozai refugee camp is once again packed with destitute people. The camp 
has housed waves of  Afghan refugees since the years of  Soviet occupation. 
Last year, the Pakistani authorities closed the camp, ordering its inhabitants—
some of  whom had lived there for decades—to either return to Afghanistan 
or to relocate to other settlements in Pakistan. Dwellings in the camp were 
demolished, and an era apparently ended.
Now, as the camp refills, this time with Pakistani refugees fleeing the conflict 
in Swat, another tragic era begins. Last month, the Pakistani parliament passed 
a regulation allowing the Taliban to administer its own form of  Sharia law 
in the areas under its control, in return for a ceasefire. However, the Taliban 
were emboldened rather than constrained by this attempted settlement and 
expanded their operations ever closer to Islamabad.
For years, the Pakistani military has used these militants as its proxies 
in maintaining its influence inside Afghanistan and in the seemingly never-
ending confrontations with India. Pakistan has been positioned as a valuable 
ally in the ‘war on terror’ (and has received lavish amounts of  US aid 
accordingly), but its political and military establishment has played both sides, 
Posted as ‘Inside Pakistan’s Jalozai refugee camp: an eyewitness account’, Crikey, http://
www.crikey.com.au, 11 May 2009.
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collaborating with the same forces that it was supposedly confronting.
Now under pressure both from spiralling numbers of  terrorist attacks 
within Pakistan and from international demands to take substantial measures 
to combat terrorism, the Pakistani military has entered into a full-scale 
conflict with its former proxies. The Pakistani prime minister has declared 
that the Swat operation is a struggle for the nation’s very survival.
Watching the new reports of  hundreds of  thousands of  internally 
displaced people (some of  them Afghan refugees who have now been 
displaced yet again) seeking shelter in Jalozai, I recall visiting the camp in 
2000 and 2001 to interview its previous inhabitants.
I remember the stories of  Taliban atrocities, the mourning for lost farms 
and gardens full of  grapes. I remember the ubiquitous sound of  children 
coughing. I remember the brick kilns in the area, where many of  the refugees, 
including young children, worked as bonded labourers. I remember the boy 
who spoke in a tone of  dizzied fantasy of  one day having ‘all the milk he 
could drink’.
And I remember meeting Maryam Marao, back in Peshawar. Maryam was 
an Afghan village woman whose daughter had been evacuated to Pakistan 
for medical treatment after she was injured when the village of  Karam was 
hit by an American airstrike, during the weeks after 9/11. Maryam heard the 
blast in the middle of  the night:
We thought it was an earthquake. We could see it from our village. Everyone 
rushed to Karam. Five in my daughter’s house were killed. Two children, two 
young women, and one old man…The Americans should know they acted 
wrongly. They have killed a lot of  very poor people. In every home in Karam, 
there are at least one or two dead.
Today, many innocent people are again being killed, maimed and driven from 
their homes. Pakistan’s military establishment has benefited for decades from 
Pakistan’s position as a ‘frontline state’, first in the war on communism, then 
in the ‘war on terror’.
Now the frontline has come home and the military—with much talk 
from Washington about how Pakistan is illustrating (at last) its seriousness in 
tackling Taliban jihadists—has turned against its own citizens the firepower 
that it has accumulated over years of  US largesse. A military that has always 
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envisaged its battlefield as a confrontation with the Indian military is now 
attempting to fight a counter-insurgency on its own territory, with its own 
civilians in the crossfire.
Pakistan’s military budget always took precedence over spending on health 
and education. As government services withered away, Islamist movements 
moved in to fill the gap, winning hearts and minds in the process. Those 
same movements will be mobilising to provide services to the displaced 
refugees from Swat (as, of  course, are the various international agencies—
but demand seems likely to outstrip supply) and to tap into their resentment 
against the forces that drove them from their homes. Yes, the refugees may 
resent the Taliban, but they despise being conscripted as ‘collateral damage’ 
by an army supposed to be protecting them from the Taliban.
The crisis in Pakistan is the result of  decades of  shortsightedness and 
opportunism—by successive Pakistani military and civilian governments, by 
one US administration after another. There are no easy solutions. But killing 







Papua New Guinea: from economic boom to gloom?
Papua New Guinea had another interesting year in 2008. The first half  of  
the year saw economic growth remain strong as the country continued to 
benefit from yet another boom in the price of  its commodity exports. High 
resource prices underpinned a significant expansion in the manufacturing, 
construction and agriculture sectors. Towards the middle of  the year, 
however, poor monetary responses to a prolonged growth in domestic 
liquidity, coupled with a continued strong external sector, meant that 
inflationary pressures began to increase, with inflation rising to 13.5 per cent 
in September 2008.
September, of  course, also marked the onset of  the global financial crisis. 
Barring a couple of  jitters on the PoMEX, PNG’s economy weathered 
the direct impacts of  the crisis relatively unscathed. In large part this was 
Posted on East Asia Forum, 9 January 2009; reprinted as ‘From economic boom to gloom?’ 
in East Asia Forum Quarterly, April–June 2009.
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because of  the healthy supply of  foreign exchange reserves and domestic 
bank liquidity built up over previous years which gave the financial sector 
sufficient flexibility to cope with any adjustment costs.
The flow-on effects of  the crisis have led to a large downturn in the price 
of  many of  PNG’s key commodity items which had been driving revenue 
and output growth. This has had an immediate impact on the government’s 
fiscal position with the 2009 budget predicting a 25 per cent overall decline 
in domestic tax revenue.
In last year’s PNG Economic Update, Bob Warner and Eric Omuru 
warned that PNG would one day face this situation, highlighting the need for 
commodity-boom revenues to be invested in productivity-enhancing sectors 
which can generate long-term economic benefits for the country. The global 
financial crisis appears to have brought that day to the present. The question 
is, however, has PNG made the requisite reforms and investments in human 
and physical capital to withstand a global economic downturn? Or will this 
commodity boom follow the path of  previous decades and be followed by 
an economic bust?
Unlike previous booms, the government has a large supply of  unspent 
windfall revenues which it will be able to use to maintain expenditure levels 
at commodity boom levels for a number of  years. Indeed, this will be the 
case in 2009 with the Budget foreshadowing a PGK600 million drawdown 
from Trust. Perhaps the most important difference between this and past 
bust cycles is the prospect of  the ExxonMobil LNG Project. In the event 
that this project comes on stream, and this is looking increasingly likely, 
the nature and structure of  the PNG economy will fundamentally change. 
Although weaknesses in these calculations exist, ExxonMobil modelling 
predicts that the size of  the PNG economy will more than double over the 
medium term, rising in real terms from PGK8.65 billion in 2006 to PGK18.2 
billion. Oil and gas exports would increase more than fourfold, with the 
LNG project contributing an additional PGK11.4 billion, compared to total 
PNG oil and gas exports of  PGK2.6 billion in 2006.
Significant reforms have been made this year to the system of  
intergovernmental financing. Following reforms to the Organic Law on 
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Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments in July, new measures 
were introduced in the 2009 budget to reduce the difference between each 
provincial government’s service delivery costs and the amount of  revenue 
which they receive. This is a positive step forward as continued progress on 
this front, combined with improved accountability mechanisms, will bring 
provinces to a similar level of  fiscal capacity to meet the costs of  delivering 
a comparable set of  basic services.
This optimism does mask some important challenges facing the country 
over coming years. The onset of  the LNG project will create classic ‘Dutch 
disease’ effects and put further pressure on the rural sector, which creates 
wealth and livelihoods for the vast majority of  Papua New Guineans. The 
massive growth in output is also likely to spur on more growth in domestic 
liquidity and inflation. Again, this will disproportionately impact on the 
welfare of  the poor.
More fundamentally, the LNG Project is likely to perpetuate what is 
already a highly commodity-dependent economy. This has diverted, and is 
likely to continue to divert, much needed attention and focus away from 
more important economic challenges such as lowering the costs of  the 
PNG’s pervasively expensive business and investment environment. Some 
progress was made in the airlines sector this year with the entrance of  a 
Virgin Blue/Airlines PNG partnership dramatically lowering the cost of  
international flights. Nevertheless, national investment policies continue to 
be dominated by subsidies, concessions and monopoly trading rights. As a 
result, PNG fell back another 9 places in the 2009 World Bank cost of  doing 
business survey, now ranking 91st out of  121 developing countries.
Further microeconomic reform is needed if  PNG is to set itself  on a 
long-term sustainable growth path.
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13 January 2009
THE NATIONAL
rOCHELLE BALL ANd NICOLE HALEY
International labour mobility: opportunities and 
challenges for PNG
Papua New Guinea stands ready to embrace international labour mobility 
as a means for creating new opportunities and needed solutions to the 
intractable issues of  widespread poverty.
While labour migration between Australia and Pacific Island Countries 
(PICS) makes sense, making the system work for all stakeholders poses 
significant short and longer-term challenges. These opportunities and 
related challenges need to be carefully thought through at the national 
level; decisions need to be made concerning future development options—
including community involvement at the local level; and government policy 
needs to be carefully deliberated and developed. A major policy challenge 
that accompanies international labour mobility is the creation of  governance 
mechanisms that are simultaneously responsive to the needs of  PNG’s 
citizens and which meet PNG’s international obligations.
This article seeks to contribute to this discussion and responds to The 
National editorial piece, ‘Is the list for seasonal work ready?’ It begins to tease 
out some of  the complex issues that Papua New Guinea needs to grapple 
with quickly in order to make international labour mobility a success.
Background
Australia announced in August 2008 that PNG is one of  four PICS (Kiribati, 
Tonga, Vanuatu and PNG) selected to be involved in a Pilot Labour Mobility 
Program. This announcement was widely welcomed after many years of  
lobbying. Workers from the first three countries will arrive in January 2009. 
First published in The National (Papua New Guinea), 13 January 2009.
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Australia-PNG arrangements for the pilot are due to be finalised by April, 
with the first workers arriving in October 2009. There will be an upper limit 
of  650 PNG workers over the three year Pilot.
Selecting the right people is critical
The Australian pilot scheme will involve people working in the horticulture 
industry for up to seven months. Workers will need to be suited to this kind 
of  work, physically fit and agriculturally skilled. We note that there has been 
some discussion that this scheme might help solve the problem of  PNG’s 
unemployed school leavers and disaffected youth more generally. However, 
are unemployed school leavers the most appropriate people to be sending? 
Will they ‘sit down good’ and will they, after 10 or 12 years of  schooling, have 
the skills, and/or resolve, to work long hours, doing repetitive agricultural 
work.
Experience elsewhere suggests that a high level of  maturity is essential 
to the success of  the scheme and to maximise the benefits for families and 
communities. For example, the average age of  the workers from Vanuatu 
selected to work in New Zealand under their seasonal labour mobility 
program was 35 years. Most were married with two to three children.
It is essential that PNG select the right people from the outset. The 
international labour supply market is highly competitive. The pilot provides 
the opportunity for PNG to establish itself  as a reliable supplier of  workers. 
Sending inappropriate workers could jeopardise PNG’s chances of  longer-
term involvement in any expanded program or in related programs in other 
countries, especially if  other PICS get it right.
Maximising the benefits
For Papua New Guinea to maximise the benefits presented by the Australian 
pilot there are several issues that warrant critical attention immediately.
Contributing to development
Labour mobility provides PNG with new development opportunities. Failure 
to consciously direct the process could see these opportunities wasted, and 
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inequity/security tensions increased.
For example, seasonal labour mobility provides the opportunity to 
contribute towards local-level development and to lessen the serious levels 
of  poverty that affect many Papua New Guinean communities. This will not 
happen if  people living in remote rural areas are denied access to the scheme. 
PNG needs to develop policy concerning which regions/communities are 
given the opportunity to engage in this scheme and where workers are 
selected from. Getting the selection process right is therefore critical.
By prioritising districts to recruit from, this scheme could help to address 
historical development inequities, many of  which are contributing to 
ongoing tension and conflict. The labour mobility program has the potential 
to succeed where successive governments and bilateral programs have failed. 
Early indications from Vanuatu suggest that involvement in such schemes 
may alleviate poverty more effectively than aid.
The Vanuatu experience suggests that the involvement of  local NGOs has 
contributed to the scheme’s early success. Vanuatu relied on licensed private 
sector recruiters who worked in consultation with chiefs, church leaders and 
local NGOs. Communities oversaw the selection process and developed 
strategies to maximise the flow of  remittances back into the community, 
through supporting education and community funds. A government-directed 
worker recruitment scheme could similarly incorporate these community-
based engagement models in the PNG context.
PNG would do well to learn from the Vanuatu experience. Dame 
Carol Kidu has noted the disconnect that exists between government and 
communities and the need for a national policy framework on Integrated 
Community Development. A properly managed framework linking 
government, NGOs and local communities will be central to the success of  
the labour mobility program.
We strongly urge the PNG government to include the Department of  
Social Welfare and Community Development in its whole-of-government 
approach to labour mobility. We would also urge them to adopt a policy that 
targets workers from the most disadvantaged districts in order to maximise 
development potential. In doing so, they might adopt a long-term approach 
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that is accompanied by the necessary supportive measures to ensure its 
success.
Whilst it might be initially tempting to ignore or delay consideration of  
the bigger-picture issues and select workers only from urban centres, this 
would be foolish. If  recruitment is biased towards major urban areas, this 
will exacerbate regional inequalities, further accelerate urbanisation and 
compound urban unrest.
PNG will also need to decide how best to incorporate labour mobility 
into development strategies. Failure to properly address issues concerning 
equity of  access could see PNG missing an important opportunity to use 
this scheme to really impact on the many development issues that beset this 
country.
The international community will be watching how PNG engages with 
this opportunity and how effectively it works through the complex issues 
arising from this new level of  international engagement.
Developing national infrastructure to support labour mobility
To be granted a visa, prospective workers will need to have a passport, a 
job offer, a return air ticket and to have undergone the necessary health and 
character checks.
Anyone who has tried to obtain a PNG passport in recent years will know 
how difficult this is. There are countless stories of  people who have attended 
the immigration office at Waigani day after day, and sometimes for several 
months, before obtaining a passport. Often people are turned away if  they 
do not possess an airline ticket. But what employer is going to supply a ticket 
to a prospective worker on the off-chance they will be issued with a passport, 
and how many unemployed/rural Papua New Guineans can afford to travel 
to Port Moresby, buy a return ticket to Australia and spend an indefinite 
amount of  time attempting to navigate a moribund bureaucracy?
Applying for a passport or police check requires a birth certificate. Obtaining 
a birth certificate is often problematic, as the majority of  births, deaths and 
marriages in PNG are never formally registered. These disorganised, slow 
and often circular procedures require immediate overhaul. Organising the 
documentation side of  things stretched Vanuatu’s institutional capacity to its 
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limits. Vanuatu has responded successfully to the challenge. Nine hundred 
and fifty workers gained employment in the New Zealand Pilot.
There are also the issues of  cost and access. People living in Port Moresby 
are privileged in both respects. Other countries with established labour 
mobility programs, such as the Philippines, have facilitated regional access by 
setting up one-stop regional document processing centres, enabling people 
throughout the country to access international employment.
Obtaining work overseas also requires significant capital investment 
(passport, birth and marriage certificates, ticket, health and character checks, 
agent fees) well beyond the capacity of  ordinary households. In Vanuatu 
upfront costs typically amounted to around PGK2000, not including agent 
fees. In order to facilitate equitable access to New Zealand’s Recognised 
Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme the Vanuatu government provided short-
term loans to workers. This meant that people from some of  the poorer 
islands have been able to access the scheme.
PNG should seriously consider developing a highly regulated scheme to 
ensure equity of  access and to help mitigate the likelihood that unscrupulous 
agents and potential traffickers gain a foothold in the market. Agent fees 
could see upfront costs significantly inflated. To ensure that families/
communities reap the benefits of  international labour mobility, bureaucratic 
procedures need to be streamlined and local infrastructure enhanced to 
enable prospective workers to apply and undergo all necessary procedures 
in all major regional centres.
Another issue of  concern for workers and governments alike is the safe 
and cost effective transfer of  remittances. Moves to establish mobile phone 
banking are welcomed as this will broaden access and diminish the likelihood 
of  theft and/or illegal transfers, which would leave workers extremely 
vulnerable. Further roll-out of  mobile phone infrastructure should be 
hastened in view of  increasing local and international labour mobility.
Avoiding the dangers
We have noted the current difficulties obtaining official documents. Given 
these, there is potential for document fraud and other forms of  illegality 
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to proliferate. This is an enormous issue for national and international 
governance. Even before the Australian scheme was announced many 
people in PNG had fallen victim to unscrupulous agents.
It is essential the PNG government quickly develop robust licensing 
mechanisms and advertise names of  illegal operators. A well-regulated 
system requires a clear government commitment to provide up-to-date 
information throughout the country. Experience elsewhere has shown that 
NGOs and civil society can play a key role in recruitment, in advocating 
workers’ rights and in government accountability.
Although PNG is to be given preferential access to the Australian labour 
market, it must not become complacent. Labour-receiving governments 
may well decide to expand labour market access to other countries with 
highly developed labour supply systems. A recent review of  the RSE scheme 
revealed that more than 20 per cent of  workers had been recruited from 
Southeast Asian countries. We understand that China is seeking access to 
Australia’s labour markets.
If  international labour mobility is to be a national priority then we strongly 
encourage PNG to quickly develop recruitment and document verification 
systems that meet world’s best practice in order to secure international 
market access.
One final area of  concern is proper health screening of  workers, 
particularly for communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV/
AIDS. PNG is only one of  three countries in the Asia Pacific Region with 
a generalised HIV/AIDS epidemic. If  infected workers are permitted entry 
to Australia, there is potential for HIV transmission. If  this were to happen 
there is real potential for a backlash against Papua New Guinean workers 
and souring of  relations between the two countries.
Conclusion
Delaying the arrival of  the first PNG workers until October 2009 provides 
PNG with the opportunity to establish robust recruitment procedures, 
efficient health care checks and passport and visa documentation services to 
facilitate developing a ‘worker-ready’ pool of  workers.
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Labour mobility not only offers PNG the opportunity to review its 
medium and long-term development strategies but offers communities 
real opportunities to own and participate in national development. Strong 




THE PHILIPPINES ANd JAPAN IN EAST ASIA ANd THE WOrLd
PAUL d. HUTCHCrOFT
‘Getting Our Act Together’?
Almost 15 years ago, in November 1994, the New York-based Asia 
Society and the Makati-based Asian Institute of  Management (AIM) met 
in Washington DC to launch a multi-year project entitled ‘Focus on the 
Philippines’. Coming just two years after the departure of  US military bases 
from the Philippines, the goal was to renew dialogue and promote a new 
post-bases foundation for healthier bilateral ties.
Over lunch, Nicholas Platt—the former ambassador to the Philippines 
who was at that time president of  the Asia Society—introduced the historian 
David Joel Steinberg as keynote speaker. With Platt nodding approvingly in the 
Brief  reflections presented on 20 March 2009 at ‘The Philippines and Japan in East 
Asia and the World: Identity, Images, and Roles’, a conference of  the University of  the 
Philippines Asian Center and the Japan Foundation, Makati City, Philippines. Published as 
‘“Getting our act together”? Assessing the implications of  Philippine politics and political 
economy on Philippine foreign policy’, in The Philippines and Japan in East Asia and the 
World, Aileen S. P. Baviera and Rowena R. Pangilinan (eds), Quezon City: University of  the 
Philippines Asian Center/Japan Foundation, 2009, pp. 24–7.
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background, Steinberg began his speech with the following proclamation:
If  the colonial era in the Philippines ended on July 4, 1946, the date on which 
formal sovereignty was transferred from the metropolitan power to the newly 
independent nation, what has often been called the ‘neoimperial’ era ended 
when the United States brought down the flag for the last time over the vast 
naval and air station at Subic Bay on November 24, 1992.
Going on to note the ‘profound asymmetry in the Philippine-American 
relationship’, Steinberg concluded with a call for moving beyond the 
patronising tone of  ‘little brown brothers’ (coined early in the twentieth 
century) to the establishment of  ‘a genuinely adult relationship’—one that 
acknowledges a shared past of  kinship ties, ‘[celebrates] the present, and 
[builds] a mutually beneficial future’.*
In this new post-bases environment, there was a growing sense that the 
Philippines was facing tough new imperatives. In the words of  the head of  
the AIM Policy Forum, historian Edilberto C. de Jesus, the country needed 
‘to reconcile conflicting political interests and to cope with an increasingly 
competitive economic environment’. Drawing on the previous year’s theme 
of  the Philippine Chamber of  Commerce and Industry, de Jesus spoke of  
the need for ‘Getting Our Act Together’, with what he called ‘the unfortunate 
acronym GOAT’.†
This was, indeed, a time in which there seemed to be substantial progress 
in getting the country’s act together. As the security umbrella was lifted, 
Filipinos were taking a closer look at their neighbours and discovering how 
much the lost decade of  the 1980s (with a decline in real per capita income 
of  7.2 per cent) had affected the country’s position relative to its regional 
neighbours. Forward-looking, strategic thinking from the national political 
leadership helped to nurture more awareness of  the neighbourhood. Under 
President Fidel V. Ramos and his security advisor Jose Almonte, there was 
*  David Joel Steinberg, ‘The Philippine-American experience: a historical perspective’, 
presented at the 29 November 1994 dialogue of  the ‘Focus on the Philippines’, a public 
education project of  the Asia Society and the Asian Institute of  Management. Published 
in Focus on the Philippines, New York: Asia Society, 1995, pp. 9–16, quotes at pp. 9, 16.
†  Edilberto C. de Jesus, ‘Welcoming remarks,’ presented at the 29 November 1994 
dialogue of  the ‘Focus on the Philippines’. Published in Focus on the Philippines, pp. 7–8.
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a sense that the old reliance on the US could not continue. They set out 
to resolve enormous infrastructural deficiencies and promote changes in 
the political economy. At home, this involved liberalisation combined with 
attacks on the ‘cartels and monopolies’ of  major oligarchic family firms that 
enjoyed a stranglehold over key segments of  the national economy. In the 
region, there were concerted efforts to promote economic cooperation and 
reduce trade barriers.
It seemed, indeed, as if  the country was moving steadily toward the goal 
of  GOAT. Put in different terms, a delicious stew of  kalderetang kambing 
(goat stew) was on the fire, and delightful aromas were wafting through the 
house and into the neighbourhood.
There were, of  course, huge issues still to be resolved—including a 
system of  oligarchic privilege that was not to be undermined with just one 
concerted push. Closely related, there were resentments over inequitable 
growth, focused in part on a Ramos administration ‘social reform agenda’ 
that yielded few concrete benefits to those at the bottom end of  deeply 
entrenched socioeconomic divides. The country was hobbled, moreover, by 
a bureaucracy lacking the capacity to effectively implement national policies. 
The effort to introduce new-style economics had been accomplished 
almost entirely with old-style politics—notably heavy reliance on the pork 
barrel—and there had been almost no effort to accompany economic 
reform with complementary measures of  political reform. Driven by the 
imperatives of  electoral financing in a patronage-based political system, the 
Ramos administration was not immune to scandal. The search for fruitful 
political alliances produced compromises with a host of  unsavoury allies. 
And we should not forget that the ‘modernisation’ of  wholesale electoral 
manipulation can be traced in large part to the sophisticated dagdag-bawas 
(vote augmentation and shaving) efforts of  administration allies in the 1995 
mid-term elections. In the south, one portion of  the Muslim secessionist 
struggle (the Moro National Liberation Front) was tamed by throwing lots 
of  patronage resources their way, but another (the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front) was gaining in strength. Elsewhere, long-standing injustices allowed 
a communist insurgency to simmer away with no real prospect of  either 
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victory or defeat. 
In the external sphere, Ramos sought to re-establish close ties with a US 
military establishment often bitter at how ‘our’ former colony had expelled 
us from ‘our’ bases. In particular, Ramos helped to forge a new Visiting 
Forces Agreement that came to be signed after he had left office. While 
there was general acknowledgement that it was a post-Cold War, post-bases 
world, Ramos was still keen on nurturing close ties with the sole remaining 
superpower. On the one hand, his strategy was not unlike those of  other 
countries in the region, whether Australia or Indonesia or Singapore or 
Japan or Korea. On the other hand, the Philippines was re-establishing ties 
based on a particularly stark asymmetry of  power relations—and within 
the context of  a century-long ‘special relationship’ prone to particular 
sensitivities on both sides.
I focus particular attention on the Ramos years because they constituted 
the last serious top-level effort at ‘Getting Our Act Together’—or even long-
range thinking for that matter. In preparation for this conference, I re-read 
a 1998 essay by Jose Almonte on Philippine foreign policy,* and was struck 
at how no subsequent top administration official would have crafted such a 
lucid document on the Philippines’ long-term strategic interests. Sad to say, 
the past decade has not featured much attention to the task of  ‘Getting Our 
Act Together’, or GOAT.
Moving on to a quick overview, resentment over social inequality helped 
propel Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada to the presidency in 1998, with the slogan 
‘Erap para sa masa’ (Erap for the masses). But it soon became clear that 
Estrada’s real agenda was not to look after the poor, but rather to look 
after his multiple families. There was no strategic thinking in the so-called 
‘midnight cabinet’, the nightly drinking sessions with assorted cronies and 
hangers-on that were often credited with establishing policy directions for 
the administration. With the Visiting Forces Agreement in place, Estrada 
was treated to a trip to Washington. The movie star became star-struck, 
*  Jose T. Almonte, ‘New directions and priorities in Philippine foreign relations’, in The 
Philippines: New Directions in Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations, David G. Timberman 
(ed.), New York: Asia Society, 1998, pp. 137–54.
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absolutely giddy to be in the shadow of  Bill Clinton. In fact, the entire 
spectacle seemed to have more in common with the spring break visit of  
a Kansas high-school kid to the nation’s capital than the state visit of  the 
president of  the 12th most-populous country in the world. It was not exactly 
the ‘genuinely adult relationship’ that Steinberg had hoped would emerge at 
century’s end.
When Estrada was brought down by a gambling scandal, and ‘People 
Power II’ put Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) in the palace 
in January 2001, many had high hopes that GOAT would be back on the 
agenda. Indeed, some of  us could almost taste the kalderetang kambing that we 
thought was on the way. There was certainly every indication that reforms 
were needed, as demonstrated most dramatically by ‘People Power III’ over 
May Day 2001—when urban poor masses, angry over treatment of  Estrada 
and spurred on by Estrada’s supporters, nearly breached the gates of  the 
presidential palace. Time and again for the past eight years, however, reform 
imperatives have been crowded out by regime preservation. GMA very 
effectively wields the substantial powers of  the presidency to keep herself  in 
office, and in the process she exhibits no qualms about further undermining 
the country’s already weak political institutions.
A crisis-ridden polity has been pummelled by one crisis after another, 
adding up to what I have elsewhere termed ‘the Arroyo imbroglio’. In 
addition to the uprising on May Day 2001, these crises have included a 
botched military mutiny in July 2003; corruption scandals involving the first 
family; allegations of  presidential involvement in fixing the 2004 elections; a 
failed coup-attempt-cum-popular-uprising in February 2006 that led to the 
declaration of  emergency rule; concerted attacks on the press; an alarming 
spike in extrajudicial killings; annual impeachment attempts since 2005; two 
major bribery scandals in late 2007, one involving the chief  election officer 
and, the other, brazen cash payouts to congresspersons and governors at 
the palace; a November 2007 bombing at the House of  Representatives 
that killed a notorious warlord congressman from Mindanao; an incident 
the same month in which junior officers barricaded themselves at a luxury 
Manila hotel in protest against the Arroyo administration; and, in late 
Philippines 249
2008, renewed conflict between the government and secessionist groups in 
Mindanao.
In 15 months, presuming no further schemes of  regime preservation 
intervene, there should be a new inhabitant in the palace. Will the goal of  
GOAT once again come to the fore? I do not know. It is obvious, however, 
that the country faces huge challenges on many fronts. Let me just mention 
three: one economic, one strategic and one environmental.
It is difficult not to be concerned about the extremely narrow base of  the 
Philippine economy, dependent as it is on just one major crop: the export of  
labour. The economy has been moving along at a respectable pace, thanks 
in large part to remittances, and let’s hope they remain high. But narrow 
reliance on one commodity is highly risky, especially in the context of  the 
global economic crisis.
Second, there are the challenges of  protecting territorial integrity, both 
low-intensity intrusions of  fishing vessels and the possibility—hopefully 
slim—of  conflict in the Spratlys. Other contributors to this conference have 
already addressed these challenges with admirable insight, and I will not 
attempt any further analysis.
Third, I want to focus on the grave threat posed to the Philippines by 
climate change—particularly given the relative lack of  attention to issues 
of  environmental security in other presentations at this conference.* For 
six reasons, the Philippines is particularly vulnerable to anticipated patterns 
of  global warming and rising sea levels. First, it is the fifth-largest country 
in the world in terms of  kilometres of  coastline. Second, it ranks third, 
behind India and China, in the number of  people living in the one-meter 
low-elevation coastal zone (roughly 15 million persons). Third and fourth, 
it has two additional characteristics that the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change associates with particular vulnerability to climate change: 
high susceptibility to extreme weather events (as one of  the most natural 
disaster-prone countries in the world) and an economy ‘closely linked 
with climate-sensitive resources such as agriculture’. Fifth, the country has 
*  This section draws on Paul D. Hutchcroft, ‘The Philippines’, in Climate Change and 
Regional Security, Daniel Moran (ed.), forthcoming 2010.
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already, in recent decades, experienced severe levels of  prior environmental 
degradation:
 • Forest cover has declined from 70 per cent to 19 per cent of   
  total land across the twentieth century.
 • Mangroves have been reduced by almost 75 per cent from 1920  
  to the end of  the century.
 • Ninety-five per cent of  coral reefs have some degree of   
  degradation, with one-third in poor condition. 
 • Philippine urban areas are under mounting stress, with major  
  infrastructural deficiencies in water, sewage and drainage,  
  transportation and pollution control.
Sixth and finally, long-standing deficiencies in political and administrative 
structures pose major obstacles to confronting the challenges ahead—
whether it be ongoing issues of  environmental degradation or future 
projections of  climate change.
Coping with these threats demands a very carefully considered program 
of  reform, with the goal of  helping the country prepare for the enormous 
challenges ahead. Institutional reform of  political structures needs to be 
crafted with the goal of  nurturing a polity more oriented to the long-term 
public good and less oriented to the short-term goals of  the patronage system. 
Administrative structures need to be freed from the constraints of  the spoils 
system, and incentives go beyond mere responsiveness to the particularistic 
demands of  dominant elites and toward more effective implementation 
of  public policy. With greater bureaucratic capacity in place, creative new 
policy measures must be implemented toward the goal of  reversing the 
myriad causes of  environmental degradation. Civil society groups have long 
articulated the urgency of  change, but the country has lacked the political 
and administrative structures able to bring forth a coherent program of  
environmental restoration.
There are many reasons why advocates of  reform have articulated the 
need for their country to begin ‘Getting Our Act Together’. Climate change 
forces the issue. If  the Philippines is to begin to confront the mounting 
environmental dangers that lie ahead, a concerted and well-considered 
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program of  political and administrative reform is a necessary first step.
In conclusion, I will return to the broader theme of  Philippine foreign 
policy. If  the Philippines fails in the task of  GOAT, the country will be 
unable to achieve its national goals on its own terms. The Philippines will 
be increasingly dependent on other countries and increasingly beholden to 
external involvement as it seeks to resolve a host of  challenges in the spheres 
of  the economy, traditional security and environmental security. In assisting 
the Philippines, these other countries can be expected to pursue their own 
economic and political and security goals. Not infrequently, these interests 





Thailand’s human rights challenges
Harry Nicolaides was herded, shackled, into a Bangkok holding cell on 
Monday. After a short trial, he was sentenced to three years in prison for the 
contents of  a single paragraph. The Melbourne author’s crime was to write 
a short passage referring to the private life of  Thailand’s crown prince in a 
self-published novel that sold only 10 copies.
He was sentenced under Thailand’s draconian lèse majesté law, which 
forbids any frank discussion of  the royal family. In the wake of  the 
conviction, he threw himself  on the mercy of  the very people he was accused 
of  offending, petitioning the palace for a royal pardon.
On Wednesday, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that the Thai army 
had—on two separate occasions—pushed about 1,000 Burmese boat 
people back into international waters. The refugees were escaping from the 
Published as ‘Rights abuse? You wouldn’t read about it’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 January 
2009.
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Burmese regime’s persecution of  ethnic minorities. Over 500 are now said 
to be dead or missing.
The Thai military stands accused of  detaining the refugees, beating and 
whipping them, before setting them adrift without motors or sufficient food 
and water. The government in Bangkok says it has launched an investigation, 
while the local army commander denied the accusations, arguing his men 
gave the refugees provisions and ‘helped them on their way’.
Thailand’s human rights reputation has taken a battering. These two 
incidents represent a serious challenge for the new Prime Minister, Abhisit 
Vejjajiva, who says he is determined to restore his country’s reputation after 
last year’s political turmoil.
His government came to power a month ago, in the wake of  the dramatic 
occupation of  Bangkok’s international airport by protesters determined to 
overthrow the previous government. The protesters crippled Thailand’s 
lucrative tourism industry and shredded its long-cultivated image as a 
foreigner-friendly destination.
Abhisit presents himself  as an urbane and modern leader (and Oxford 
educated to boot), one who can guide Thailand through the international 
financial crisis, restore the rule of  law and repair the country’s damaged 
image.
But the Harry Nicolaides case and the humanitarian tragedy of  the 
Burmese boat people are not isolated incidents that can be easily dealt 
with by public relations spin. They relate directly to the role of  two of  the 
country’s most powerful institutions, the monarchy and the army, both of  
which helped bring Abhisit to power.
The new government has placed protecting the monarchy’s reputation at 
the top of  its political agenda. Heightened political divisions over the past 
few years have generated increasing local and international comment about 
the political role of  the royal family. There is unprecedented discussion 
about the palace’s support for the campaign waged by the so-called People’s 
Alliance for Democracy (PAD) against Thailand’s former government, 
which was democratically elected in December 2007.
The Economist suggested—in a now infamous article—that the Thai king 
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had ‘lost faith in democracy’ by endorsing a series of  military coups during 
his reign and remaining silent throughout last year while the ultra-royalist 
PAD campaigned to overthrow an elected government.
Forbes magazine encouraged further frank discussion by reporting that 
the king was the world’s richest royal, with assets worth US$35 billion, 
while Thai internet bulletin boards regularly feature barely coded antiroyal 
comments that are especially critical of  the queen, given her open support 
for the PAD’s campaign.
There has been a vigorous royalist backlash to this outbreak of  free speech. 
The Ministry of  Information and Communication Technology has tried to 
block thousands of  websites that carry material on the royal family; army 
units have been ordered to monitor the internet for inappropriate content; 
and ordinary citizens have been encouraged to report antiroyal comments 
to local police.
There is no doubting the seriousness of  this crackdown: a political 
activist was sentenced to six years in prison for criticising the king at a public 
rally, while another is in prison awaiting trial and facing the prospect of  an 
even heavier sentence. Just this week came another charge of  lèse majesté. 
An academic at a prestigious Thai university was charged because eight 
paragraphs in his book about the military coup in September 2006 referred 
to the political influence of  the king.
Harry Nicolaides was in the wrong place at the wrong time, caught up in 
a campaign of  good old fashioned political repression. It is clear the Thai 
government is willing to sacrifice freedom of  speech for protection of  the 
image of  the royal family.
But how will it respond to human rights abuses perpetrated by the 
army? The gravity of  the charges in relation to the Burmese boat people, 
plus ongoing international scrutiny, should prompt firm action against the 
perpetrators. But this is far from inevitable, as there are much bigger political 
issues involved.
The extent of  military influence within the current government is not 
clear, but Abhisit certainly owes his commanders big favours. Abhisit’s path 
to the prime ministership goes back to the 2006 coup, which overthrew 
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Thaksin Shinawatra’s populist government and sent him into exile.
The military-controlled government which followed put in place a new 
constitution, complete with provisions that could be used to undermine a 
pro-Thaksin government if  one was to regain power, which is exactly what 
happened in December 2007 at the first post-coup election.
The newly elected government had to live with judicial interference and 
speculation about another military coup for much of  its short life. Its fate 
was sealed when the army refused to move on PAD protestors who occupied 
Government House and, later, the international airport.
The army chief  even took the extraordinary step of  calling on Abhisit’s 
predecessor, Somchai Wongsawat, to resign during the airport crisis. When 
the ruling party was finally dissolved by Thailand’s Constitutional Court, the 
army chief  played a key role in persuading government politicians to defect 
to Abhisit’s camp, giving him the numbers to win the parliamentary vote for 
prime minister.
The army is a powerful political player, and Abhisit can be expected 
to come under pressure not to expose it to undesirable domestic and 
international scrutiny. There is no lèse majesté law that can be called upon 
to cover up the reports of  refugee mistreatment, but already he seems to be 
laying the groundwork for a minimalist investigation, suggesting that media 
coverage of  the incident may be exaggerated and that eyewitnesses may 
have misunderstood what they were seeing. And so far Abhisit has refused 
to give United Nations officials access to other Burmese boat people being 
held in Thailand.
The brutal dirty work against the unfortunate refugees is alleged to 
have been done by the Internal Security Operations Command, a military 
unit dating from Thailand’s fight against communist insurgents during the 
Cold War. It was given expanded powers after the 2006 coup, and its broad 
national security brief  may grant it protection from close scrutiny.
But whatever the outcome of  the investigation, the incident is the latest 
in the army’s very patchy human rights record. There is a well-documented 
history of  forced repatriation of  refugees by army units. And in the 
southern Muslim provinces, the army’s heavy-handed response to low-level 
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insurgency has compounded local grievances and strengthened the cause of  
antigovernment elements.
In 2004, there were two notorious cases of  military brutality. In April, 
28 militants were killed when the army stormed the highly sacred Krue Se 
mosque after a poorly managed siege. One of  the commanders involved in 
the killings at Krue Se, Colonel Manat Kongpan, is now accused of  leading 
the recent push-back action against the Burmese boat people. In October 
2004, about 80 protesters suffocated when they were detained and stacked 
like logs in army trucks for a three-hour journey to a military base.
No one has been punished for these incidents, which took place under 
the watch of  Thaksin Shinawatra, the champion of  the notorious ‘war on 
drugs’, an operation which claimed over 2,000 lives in a nationwide spree of  
extrajudicial killings.
Abhisit is undoubtedly keen to distance his administration from the 
excesses of  the Thaksin era. So far, despite some hitches, he has succeeded 
in presenting a positive image to the international community. After the 
political turmoil of  the past year, his leadership holds out the attractive 
prospect of  stability, perhaps even reconciliation.
But unless his government is willing to expose both the monarchy and 
the military to internationally acceptable standards of  scrutiny, critique and 
accountability, his human rights credibility will be compromised and he will 
bear a heavy burden of  repression.
Murderous military brutality cannot go unpunished, especially when 
writing a paragraph about the private life of  a prince in an unread book 
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Thailand’s royal subplot
When Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva launched his crack-down on 
red-shirt protesters on Sunday night, one of  his first acts was to post army 
units around Chitralada Palace, the Bangkok residence of  Thailand’s king. 
It was a routine security measure but, in the current climate, it was an act 
rich in symbolism. No one imagines that the red-shirts posed any immediate 
threat to the security of  the king, but Thailand’s supreme institution is being 
inexorably drawn into battles about who should legitimately run the country. 
As the political heat increases, Thailand is edging ever closer to open public 
debate about the political role of  the monarchy.
The latest impetus has come from ‘phone-ins’ by exiled former Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who was overthrown in the coup of  September 
2006. In a series of  speeches that helped to galvanise his red-shirted 
supporters, Thaksin launched direct attacks on the king’s Privy Council. 
He specifically targeted Privy Council power brokers Prem Tinsulanonda 
and Surayud Chulanont, accusing them of  orchestrating the military coup 
against his former government. His brazen words transformed persistent 
rumour about high-level royalist plotting into front-page news and motivated 
thousands of  red-shirts to lay siege to the house of  Privy Council president 
Prem, before descending on Pattaya to disrupt the East Asia Summit.
In the current turmoil, why do Prem and Surayud matter? They matter 
because they are two of  the most influential men in Thailand, regarded as 
national statesmen and moral guardians. Prem is a former commander-
in-chief  of  the army and ruled as prime minister from 1980 until 1988, 
cementing his place as a favourite of  the king with the defeat of  the 
First posted on Inside Story, http://inside.org.au/thailands-royal-sub-plot/, 14 April 2009; 
revised as ‘Sacrosanct no longer’, Canberra Times, 18 April 2009.
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Communist Party of  Thailand. Surayud was Prem’s protégé. He went on to 
be supreme commander of  the Royal Thai Armed Forces and was appointed 
prime minister by the September 2006 coup-makers. Both Prem and Surayud 
were unelected prime ministers; both have held top military command and 
both are now members of  the king’s Privy Council. Thaksin’s direct attack 
on men of  such status and authority represented a significant escalation in 
Thailand’s ongoing political conflict. But most ominous is that in attacking 
these prominent royal advisors Thaksin took a step closer to an attack on 
the monarchy itself. Thaksin’s fighting words gave the red-shirt campaign a 
republican tinge.
The nightmare for Prem, Surayud and others in the royalist elite is that 
decades of  careful media management and ostentatious good works could 
start to unravel at a moment when the monarchy is facing an uncertain 
future. King Bhumibol Adulyadej is 81-years old and his health is fragile. 
Inevitably, even amidst the ongoing political chaos, his likely successor, 
Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, is receiving extra scrutiny. The prince is an 
unpopular and divisive figure who has failed to tap into the reservoir of  
charisma and auspiciousness that his father has built up during his 62-year 
reign. Many feel that the king’s younger daughter, Princess Sirindhorn, would 
be a more appropriate heir. The privy councillors are naturally worried that 
the monarchy is being drawn into the political mêlée during a period of  royal 
vulnerability and lingering uncertainty about the succession.
The last time the royal institution faced such a potentially hazardous 
set of  circumstances was in 1932 when the absolute monarch, King 
Prajadhipok, was forced to accept constitutional constraint. In that decisive 
year, Thailand’s king was called to account by a group of  non-royals who 
demanded that he relinquish total control. Back then, the modernising drive 
of  former kings had left many in the Thai elite with a conviction that a more 
democratic government was required. The old feudal order was no longer 
appropriate; it would only be allowed to remain as a more minor part of  the 
political landscape. Absolute rule had come to an end.
Over the years and decades that followed, an uneasy compromise was 
established between the people, the military and the palace. The military 
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governments that held sway for so much of  the twentieth century ultimately 
saw the benefits of  maintaining a highly respected royal figurehead. King 
Bhumibol, who ascended to the throne as a very young man in 1946, grew 
into a role that was cultivated for him by statesmen and power brokers, 
men like Prem and Surayud. Successive governments that sought to foster 
national integration and economic development found it useful to deploy 
the monarch as a central unifying symbol. As Bhumibol grew into his role 
and consolidated his influence, he came to assume a supreme moral stature. 
He is now Thailand’s pre-eminent national figure and a powerful ally of  
every government that enjoys his favour.
Many have speculated that the Thaksin government did not enjoy such 
royal favour. Thaksin’s enemies accused him of  undermining the position 
of  the monarch. His CEO-style leadership, combined with unprecedented 
electoral support, presented a stark contrast with the ceremony, tradition and 
patronage of  the palace. The king has been long regarded as a champion of  
Thailand’s poor through his well-funded and high-profile rural development 
projects. However, Thaksin’s populist economic policies, which pumped 
money directly into every village in the country, dwarfed the king’s royal 
munificence.
For most Thais there was no inconsistency in supporting both Thaksin 
and the king. Thailand’s masses readily accepted that two styles of  leadership 
and charity could exist side by side. After all, the popular Thai cosmos is full 
of  all sorts of  power and influence. Purists may lament the mix of  spirit 
belief, Buddhism and consumerism that pervades Thai popular culture, but 
most Thais celebrate the varied ways in which power and potency can be 
expressed. In this culturally tolerant framework, Thaksin’s modernism could 
blend readily with royal traditionalism.
But Thailand’s elite is not so conceptually adroit. For them, hardening 
of  the categories of  authority set in long ago. They see power as a zero-
sum game. In their besieged world-view, mass electoral support for Thaksin, 
and his personal adoration among the country’s poor, threatened the pre-
eminent symbolic power of  royalty. Something had to be done. The coup of  
19 September 2006 was their answer.
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Thaksin has yet to reveal detailed evidence of  how privy councillors Prem 
and Surayud plotted against him, but there is no doubt that the 2006 coup 
had a strong royalist flavour. The plotters decided to wrap yellow ribbons 
around the gun barrels of  the tanks that rolled onto Bangkok’s streets and 
forced Thaksin out of  office and into exile. Yellow is the colour of  the king. 
The yellow ribbons were a clever short-term strategy for winning popular 
support in Bangkok, but the colour coding has now backfired badly. The 
image of  royal support for the coup has done more than anything else to 
generate critical domestic and international discussion about the way in which 
the power, charisma and symbolism of  the palace is deployed to support 
authoritarian tendencies in modern Thai politics. The rapturous celebration 
of  the king’s 80th birthday in 2007 was not completely overshadowed by 
the coup and its aftermath, but increasing discussion of  royal ambivalence 
about democracy was an unwelcome distraction at the party.
This critical discussion has been building for some time. In 2006, 
journalist Paul Handley published an unauthorised biography of  Bhumibol, 
The King Never Smiles. It is a landmark exploration of  the creation of  royal 
imagery and the king’s entanglement in six decades of  Thai political life. It 
paints an unflattering picture of  a monarch who has consistently backed 
military intervention into the political sphere. The King Never Smiles is, 
without doubt, the most important book published on Thailand in the past 
decade, if  not longer. It took a journalist to venture where academics feared 
to tread. The book was banned in Thailand (by Thaksin himself) but it can 
be readily ordered from online bookshops, scanned chapters are available 
on the internet, and some parts have been subversively translated into Thai. 
Handley’s royal revelations generated an unprecedented flurry of  Thai web-
board chatter that continues to reverberate today.
Another small stepping stone towards frank discussion of  the monarchy 
was the International Conference on Thai Studies held at Bangkok’s 
Thammasat University in January 2008. The conference was attended by 
over 600 academics, journalists and students from Thailand and overseas. 
There had been calls for an international boycott of  the royally sponsored 
conference in the wake of  the royally sponsored coup. Instead, senior 
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academics organised a series of  presentations that examined the contemporary 
role of  the monarchy. Scholars critically discussed royal business interests, 
the appropriateness of  the king’s rural development theories and the 
extraordinary legal protections provided to the royal reputation. The best-
attended session was a panel discussion of  Paul Handley’s The King Never 
Smiles. It would be academic narcissism to suggest that the conference was 
an important turning point in Thai public life, but it provided some support 
and encouragement for those in Thailand who are working towards a more 
mature public discussion of  royal power. It was a sufficiently important event 
to attract the attention of  Thai special branch officers who were diligent 
observers in the most controversial sessions.
But it has been much less academic action that has prompted the most 
severe reaction and created the most negative publicity for Thailand’s king. In 
December 2006, a Swiss national, Oliver Jufer, was arrested in the northern 
city of  Chiang Mai for defacing a poster of  the royal family because he could 
not buy an alcoholic beverage on the king’s birthday. Jufer’s juvenile graffiti 
earned him a 10-year prison sentence under Thailand’s draconian lèse majesté 
law. He received a royal pardon after spending only four months in prison 
but, in the meantime, the case generated a virulent wave of  online material 
mocking the king. The Thai government responded by blocking the entire 
YouTube website. In August last year, Australian author Harry Nicolaides 
was arrested for writing a single paragraph about the crown prince in a self-
published novel that sold only a handful of  copies in Thailand. Nicolaides 
was sentenced to three years in prison, but he too received a royal pardon 
after being locked up for six months. Nicolaides’s fate didn’t produce as 
much online vitriol as Jufer’s case but it increased international disquiet 
about the use of  the anachronistic lèse majesté law.
It is unfortunate, but inevitable, that lèse majesté charges against 
foreigners generate the most international media attention. As the political 
heat has steadily increased, the law has been used against dissident voices 
within Thailand. Two political activists who made antiroyal comments at 
political rallies have been locked up—one sentenced to six years, the other 
still awaiting trial. A warrant has been issued for the arrest of  an academic 
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from one of  Thailand’s most prestigious universities who fled to England 
after being charged for writing about the role of  the king in the 2006 coup. 
Most recently, in an instance of  bizarre excess, a 10-year sentence was 
handed down to internet user Suwicha Thakor for posting ‘digitally altered’ 
images of  the king. These cases of  repression have prompted a call by over a 
hundred international academics for reform or abolition of  the lèse majesté 
law. In response, the Thai government has merely said that it will make sure 
the law is implemented properly. There have even been calls from within the 
government for harsher punishments. Royalist commentators have made 
the predictable charge that international academics do not understand how 
deeply Thais revere their king.
One of  the reasons why the current Thai government is reluctant to change 
the lèse majesté law is because it is thoroughly indebted to royalist forces for 
bringing it to power. Last year royal yellow hit the streets of  Bangkok again 
when the so-called People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) campaigned for 
the overthrow of  the pro-Thaksin government that had been elected in the 
post-coup election of  December 2007. The ‘yellow-shirts’ didn’t accept the 
result of  that election and were determined to erase any vestiges of  Thaksin’s 
influence from the political scene. They occupied Government House for 
three months, besieged the parliament and then, in an act of  supreme 
provocation, closed down Thailand’s international airport for a week. Even 
though they called themselves the People’s Alliance for Democracy, they 
argued that parliament should be predominantly appointed rather than 
elected. This antidemocratic campaign was waged unashamedly under the 
royal banner, with yellow shirts the uniform of  choice and images of  the 
king and the queen prominently displayed at their increasingly provocative 
rallies. ‘We will fight for the king’ was their battle-cry. They claimed to be 
defending the monarchy against corrupt pro-Thaksin politicians.
The king himself  chose to remain silent about the use of  his royal brand 
in the yellow-shirts’ campaign. His silence could, perhaps, be justified by 
the old cliché that Thailand’s royals sit above politics. But the cliché was 
shattered when the queen appeared at the funeral of  a PAD protestor, killed 
in a violent confrontation with police in early October 2008. With this single 
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act, Queen Sirikit placed the monarchy’s immersion in politics on full public 
display and added force to the rumours that the yellow-shirted PAD had 
backing, and personal connections, at the highest level. The images of  the 
queen standing shoulder to shoulder with political thugs who were trying 
to engineer the forcible overthrow of  a democratically elected government 
were deeply disconcerting for many Thais.
Ultimately the pro-Thaksin government was removed from office. It 
was weakened by the relentless street campaign against it, discredited by 
the refusal of  the military to enforce its emergency decrees or clear the 
airport occupation and ultimately killed by a Constitutional Court ruling that 
dissolved the ruling party and expelled 28 government members from the 
parliament. In December 2008, Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of  the Democrat 
Party, was able to cobble together a parliamentary majority with the help of  
the defection of  some of  Thaksin’s former buddies.
Thaksin is in exile, his allies have been forced out of  government, and the 
red-shirts now face the wrath of  Thailand’s security apparatus. But Thaksin 
remains a potent political force in Thailand. His increasingly inflammatory 
‘phone-ins’ are tapping into feelings of  anger towards the hitherto hidden 
forces that helped engineer the 2006 coup and the unelected rise to power 
of  current Prime Minister Abhisit. The explicit targets of  his campaign 
are the two named privy councillors. But this is code for something much 
more significant. Thaksin has gone to considerable lengths to declare his 
unwavering loyalty to the king, but he can now see political benefit in 
attacking royalist elitism, backroom power broking and the way in which 
royal power—real and symbolic—has been used to undermine electoral 
mandates. The strategy has been instrumental in galvanising the red-shirts in 
their high-stakes campaign against Abhisit’s government. With Thaksin and 
his red-shirted masses on a collision course not just with the government, but 
also with the Privy Council, the ‘royal institution’ itself  is now uncomfortably 
close to the heat of  political battle.
When the smoke clears, there will, of  course, be vigorous attempts to put 
the royal genie back into its gilded and apolitical bottle. Legal restrictions on 
royal commentary will be enforced with increasing gusto. Thais who dare 
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speak up about the country’s political realities will face the risk of  heavy 
legal sanctions. International commentators calling for free speech will be 
vilified as cultural imperialists seeking to impose western values on the loyal 
subjects of  the Thai king. But these attempts to impose silence won’t work 
because each clamp-down on royal discussion generates yet another, more 
penetrating, round of  debate, speculation and, in some cases, irreverence.
With or without Thaksin’s latest provocations, and whatever the ultimate 
fate of  the red-shirts, the extraordinary events of  the past few years mean 






So, the result is in and the huge wave of  excitement about Obama continues 
to roll across America and the world. What should we expect about his 
approach to Asia—both for relations with the big Asian states and multilateral 
engagement?
The first thing is to recognise that the crisis in the global financial system, 
the challenge of  restoring economic confidence at home, the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and the challenge of  climate change are all higher on his agenda 
than focusing on America’s engagement with Asia. And this is as it should be. 
But questions about America’s engagement with Asia will be in the mix of  
other major issues that receives attention—it can’t be otherwise. Of  course 
the team of  top officials Obama ultimately appoints will make an important 
difference to his administration’s approach to Asia, but my reading of  his 
approach and instincts suggests some interesting adjustments in emphasis.
Posted on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 6 November 2008.
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The most conspicuous of  these relates to India. I expect India will 
receive increased attention. Above all, its vibrant democracy and traditions 
of  robust cultural pluralism will attract him to it. The potential for India to 
buttress American interests in Afghanistan and Iraq and to counterbalance 
China’s rise will reinforce this. All of  these factors lead me to expect an 
intensified drive for engagement with India. I do not expect major change in 
America’s approach to China. Two overarching factors are likely to continue 
to dominate: he will have growing need for China’s cooperation on economic 
matters and he will be unable to escape the inexorable challenge of  China’s 
growing geopolitical weight for American strategic interests. Beyond this, his 
instincts will be to reach out to social, economic and political reformers in 
China—to the extent circumstances in China afford opportunities for this.
Indonesia is an intriguing case. Although he has said very little about this 
during the campaign, there are indications that his time in Indonesia has 
strongly positive associations for him. His willingness to make time during 
the presidential campaign for personal meetings with private Indonesian 
citizens, who knew his mother from her years there, offers a small window 
onto this dimension of  his background. Published and private accounts 
suggest Indonesia carries very positive associations and experiences of  
cultural pluralism. This is unlikely to have major consequences for America’s 
approach to Indonesia, but it could lead to efforts to ensure a particularly 
capable envoy is chosen as Ambassador and a heightened interest in engaging 
with Indonesia.
But the most interesting bilateral question, I think, will centre on Obama 
and Japan. Obama appears to have no significant connection to or affinity for 
Japan. His political instincts are unlikely to lead him to place the same heavy 
emphasis on Japan’s importance as an ally as Bush. And Japan is unlikely to 
put itself  forward as a strong, active partner on the international issues that 
matter most for him. While I don’t expect any conspicuous change here, I 
would not be surprised if  there is a subtle easing in American prioritisation 
of  Japan.
Finally, Obama’s interest in rebuilding America’s international image and 
relationships will almost certainly lead to a renewed emphasis on multilateral 
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engagements. I would not be at all surprised if—as part of  this general 
orientation—he finds Kevin Rudd’s Asia-Pacific community initiative a 
very convenient opportunity for advancing America’s collective engagement 
with Asia. There is a strong chance of  multiple interests coinciding on that 




Asians are now proud Americans too
There has been no American presidential election in my lifetime that has 
been watched with such intense and partisan interest internationally as the 
election that has just swept Barack Obama into the White House. Through 
the prism of  the new technologies we’ve watched the detail of  Obama’s rise 
and rise and his eventual triumph over John McCain in a way that wasn’t 
possible just four years ago when George W. Bush defeated John Kerry. 
But more remarkable than our access to the contest and his access to power 
through cyber technologies has been our partisanship in the process.
The overwhelming majority in almost every constituency around the globe 
pumped for Obama’s success. President Obama has passed historic muster 
before the American electorate and, if  the polls are to be believed, would 
have been elected even more resoundingly by a global constituency, from 
China to France and assuredly here in Australia where the latest Nielsen poll 
suggests that 73 per cent of  the electorate would have voted for Obama had 
they had a chance. We are all proud Americans now.
Published in Australian Financial Review, 13 November 2008; posted as ‘What Obama means 
for Asia’, East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 5 November 2008.
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Obama’s victory is a triumph of  hope in America’s future and hope for 
America’s positive role in world affairs. Obama brings hope with expectation 
of  change.
McCain and Obama both would have brought hope for America in 
Asia. Though in very different ways, Asia was part of  both men’s formative 
experience and is an important element in their world view and international 
strategic priorities. There are many in Asia, like Prime Minister Taro Aso 
in Japan who, despite his current and intense East Asian diplomatic 
initiatives, might have preferred a McCain victory. McCain’s idea of  a ‘league 
of  democracies’ might have provided an instrument to keep China more 
comfortably at bay and his more hawkish foreign policy positions might 
have provided a surer guarantee of  Northeast Asian security. But the 
main current in policy thinking, in Japan and throughout the rest of  Asia, 
rejects this exclusivist thinking on China, embraces President-elect Obama’s 
assessment of  the limits to America’s hard power in the Middle East and, like 
him, puts trust in the rebuilding of  soft American power through regional 
and multilateral engagement.
The rejection of  McCain, and the election of  Obama, is a rejection of  
the Bush administration’s legacy at home and abroad—a damaged economy, 
diminished standing in world affairs and the continuing quagmire in the 
Middle East.
For Asia, Obama’s victory represents a chance to wipe the slate clean 
on all of  that and for America to bolster its standing and influence in the 
region and the world. In Asia, that is what the overwhelming majority 
wants, as palpably in China as (exquisitely) in Indonesia or in Australia. A 
stronger America that commands respect for its openness, its democracy, its 
generosity, its election of  the first African-American president is why Asia, 
too, voted in its heart for Obama. Asia and the world need such an America 
more than ever it did.
So it’s back to business as usual? Not at all.
The change in the structure of  economic and political power in Asia and 
the Pacific, the management of  the global economic system, the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, the problem of  climate change: all require nothing less 
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than a historic shift in the paradigm of  dealings between America and the 
rest of  the world. Only a paradigm shift will allow the international public 
goods to be put in place that might address these problems. Across this 
range of  issues, there are no ideas and strategies that yet dominate thinking 
or show the path towards international consensus. There is an undercurrent 
of  hope that President-elect Obama understands the need for a paradigm 
shift. But what kind of  new paradigm is a question to which both America 
and the rest of  the world have yet to parse an answer.
There are bound to be disappointments, frustrations and impatience as 
soon as the new administration gets down to work. Even on the Group 
of  Twenty (G20) meetings which President Bush has convened in America 
next week to frame solutions to the urgent problem of  instability in the 
global economic system, President-elect Obama has stood back: there can 
only be one president at a time, he cautioned. Not everybody’s expectations 
will be met in all respects and dimensions.
But in the enterprise that he has inherited, the new American president 
has an incredible bank of  international and Asian goodwill on which he may 
draw in forging, in cooperative partnership, the new institutions in Asia and 
the Pacific, and globally, that are needed for dealing with the problems of  
our time.




Under Obama, realism ain’t so realistic any more
George W. Bush has bequeathed to President Obama two unwinnable wars, 
a global financial crisis, problems of  nuclear proliferation in North Korea 
and Iran, and a record of  doing nothing about climate change.
When the president invites advice from his experts about how to deal with 
these problems inherited from Bush, he will find that most of  his foreign 
relations advisors are practitioners of  realism, by far the most popular 
paradigm for strategic thinkers and policymakers.
The problem is that realism, as a way of  understanding the world and 
making it comprehensible, will not help very much, because it is based on 
three fundamental assumptions that no longer hold true. Obama will have 
to look elsewhere for advice.
Realism, as a paradigm of  international relations, assumes that the world 
is (more or less) anarchy; that the most important actors are states; and that 
those states will struggle for survival in a dog-eat-dog world, relying mainly 
on strategies of  self-help and calculations of  zero-sum games.
But this is not how the world of  the twenty-first century is working out. 
And as Thomas Kuhn observed years ago, the best evidence of  impending 
paradigm change is an accumulation of  anomalies, events that cannot be 
explained by the orthodox way of  thinking. Realism is confronting an 
increasing number of  these anomalies.
First, the world is not anarchic. While it is true that there is still no 
authoritative world government with the power to enforce its decisions, 
relations among nations are nevertheless far from anarchic. Economic 
interdependence, advanced means of  communication and transportation, 
Posted on East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/, 3 June 2009.
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and international institutions like the United Nations and the World 
Trade Organization, have transformed international relations in ways that 
profoundly alter calculations of  cost-benefit and national interest.
Moreover, in an anarchic world, inter-state warfare is common, but in 
today’s world, the incidence and expected gains of  war among states have 
sharply decreased. At the same time, the perceived benefits of  state-to-
state cooperation have increased. If  there were any doubts about how 
interconnected our world had actually become, the current financial crisis 
has demonstrated our interdependence in a devastating way.
Second, realism assumes that international relations can be explained 
simply by focusing on state behaviour. For realists, the state is the basic unit 
of  analysis. But how can you explain 9/11 in terms of  state behaviour? Or 
the global financial crisis, labelled by many analysts as the greatest security 
threat of  our time?
The basic concept of  state sovereignty, a cornerstone of  orthodox 
thinking, has also come under attack. Kofi Annan, when he was United 
Nations Secretary-General, spoke of  ‘two concepts of  sovereignty’, the state 
and the individual, in a world in which ‘states are now widely understood 
to be instruments at the service of  their peoples, and not vice versa’, and 
he urged that individual sovereignty should be a priority for the United 
Nations.
More recently, the concept of  R2P, the responsibility to protect, claims that 
the international community has the responsibility to intervene to protect 
civilians from major abuse in states that are either unable or unwilling to 
protect their own. Finally, at the same time that state sovereignty has come 
under challenge, multinational corporations, NGOs and other civil society 
actors have played an increasingly influential role in foreign affairs.
The third major assumption in the realist paradigm, self-help, is also being 
challenged. The classic realist interpretation of  the world envisions states 
that operate as isolated individuals in a struggle of  ‘the survival of  the fittest’, 
where each must rely principally on its own wit and capacity. Cooperation 
among states is understood to be motivated mainly by the principle of  ‘the 
enemy of  my enemy is my friend’ or, at best, balance of  power. Today, by 
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contrast, virtually every major world problem appears to require sustained 
cooperation among states, rather than confrontation.
The world has changed. Governments today are responding to a very 
different strategic environment than during the Cold War. Just as, by the 
1960s, it was clear that autarky as an international economic strategy for 
any country was no longer viable (and the price that China had paid for its 
‘self-reliance’ period under Mao was clear evidence of  this), by the turn of  
the century, it had become clear that strategic autarky was no longer viable 
for any state, including the United States. George W. Bush’s adventure in 
unilateralism and the disasters that his administration produced were strong 
evidence that even for the world’s sole superpower, going it alone would not 
work.
Aware of  this fact, President Obama is searching for opportunities to 
cooperate with other states to deal with the immense problems left to him 
by Bush. It is clear that the United States will not be able to resolve any of  
these problems by itself: getting out of  Iraq; reaching a viable solution in 
Afghanistan; dealing with the global financial crisis; handling the nuclear-
weapons challenges by Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea 
(DPRK); or, indeed, climate change.
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